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ABSTRACT 
The central purpose of this thesis is to examine the affinities 
and contrasts in the metaphysical systems of A. N. Whitehead and F. H. 
Bradley. Not only does this thesis aim to explore thoroughly and show 
exactly where these two philosophers agree, it also attempts to provide 
an analysis and evaluation of the arguments where conflict does arise. 
After a brief introduction which sets out Whitehead's and Bradley's 
respective positions on philosophic method and approach to metaphysics, 
Chapter II "Immediate Experience and Feeling ", shows where Whitehead and 
Bradley unite in their reaction against the ontology of scientific 
materialism of the 17th century cosmology. At this point various affinities 
are shown concerning the central role of the doctrine of feeling. But in 
Chapter III "The Analysis of Experience ", Whitehead's interpretation of 
feeling in terms of a distinctive pluralistic ontology is seen to conflict 
with Bradley's doctrine, and thus the stage is set for the central Chapter IV 
"Relations: Internal and External ". In this chapter Whitehead is confronted 
with Bradley's very rigorous and exhaustive analysis of the relational form. 
Despite Bradley's arguments it is here concluded that Whitehead's scheme can 
be shown to be consistent, given various modifications of the pluralist 
ontology in terms of the temporal asymmetry of one -way dependence. In Chapter 
V "Extension and Whole -Part Relations ", an attempt is made to defend the new 
doctrine of event -pluralism against a recent version of the ontology of 
material substance; and it is shown how such an ontology of events can account 
for the physical bodies which make up the system of nature. In the remainder 
of this chapter and the following Chapter VI "Time ", special problems of space 
and time are raised in connection with Whitehead's and Bradley's very 
different conceptions of the extended universe; and various attempts are made 
to defend Whitehead's view of process against an eternalistic view of the 
universe largely consistent with the Bradleian Absolute. However in the 
course of evaluating the arguments, it is discovered that Whitehead's ultimate 
metaphysical position must make certain concessions to the theory of 
eternalism; and this gives rise to the final Chapter VII "God and the 
Absolute ", where it is concluded that Whitehead's God must be seen as an 
'Absolute open at one end'. Here Whitehead and Bradley merge on the notion of 
universal absorption of all finite actualities into one eternal actual entity; 
though Whitehead's conception, in the end, differs in the sense that God is 
not the only real entity, but one divine actuality which is in unison of 
becoming with the whole of creation. 
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PREFACE 
Before my arrival in Britain some three years ago my original 
intention was to write a Whitehead thesis from a British point of view. Under 
the supervision of Professor Timothy Sprigge, I became aware of the importance 
of certain metaphysical issues which bind Whitehead and Bradley into a larger 
genre of philosophical Idealism, and found that the Bradleian influence on 
Whitehead's thought is much greater than most of his followers are willing to 
acknowledge. This thesis therefore attempts to show exactly where Whitehead 
is in accordance with Bradley's doctrines and where he has developed a theory 
which either far exceeds or conflicts with the general principles of Bradley's 
metaphysics. 
Wherever possible equal consideration has been given to both thinkers. 
However, the reader may encounter several sections of this thesis where 
detailed attention has been given to some aspect of Whitehead's philosophy 
which finds no parallel in Bradley. In most cases this is a result of 
Whitehead's attempts to construct a cosmology consistent with the findings of 
20th century physics and biology, and my policy here has been to deal with 
these ideas briefly in order to illuminate their major differences. 
My single most important obligation is to Professor Sprigge for his 
invaluable criticism and friendship during the course in which this work was 
written. His suggested improvements to earlier drafts of these chapters 
have given this thesis a good deal more strength and interest. Also it 
must be mentioned that his own metaphysical system has been a continual source 
of inspiration in a time in which current orthodoxy has been preoccupied with 
issues quite far afield from the mainstream of speculative philosophy. To 
others who have contributed to this work in one way or another, I am greatly 
indebited to Professor Dorothy Emmet and Professor Charles Hartshorne for 
discussions on Whitehead and for faithful correspondence thereafter. Here in 
Edinburgh I owe thanks to Mr. Errol Bedford and Mr. Stanley Eveling for three 
years of postgraduate seminars in which various sorts of philosophical sparring 
have kept me reasonably abreast with contemporary philosophy. And to Timothy 
Engström and John Slepokura, I am most grateful for various suggestions 
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regarding style. 
Parts of chapters III, IV and VI have been published in a paper entitled 
"Time, Relations and Dependence" in The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 
Volume XXI, Number 3, 1983. Section 1 of chapter VI carries the bulk of this 
paper with only slight modifications demanded by the context of the chapter. 
Also throughout this thesis, I have adopted my native American spelling with 
the exception of certain technical terms, (e.g., finite centre of experience). 
I wish to thank three sources which have made this work possible: 
the Faculty of Arts of the University of Edinburgh for a Vans Dunlop Scholar- 
ship in Logic and Metaphysics (1981 -84); the Committee of Vice -Chancellors 
and Principals of the Universities of the United Kingdom for an Overseas 
Research Students Award (1982 -84); and the Board of Trustees of State, 
Institutions of Higher Learning, Jackson, Mississippi for a Professional 
Degree Scholarship (1981 -84). 
Finally, my list of acknowledgments would not be complete without 
mention of my wife, Jo, for her sympathetic encouragement and understanding 
during my preoccupation with this thesis. The experiences which we have 
shared together in Edinburgh have made our European adventure all the more 
vivid and memorable. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Whitehead's Philosophical Influences 
Of the many influences and motivations which coalesce in Alfred North 
Whitehead's philosophy, it would be simply arbitrary to choose one as primary. 
Whitehead's extraordinary breadth expressed in his metaphysics provides a rich 
and fertile ground for many interpretations and comparisons. His serene 
dealings with aesthetics, religion and education have captured the attention 
of philosophers inclined to a more romantic mode of expression; yet at the same 
time his emphasis on precision and clarity through mathematics, logic and 
physics has given him a prominent place in the classic understanding of the 
20th century. But it would be misleading to suggest that Whitehead's 
achievements are appreciated by the majority of philosophers committed to an 
age of analysis and overall distrust of speculative philosophy. The very 
fact that his metaphysics attempts to cover many facets of existence by 
generalizing from our experience will be disturbing to many philosophers. 
Indeed as Victor Lowe rightly remarks: "Whitehead's philosophy has never 
enjoyed the popularity which rewards narrowness ".1 
Whitehead draws upon and synthesizes the most heterogenous thinkers 
and contrasting sources for his final product; yet this procedure must not 
be taken merely as eclecticism. What Whitehead does in his constructive 
synthesis is highly original and innovative to such an extent that most 
positions of earlier philosophers are transformed beyond recognition as they 
are adapted to inclusion in his philosophy. In the preface to his magnum opus, 
Process and Reality, he states that his work is "...based upon a recurrence 
to that phase of philosophic thought which began with Descartes and ended with 
Hume ".2 Locke, he says, most fully anticipated the main positions of his 
'philosophy of organism' and the metaphysical problems raised by Plato and 
Aristotle receive constant attention as Whitehead expressed his hope that his 
work would fall within this European philosophical tradition. Of other 
thinkers who provide a rich source for Whitehead's metaphysics, he mentions 
his debt to Henri Bergson and the American Pragmatists- William James and John 
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Dewey. As for his connections with the realists- T. F. Nunn, Lloyd Morgan and 
Samuel Alexander have several points of contact. George Santayana may also be 
mentioned among the realists with regard to his Scepticism and Animal Faith. 
However, Whitehead's proximity to a seemingly opposite school of thought in 
the distinctively British tradition of Absolute Idealism is the focal point of 
this thesis. In particular the metaphysics of Francis Herbert Bradley, 
recognized as the central exponent of British Absolute Idealism, will be 
considered in detail. 
Although Whitehead is generally regarded as a realist in American 
philosophy, having accepted the Chair of Philosophy at Harvard after his long 
career in mathematics at Cambridge University and philosophy of science at the 
University of London, his relation to Bradley provides an insight into what 
Whitehead himself thought of his final results. This element has certainly 
not been emphasized as an important influence on Whitehead's thought despite 
his explicit obligations to Bradley's work. In one of his very late essays 
he writes: "I admit a very close affiliation with Bradley.... "3 as he explains 
his relations to the Idealist tradition. And in the preface to Process and 
Reality, Whitehead, in a tightly packed statement comparing his own view 
with that of Bradley, gives us a crucial passage from which the present study 
proceeds: 
.though throughout the main body of the work I am 
in sharp disagreement with Bradley, the final outcome is 
after all not so greatly different. I am particularly 
indebted to his chapter on the nature of experience, 
which appears in his Essays on Truth and Reality. His 
insistence on 'feeling' is very consonant with my own 
conclusions. This whole metaphysical position is an 
implicit repudiation of the doctrine of 'vacuous 
actuality'. 
The fifth part is concerned with the final inter- 
pretation of the ultimate way in which the cosmological 
problem is to be conceived. It answers the question, 
What does it all come to? In this part, the approximation 
to Bradley is evident. Indeed, if this cosmology be 
deemed successful, it becomes natural at this point to 
ask whether the type of thought involved be not a 
transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute 
Idealism onto a realistic basis.4 
In this regard the justification for describing Whitehead's metaphysics 
as a 'realistic Idealism' gains its validity when considered in light of the 
affinities and contrasts with the position of F. H. Bradley. 
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2. The Problem of Experience and Relations 
A central problem arises from this synthesis in that Bradley offers 
the most rigorous and exhaustive criticism of metaphysical pluralism of any 
Western philosopher. The theme which Bradley continuously pursues is that 
relations are self- contradictory and therefore cannot belong to the nature of 
ultimate reality. The strength of this argument leads him to the view that a 
plurality of individuals is not possible and that reality must be a non - 
relational one. Whitehead, on the other hand, takes relatedness to be an 
essential character of his 'philosophy of organism' whereby it is within 
the essence of the individual occasion of experience that it enters into 
relationship as an ingredient of process. This problem I take to be the 
fundamental issue of disagreement between Whitehead and Bradley from which 
the title of this thesis, "Experience and Relations" arises. The definitive 
problem, then, is how is it possible for a pluralistic ontology to produce a 
consistent, integrated metaphysical system given the very rigorous treatment 
of relations in Bradley's arguments? This is the task confronting Whitehead 
in his synthesis of Idealism and realism. The fact that Whitehead was a 
successor to Bradley and in large measure accepts his theory of feeling 
provides a certain strategy for the present work. What I offer is an 
analysis and evaluation of the different consequences drawn from the 
interpretation of feeling, and in so doing attempt to answer how, in the 
end, "the final outcome is after all not so greatly different ". 
3. Idealism and Realism 
'Idealism' as used throughout our philosophical heritage has 
been attached to numerous and conflicting sources. Though all varieties 
acknowledge that mind is the only thing that is ultimately real, the issues 
which divide one type of Idealism from another could occupy the better part 
of this introduction: Absolute Idealism, personal Idealism, panpsychistic 
Idealism, subjective Idealism and transcendental Idealism are the major 
classifications, though we should note that such divisions are not exclusive 
of one another and overlapping is common. What is certain is that Idealism, 
taken in its most general sense, opposes any form of materialism which 
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asserts the insentient, thoughtless reality of matter. In this regard 
Whitehead and Bradley unite in attacking the materialist- mechanistic world - 
view of a universe composed of what Whitehead calls 'vacuous actualities'. 
The notion that sentient experience supplies the necessary condition for 
any form of existence is fundamental to both Whitehead and Bradley; though 
for various reasons, Bradley was never quite committed to the panpsychist 
view. Nonetheless, experience, or the more specific term 'feeling', as the 
basis of reality, provides the point of contact whereby both philosophers 
align themselves with the Idealist tradition. 
One difficulty arises which may blur the distinction between Absolute 
Idealism and the older Platonic view. That is, a doctrine of appearance and 
reality in Platonic Idealism which asserts the illusiveness and relative 
unreality of the temporal process may often be confused with Bradley's notion 
that finite experience transcends its immediacy as it becomes transmuted within 
the larger whole of Absolute experience. The crucial difference is that 
Bradley does not imply a complete disjunction between appearance and reality 
as Plato is usually interpreted as doing in his middle dialogues, e.g., the 
Republic. Whitehead, at times, seems to mistake Bradley's view when he 
interprets appearance as meaning illusory rather than finite.5 Appearance, 
though incomplete in itself, is "the stuff of which the Universe is made ".6 
Thinking of appearance as relative unreality, however, does correctly 
characterize Bradley's view in that the finite appearances are intellectually 
unintelligible without consideration of the infinite totality which they 
occupy. The appearances then, are to be taken as having a relative degree of 
truth and reality as they approach the Absolute perfection. 
Whitehead's insistence on the reality of temporal process was a long 
standing preoccupation throughout his philosophical career. He very often 
repudiated the notion prevailing in the history of European thought that the 
supreme reality is a perfection of changeless order. Such dominant tendencies 
in the Platonic and Christian traditions interpret life and motion as being 
subordinate to the essentially static conception of eternity. It is here that 
we find the notion of 'mere appearance'; and unfortunately Bradley is often 
taken as following this tradition. It is true that Bradley's Absolute is a 
timeless perfection unifying the diversity of experience. However the 
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diverse elements essentially qualify the Absolute in some degree and cannot 
be taken as illusory. They must find their place transcended within the 
harmony of the Absolute. 
What is not possible in Bradley's view is the independence of various 
appearances which would allow for a plurality of reals. It is on this score 
that Whitehead parts company with Bradley and emphasizes his connections 
with 'common sense' philosophy. The setting of the metaphysical problem, for 
Whitehead, is realistic. That is, we find ourselves among the many, each 
individual existing in its own right. The notion of a 'common world' including 
ourselves and other actualities is then transformed from a realistic basis to 
an Idealism by the manner in which each individual is temporally connected to 
form a coherent universe of experience. 
The compatability of Idealism and realism in this century has also been 
advocated by Norman Kemp Smith, a friend of Whitehead who argued that the 
central issue is not that reality is mind -dependent but that it incorporates 
'spiritual values', and these operate on a cosmic scale.? Whitehead, in a 
letter to Kemp Smith dated April 6th, 1927 (the same letter in which he 
accepted the invitation to deliver Process and Reality as the Gifford 
Lectures) comments on Kemp Smith's Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of 
Knowledge and writes: "I am inclined to suspect that what you call 
'Idealism', I call 'Realism' and that is our main difference ".8 Indeed Kemp 
Smith's definition, which ascribes spiritual values to the whole of reality, 
accords quite well with Whitehead's description of the occasion of experience 
which necessarily involves value and aim. Though Whitehead calls his position 
'Realism', emphasizing the reality of process, Kemp Smith opts for 'Idealism' 
so as not to allow the slightest association with the materialistic tendencies 
of realism. 
4. Whitehead's Process Realism and Philosophical Method 
Whitehead's realism, it must be noted, was tied to his approach to 
philosophy: by this I mean his concerns in constructing a cosmology which 
would accommodate the advances in 20th century physics. The beginning of the 
present century was clearly a time of reorganization; and Whitehead recognized 
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that the fall of the 17th century cosmology would require a new comprehensive 
system which would bring together the fundamental advances under a single 
unifying concept. It is in his essay Process and Reality that Whitehead 
achieves the most detailed exposition of his cosmology which embodies his 
earlier interests in the philosophical foundations of natural science. Though 
the metaphysics contained therein should not be considered a mere continuation 
of the problems he faced in the philosophy of natural science, the earlier 
investigations certainly set the background for the metaphysics. 
The emphasis on a neorealism which dominated philosophical thought at the 
onset of the 20th century was a result of the discrepancy between the larger 
conceptions of Idealist systems and the important results which the special 
sciences accumulated. Russell, Moore, Alexander and Nunn were the dominant 
figures in Britain who reacted against Idealism as an inadequate foundation 
for the sciences. Whitehead, too, is mentioned as belonging to this wave of 
thought, and is often compared with Russell.9 However, from a careful reading 
of Whitehead's works, there is very little to link him with the Moore -Russell 
line of thought. At no point throughout his philosophy of science or 
metaphysics did he hold a doctrine of external relations. In fact, Whitehead 
finds this to be a most disturbing feature of the extreme realist who argues 
that entities exist in complete independence of one another, each capable of 
isolation. 
What does justify Whitehead's association with the realists is 
an epistemological issue concerning the relation between mind and nature, 
i.e., what is perceived is not just one's own mental states but a direct 
apprehension of nature, and this is quite real. The most important 
consequence of this epistemological realism is that the datum for natural 
science is not mental at all. That is, scientific investigation requires 
that its objects be separate and prior to perception and thought. As against 
the contention of the subjective Idealist, that the existence of objects of 
perception consists in the fact that they are perceived, Whitehead argues 
that no assertions concerning nature can be verified if what is perceived is 
only a fact of individual psychology.10 But this doctrine must be seen as 
playing a limited role within Whitehead's thought, for the sake of scientific 
objectivity. Whitehead did not intend a metaphysical disjunction of nature 
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and mind by saying "nature is closed to mind "; for here a metaphysical 
doctrine as to how mind functions in nature is left to his later work.11 
Indeed once process is accepted as the fundamental notion in Whitehead's 
metaphysics, the extensive properties of nature become dependent upon one 
ontological type, which, in its essence, is understood as a psychical unity of 
becoming. What distinguishes the transition between Whitehead's work in the 
philosophy of science and his metaphysics is the radiating character of his 
thought. That is, the central concepts become so general as to extend their 
application to the diverse aspects of human experience. Where in his earlier 
thought his aim is to provide a unifying concept for the reorganization of 
theoretical physics, the ideal of the later work is an all- inclusive theory 
"...which will set in assigned relationships within itself all that there is 
for knowledge, for feeling, and for emotion ".12 Such a notion, then, becomes 
a comprehensive criterion by which he provides a general hypothesis concerning 
the nature of ultimate reality. Lowe remarks that Whitehead's problem in the 
philosophy of natural science "...is to offer the scientist, in place of the 
ancient trinity of time, space and matter, a coherent set of meanings based 
on relations exhibited in all sensory observation ".13 On the one hand we 
are thinking 'homogeneously' about nature when we are limiting our concerns 
by confining attention to the natural sciences.14 This is an enquiry touched 
by only one side of the philosophical debate. Whitehead says that we are 
here "...concerned only with Nature, that is, with the object of perceptual 
knowledge, and not with the synthesis of the knower and known. "15 However, 
once we are thinking 'heterogeneously' about nature so as to include mind, 
the spectrum widens as does the range of application. On this latter view, 
Whitehead holds that: 
it must be one of the motives of a complete cosmology 
to construct a system of ideas which brings the aesthetic, 
moral and religious interests into relation with those 
concepts of the world which have their origin in natural 
science.16 
The emphasis is here placed in systematic construction whereby metaphysical 
enquiry is pursued with an eye for interconnections. Having its origin in 
natural science, Whitehead's philosophy of organism begins with the perceiver 
and his immediate environment. Once generalized this notion becomes the 
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basis for understanding the relations, not only within the sciences - 
biological, physical, psychological, and sociological- but inclusive of the 
axiological studies, i.e., life understood in terms of values and feelings. 
Whitehead saw that whereas many thinkers in the abovementioned 
disciplines had accepted the advances of the 20th century revolution in 
physics, they still held an implicit conception of matter from the 17th 
century cosmology. In this sense the move was not complete from the concept 
of inert matter to the late 19th century concept of energetic vibrations. 
Whereas his colleagues were content to think of energy in more conventional 
materialistic or positivistic terms, this proved most unsatisfying for 
Whitehead. Progress in knowledge, he held, demands that science will not 
"...combine various propositions which tacitly presuppose inconsistent 
backgrounds ".17 Whitehead hoped that the total picture which emerged from 
his synthesis would guide thought for the 20th century. His theory is a 
fusion of the two previous cosmologies which dominated Western thought - 
the philosophical depth of Plato's Timaeus and the accuracy of detail in 
Newton's Principia- "...with modifications demanded by self- consistency and 
the advance of knowledge ".18 This forms the historical framework and setting 
for his event -ontology; a fluid and dynamic interpretation of energy vectors 
understood in terms of atomic quantums of experience. 
Our exposition has thusfar centered on Whitehead's approach to 
metaphysics via cosmology. We might do well at this point, however, to 
distinguish the two before introducing Bradley's conception of metaphysics. 
As Whitehead conceives it, metaphysics is "...the general ideas which 
are indispensably relevant to the analysis of everything that happens ".19 
Cosmology, on the other hand, is "...the effort to frame a scheme of the 
general character of the present stage of the universe ".20 The immediate 
difference which emerges from these definitions is the fact that cosmology 
seeks the general character of a given epoch. Its scope is limited to 
the type of order which dominates within that epoch- our own being the 
electromagnetic features of energy. It is thus clear that a cosmology will 
fall with the decline of the epoch in question. Leclerc remarks on this point 
that: "This is a necessity of the metaphysical character of the universe. But 
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the particular type of order at any time actually reigning is not a meta- 
physical necessity. "21 The laws of nature, for example, are not considered 
part of the ultimate metaphysics of the universe; they have their application 
only within a particular cosmic epoch dominated by particular facts. 
Metaphysics is more fundamental than cosmology in the sense that the 
metaphysician seeks the general characteristics which pervade the entire 
universe. In such an enterprise we attempt to construct a systematic 
investigation into the nature of being. This is the sense of metaphysics 
which Aristotle called 'first philosophy' or 'first principles', which is 
concerned with the basic and primary problems of philosophical enquiry. 
The sense in which it has such a priority in any philosophic or scientific 
thought is that it is inescapable. Whether we recognize this or not "... 
all difficulties as to first principles are only camouflaged metaphysical 
difficulties ".22 The real question, then, is whether we pursue it in some 
systematic fashion or presuppose it in the background of our thought. 
In Whitehead's view, to conceive of a 'complete fact' is to discern 
that which js in the most general sense of being. But we should not be 
misled here to think that by 'complete fact' Whitehead means our ability to 
discern the whole, or the absolute oneness of being. The 'fact' is an 
instance of experience which exhibits features which are general in the sense 
of being common to all facts which compose the universe. In short, to 
conceive of a 'complete fact' is to understand one instance capable of 
exemplification in all others. Whitehead calls these atomic facts- 'actual 
occasions' which are described as the concrete units in the temporal process. 
The point here is that metaphysics is concerned with the generic features 
of actual occasions. The 'first principles', or scheme, devised in a meta- 
physical system must be completely universal and necessary so as to apply to 
all instances. And this, by the way, constitutes rationalism in Whitehead's 
thought, i.e., an entity is rationally understood when the principles or 
reasons it embodies are discerned or discriminated. He writes: "The 
doctrine of necessity in universality means that there is an essence to the 
universe which forbids relationships beyond itself, as a violation of its 
rationality ".23 This essence is the actual occasion- the final concrete 
reality from which all other forms of existence are derived. 
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At times, Whitehead's use of 'metaphysics', of 'speculative philosophy' 
and of 'cosmology' seems interchangable. Though for our present purposes it 
will not be necessary to distinguish between speculative philosophy and 
metaphysics, his cosmology is certainly distinguished by the interpretation of 
actual occasions in terms of the electro- magnetic characteristics of energy 
and the type of order which follows- electrons, protons, molecules, cells, 
etc. When we apply the generality of metaphysical notions to the present 
cosmic epoch in the universe we are concerned with a cosmological 
interpretation. What is, however, a common denominator in all of Whitehead's 
later thought is the primacy of actual occasions in process. With the 
ultimate generality of process, Whitehead's metaphysics provides an 
explanation of the rise and fall of cosmic epochs, and of various historical 
epochs which follow, one after another, analogous with the becoming and 
perishing of actual occasions. The metaphysical necessity involved is of a 
cumulative nature whereby the present is understood as a synthesis of the 
past. 
As regards philosophic method and the evaluation of the metaphysical 
system, Whitehead sees the ideal of speculative philosophy as a combination 
of both rational and empirical elements. The rational side demands that the 
philosophical scheme be logical and coherent with respect to the consistency 
and unity of ideas, while the empirical side involves the application of the 
scheme and its overall adequacy with respect to the interpretation of 
experience. 
A metaphysics, Whitehead wrote in Religion in the Making, is a 
description: the metaphysician discerns in some special field of interest 
what he suspects to be the general character of reality; he then sets up 
categories from this investigation and seeks to discover whether they are 
in fact exemplified in other areas of human interest.24 We arrive at the 
system through the primary stage of 'assemblage' which attempts to cover 
the infinitude of the universe by the metaphysical notions of the widest 
extension. This provides the matrix, as a body of first principles, which 
is to be judged as coherent and logical, depending on the manner in which 
each proposition requires the others in systematic interconnection. However, 
- 10 - 
as a whole, the system must be confronted with the facts of experience. The 
final evaluation is a rational interpretation of the metaphysics . as applicable 
and adequate depending on its comprehensive capacity to elucidate immediate 
experience. This approximates, no doubt, the hypothetico- deductive method 
of scientific enquiry; (a method, Whitehead thinks, owned by science and 
metaphysics alike). The hope of rationalism is that things lie together in 
a certain coherence in which no element of experience proves incapable of 
exhibition as an example of general theory.25 But what is quite clear to 
Whitehead is that: "Philosophers can never hope finally to formulate the 
metaphysical first principles" as infinitude forever eludes the grasp of 
finite judgment.26 Nonetheless, the scheme, as a definite statement of the 
primary notions, must be sought regardless of the emphasis placed on its 
hypothetical character. The metaphysician must progressively modify the 
working hypothesis in his approximation to the ideal scheme. 
Whitehead says of his "categoreal scheme" that its purpose is to state 
the ultimate generalizations with the utmost precision and definiteness, and 
to argue from them boldly with rigid logic. Argument, however, in Whitehead's 
philosophy takes the character of an axiomatic approach in mathematics. 
That is to say, he construes argument to be a method of deriving consequences 
from accepted first principles or premises. This is indeed implied in 
his notion of metaphysics as a descriptive generalization. Whereas many 
philosophers have been critical of Whitehead's lack of philosophical 
argument in supporting his principles, as opposed to those of rival schemes,27 
he stands by this method as the proper objective of philosophy; that is, 
the search for the premises which extend the boundaries of previous 
philosophical systems, and thus become more comprehensive with respect to 
the ability to describe the facts. The emphasis is placed here on positive 
construction. 
5. Bradley's Absolute and the Skeptical Method 
Bradley, unlike Whitehead, was a philosopher by training who was 
very argumentative and polemical in his approach to philosophical issues. 
Whereas with Whitehead, the explication of the process view itself constitutes 
sufficient refutation of the traditional views differing from it, Bradley 
directly confronts alien views when investigating their claims to represent 
ultimate reality. Though explicit reference is often omitted in this process, 
it is clear that his target covers a wide range of philosophers, especially the 
British Empiricists, whom he refers to mockingly as "the school of experience ". 
The dominant influence on Bradley's philosophy was the neo- Hegelianism which 
formed in Britain at the end of the 19th century as a reaction against the 
Empiricist orthodoxy. T.H. Green at Oxford and Edward Caird at Glasgow led 
the movement in British Absolute Idealism, though they were surely surpassed 
by Bradley's philosophical style and intellectual rigor. In spite of all 
Bradley's protests against the spirit of "discipleship" and his dissent from 
being included as a member of an Hegelian school, it is still quite clear that 
he owes a lot to Hege1.28 One of Bradley's dedicated followers (at least at 
the onset of his philosophical career), A.E. Taylor, remarks on this point 
that: "'Anglo- Hegelianism' has meant in English- speaking countries, especially 
since the publication of Appearance and Reality, to all intents and purposes 
chiefly the views of Bradley... ".29 It does, however, become clear that 
Bradley's work since his Ethical Studies moved steadily away from Hegel's 
influence. He himself attacks the Hegelian dialectic which is obviously at 
odds with the absolute criterion of his own metaphysics.30 
Bradley's approach to metaphysics differs most from Whitehead in two 
ways. Firstly, the metaphysical problem is conceived in such a way as to 
uncover the non -relational 'one' as opposed to the 'one' which exemplifies the 
'many'. By 'non -relational one', Bradley, of course, means that there can be 
only one entity in existence- the Absolute, which is related to nothing. This 
is basically the monistic, as opposed to the pluralistic, approach. Secondly, 
he was not concerned with a cosmological construction consistent with the 
science of his time. Bradley, in fact, would reject the elaborate detail 
of Whitehead's metaphysics as secondary to the aim of discovering a general 
and theoretically tenable view of reality. Insofar as he abstains from 
such detailed explanation of the elements of experience, Bradley contends 
that his metaphysics cannot be called a system. But this is, of course, a 
very strict sense of the term. As we shall see below, the interrelation 
between Bradley's logic and metaphysics certainly provides us with a 
system or scheme of first principles. His dissatisfaction with the term 
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here refers to our inability to describe the Absolute in detail. This, 
however, does not mean that we cannot discover the main features or 
characteristics of its 'perfect' nature. 
As to the definition of metaphysics and its general purpose, perhaps the 
most concise statement of Bradley's position occurs on the first page of his 
metaphysical essay, Appearance and Reality: 
We may agree, perhaps, to understand by metaphysics 
an attempt to know reality as against mere appearance, 
or the study of first principles or ultimate truths, 
or again the effort to comprehend the universe, not 
simply piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a 
whole.31 
At first, there seems to be no disagreement between Bradley and Whitehead on 
these points. Both philosophers seek to know reality or ultimate truth as 
against mere appearance. But what exactly constitutes mere appearance will 
become an acute problem in the course of this thesis. What is particularly 
revealing about Bradley's definition is the emphasis placed on knowing reality 
as a whole. Our being, he thinks, is a wholeness which seeks complete 
satisfaction; and it is the metaphysician's task to consider this when 
constructing the main characteristics of reality. When we are mistaken is 
when: "...we attempt to set up any one aspect of our nature as supreme, and 
to regard the other aspects merely as conducive and as subject to its rule ".32 
The temptation to do so is just the problem of an uncritical metaphysician. 
To affix one aspect as primary is to distort the balance of a de facto 
whole; that is, the many aspects of being must, in the end, qualify the one 
harmonizing experience. This is the one theme which dominated Bradley's 
entire philosophical career; ethics, logic and metaphysics inclusive. 
When involved in the theoretical enterprise of metaphysics our aim is to 
understand all that is, and in a completely self- consistent unity. This is 
the purely logical foundation of Bradley's metaphysics: "Ultimate reality is 
such that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute criterion ".33 
Indeed with the criterion of consistency as the conceptual foundation of 
ultimate reality, the intellect attains satisfaction. Imperfection and 
contradiction fail to be true in that they do not satisfy the demands of our 
whole being. Truth, he thinks, must be unchangable and perfect. The source 
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of this principle we find in his Principles of Logic: 
.if A both were and were not, that would be because 
the ultimate reality had contrary qualities. The 
character in which it accepted A, would be opposite to 
the quality which excluded A from existence. Under 
varieties of detail we find the same basis, repulsion 
of discrepants.34 
Contradictory assertions, then, cannot be both true and representative of 
reality. "The Absolute holds all possible content in an individual experience 
where no contradiction can remain... "35 Diversity of content is most 
certainly reconciled, but not contradiction. On this point Bradley finds an 
irresistible link between logic and metaphysics to the extent that they imply 
one another. 
Though Bradley attempts to steer the logical investigations of his 
Principles of Logic clear of first principles, there is the necessity of 
defending the axiom of contradiction as implying "...a certain theory of the 
nature of things ".36 Logic, he thinks, investigates the nature of inference. 
It is an appraisal and interpretation of what is essentially an ideal 
experiment on the real itself.37 Likewise, metaphysics requires logical 
consistency. The assumption throughout is that absolute reality is without 
defect; this gives the metaphysician the ability to distinguish between 
appearance and reality by employing logic as an instrument of evaluation. 
With this in mind, Bradley's strategy in Appearance and Reality is to expose 
the contradictions involved in various doctrines of previous philosophical 
thought, and to show how such inconsistencies fall into varying degrees of 
unreality. The final result, he thinks, forces us to affirm the existence 
of the Absolute as a perfect and individual unity. 
It is often suggested that Bradley's thought is primarily negative or 
based on a series of rejections and denials.38 This is certainly one's first 
impression of Bradley's tone when approaching his philosophy. It must not, 
however, be underestimated for its positive value, in that his skepticism is 
constructive in ultimate intent. With his 'active questioning' and systematic 
doubt one finds easy comparisons with the skepticism of David Hume. Whereas 
with Hume the skepticism serves as a tool for his naturalism, Bradley's 
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negative elimination by logical consistency leads to his vision of reality 
as absolute. The austerity in doubting all preconceptions has the view of 
something higher and more theoretically satisfying. Indeed it is clear that 
there is a knowledge of what is sought with every denial. "Every negation 
must have a ground, and this ground is positive. "39 Philosophical skepticism 
as opposed to psychological doubting, Bradley thinks, has the advantage in 
that it transcends itself and arrives at a more general resting place. It 
is distinguished by the adoption of a notion of truth and reality as the 
criterion of doubting.40 
The doubt here is not smothered or expelled but itself 
is assimilated and used up. It becomes an element in 
the living process of that which is above doubt, and 
hence its own development is the end of itself in its 
original character.41 
The "remedy against doubt" is just this positive vision of reality. It widens 
its area to an ultimate generality where it cannot, in theory, be transcended 
or refuted. Where Bradley pushes this too far, however, his arguments tend 
to become sophistical. His most insightful critic, William James, was indeed 
quick to point these out, and to show how Bradley had overintellectualized the 
universe for the sake of the Absolute.42 Bradley's dialectic, on these points, 
has a definite affinity to that of Parmenides and Zeno. The common end sought 
is that of permanance. 
There is one theme, Bradley thinks, which infects thought with so much 
contradiction, that it affirms the positive character of the Absolute more 
than anything else. This central criticism of relations, around which the 
whole of Appearance and Reality revolves, provides a sustained attack on the 
basic unit of pluralism- the 'fact', which was seen to be the ultimate aim 
of Whitehead's metaphysics. Any relation between subjects and objects, or 
between objects generally, involves isolation and separation of finite 
facts or units of existence. But, for Bradley, this turns out to be an 
impossibility. For not only is it impossible to discover an individual as 
one of the many, but even if we could, its relations would prove it ultimately 
contradictory. These arguments are so fundamental to his conclusions that 
he suggests to the convinced reader at the end of his chapter "Relation 
and Quality" that he need not read the remaining chapters of Book I of 
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Appearance and Realitv.43 Indeed if one accepts the general arguments on 
the contradictoriness of relations, the more specific topics evaluated, i.e., 
the self, time, space, motion and causation easily fall into unreality, as 
they are dependent upon some type of units and relations. The point is, of 
course, that relations can be resolved only in a larger whole which contains 
the units: and ultimately it is the Absolute which is the final container and 
solitary Individual. The Absolute is related to nothing. It is here, Bradley 
thinks, that the universe as a whole may be called intelligible. 
What is, I think, fairly clear in the above exposition is how Bradley's 
conception of the metaphysical problem entails a specific method, and how 
this method attempts to reach beyond the limits of our ordinary, hypothetical 
and incomplete reasoning to Absolute perfection. Nothing short of the 
Absolute gives us the whole truth. This is the key concept in Bradley's 
ingenious theory of judgment, where any judgment claiming to portray a genuine 
character of reality fails to take account of the universe in the totality of 
its self- expression. Every finite judgment will always have a hypothetical 
character and will fail to represent the reality from which the content has 
been abstracted. Richard Wollheim has made this point rather nicely in his 
book F.H. Bradley: 
Reality flows uninterruptedly, without divisions, without 
fissures, from one point in space to another, from one 
moment in time to another, and it is we thinking beings 
who carve it up; indeed, even the distinctions of space 
and time themselves are, as we shall see, importations 
of Thought into the realm of Reality. And in making 
these divisions, these breaks, we harm what is really 
there: our thought, which is based upon them, is therefore 
always a distortion of the truth.44 
This does explain why, in Bradley's view, we can never explain the infinite 
detail of the Absolute or understand just how all the appearances form a 
systematic harmony. Where thought formulates a judgment as to the content of 
a given experience, it necessarily neglects the continuous mass of the whole - 
a lesson Whitehead certainly understood as well, albeit applied in quite a 
different manner within his philosophy. Since for Whitehead the universe will 
always be too complex for any finite human system, a metaphysic will only be 
an approximation to the general truths sought. 
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For a rough- and -ready description of two conceptions of metaphysics, I 
propose to view the differences between Whitehead and Bradley through a hybrid 
and a pure distinction. The former, we may define as the generalizations 
arrived at through an assemblage of knowledge; aesthetic, religious and 
scientific. It is the traditional notion of metaphysics as the "queen of the 
sciences ". The latter is a conception of a discipline, in and of itself, 
which as one discipline of many and one side of our nature, contributes to our 
whole being. Bradley's view, of course, is the pure metaphysics which does 
not attempt to integrate current scientific thought into its principles or 
anticipate the application of the principles beyond the discipline itself. 
This intentional neglect of a cosmology as linked to metaphysics can, I think, 
be traced to his monism, and to the central criticism of relations. For it 
is evident that scientific enquiry requires an isolation of its objects, thus 
requiring both relations and pluralism. Where Whitehead's pluralism and 
process realism provide a foundation for scientific enquiry, articulating 
the connections between the various disciplines and filling the gap between 
natural science and value experience, Bradley argues that the respective 
disciplines must pursue their own aims, each with their own valid methodology. 
In Bradley's view, any form of pluralism is an "ideal construction" for the 
purpose at hand and detached from the metaphysician's task of knowing ultimate 
truth and reality. Self -contradiction, at this level, where a discipline 
employs relations, is not of genuine interest to metaphysics. In fact, 
he thinks, to protest against a particular theory of science as self - 
contradictory is to bring in metaphysical criticisms at a point where 
they are inapplicable.45 This is not to say that the natural, physical, 
psychological and social sciences are not valid means of enquiry, but that we 
must not mistake their practical constructions for ultimate truth. Their 
restriction of attention, for a specific purpose, is necessarily limited. An 
evaluation of science, and for this matter, any hypothetico- deductive process 
is always in terms of usefulness and not ultimate truth. "The ideas with 
which it works are not intended to set out the true character of reality. "46 
Thus, in Bradley's view, a conflict between science and metaphysics is 
impossible provided that we realize that they each have their own proper 
sphere and function in the human intellect. 
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What Bradley saw was that science requires relations of the worst 
type, i.e., external relations, and the assumption that the inert particles of 
matter in time and space are real. It was indeed obvious that the Newtonian 
scheme of mechanics was useful for the practicalities of everyday life and in 
Bradley's time (Appearance and Reality was written between 1887 and 1891) 
there was certainly a conflict between science and the Idealist view of 
ultimate reality. However, by the time the 20th certury had arrived and the 
Newtonian physics had lost its reign, the problem confronting us was the 
construction of a new system of reality in which science could be understood 
as continuous with metaphysics.47 A parallel controversy of the late 19th 
century which reminds us of Bradley's conclusions was the conflict between 
Darwinian evolution and orthodox theology. But how far this view of 
metaphysics as separate from the scientific interests of a particular epoch is 
tenable seems rather doubtful. What metaphysician can seriously claim that 
he was not influenced by the science of his time as well as by the overall 
advance of knowledge and its effects on society? Surely both disciplines have 
their own particular emphasis. Though how far science can be said to be 
concerned with only practical constructions as opposed to ultimate reality 
is debatable. A specific scientific enquiry may be distinguished by its 
particular restriction of subject- matter, but this does not mean the 
investigation is not concerned with aspects of reality. 
Science and philosophy are merely different aspects of one human 
enterprise; the understanding of ourselves and the world in which we live. 
Our life is one. The real task is to find a way to think them together such 
that each gains insight from the other in the endless task of criticism and 
revision. Both begin with the same groundwork of immediate experience, and 
both concern themselves with the embodiment of abstract principles in 
concrete particular facts. 
Despite the way that the metaphysical problem is approached and 
the contrasts in methodology, we shall find that there are other points 
in common between Whitehead and Bradley which justify their comparison as 
metaphysicians. Both take metaphysics as the philosophical activity which 
attempts to formulate the most adequate way of understanding reality in all 
its experienced forms. In short, they both see the theory of being, i.e., 
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Aristotle's being qua being, as the fundamental problem of philosophy. Both 
present a comprehensive and unified world -view, and both would surely agree 
that the voyage of philosophy is to the higher generalities. 
As to the task of the metaphysician, an insight from each will perhaps 
best illustrate his predicament. For Bradley, "metaphysics is the finding of 
bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct "48, whereas for Whitehead, the 
metaphysician looks for that which ordinary speech sees no point in saying, 
because it so pervades our experience that it is taken for granted. 
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CHAPTER II 
IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE AND FEELING 
1. Historical Perspective 
In this chapter we focus upon the doctrine of experience which provides 
the starting point for our comparative study. It states that outside of the 
experience of actual occasions nothing exists or can possibly exist. This is 
the well known 'Ontological Principle' in Whitehead's system. For Bradley it 
is the doctrine that Reality finds temporal expression through finite centres 
of experience, that is, Reality is experience. Aside from the striking 
affinity between Whitehead and Bradley on this doctrine, we may also include, 
among other philosophers of this century, William James and Josiah Royce as 
following this ontological quest. 
The primary importance of this doctrine is its repudiation of the 
foundations of the 17th century cosmology which, as I shall contend, has been 
the ruin of modern philosophy. Beginning with Descartes' acceptance of the 
scientific cosmology and with the subsequent developments which culminated in 
Newton's Principia, the path to a reasonable and coherent metaphysics has 
been clouded by a morass of epistemological problems. It will, therefore, 
be necessary to provide a brief historical digression, investigating the 
emergence of the opposing doctrine, before the central argument can be given. 
With increasing urgency, it became clear to many thinkers in the present 
century that a world-view consistent with Einstein's relativity physics 
and with the quantum theory was needed greatly. After having dominated the 
last two hundred years with such great scientific success, classical physics 
had broken up from the inside. That is, the hypotheses put forth by 
scientists of the late 19th century led to inconsistencies within physics 
itself. Whitehead remarks that it begins with the wave theory of light and 
ends with the wave theory of matter. The effects of this breakup were indeed 
devastating, as it was assumed that, with the exception of a few 'dark spots', 
physics was a closed subject. However insofar as the move into a new epoch of 
scientific thought proved intellectually stimulating, the complete liberation 
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from the Newtonian and Cartesian world -view underlying our mental processes 
had not been achieved. 
E. A. Burtt, in his celebrated Metaphysical Foundations of Modern 
Science describes this as just the problem of modern philosophy- the 
inability to reformulate our metaphysical world -view and replace the basic 
duality which separates man from the rest of nature. The real contrast to be 
dealt with is the view resulting from the mind -body problem, that the hard 
material facts are all external to the subjective value -experience of man. 
Rival metaphysical systems of the past had not dethroned the mechanistic 
materialism. Burtt writes: "The constant renewal of these attempts and their 
constant failure widely and thoroughly to convince men, reveals how powerful 
a grip the view they were attacking was winning over peoples minds.... "1 
Beginning with Berkeley we find a series of protests against this new view of 
the relation of man to nature, but the Idealist systems were too far removed 
from the grasp of the scientific outlook for their theories to have any 
effect on the speculative side of science. Instead of a replacement of the 
theoretical foundation, the result was that metaphysical enquiry was seen as a 
different point of view. However, as we have seen above with Bradley, this 
is no solution to a completely comprehensive metaphysics. 
In the same year of Burtt's splendid work, Whitehead offered his first 
metaphysical work, Science and the Modern World, which provided a stunning 
criticism of the scientific materialism, as well as a glimpse of this novel 
scheme finally articulated in Process and Reality. Like Burtt, Whitehead 
showed why it was important that the criticism and replacement of the 
Newtonian concepts should be carried beyond the immediate concerns of physical 
science. 
Whitehead traced the origins of modern science to the development of 
mathematics which provided a background to the observation of nature in the 
17th century. In one of his most insightful passages he writes: "Nothing is 
more impressive than the fact that as mathematics withdrew increasingly into 
the upper regions of ever greater extremes of abstract thought, it returned 
back to earth with a corresponding growth of importance for the analysis of 
concrete fact ".2 Thus the application of the abstract mathematical formulae 
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to the concrete order of nature produced the laws of nature which gave 
scientific enquiry an air of precision and certainty. 
Mechanism was established with Galileo and Kepler as the view that 
all occurrences in the phenomenal world follow fixed natural laws reflecting 
absolute principles of cosmic order. This involved a banishment of animation 
(the view that things are guided by purposive minds or souls) from the whole 
realm of inorganic nature. However, interestingly enough, when Kepler 
originally proposed his modification of the Copernican theory, he began with a 
conception of nature in which all things, especially the planets, were moved 
by souls; but he replaced this notion with the conception of forces.3 Galileo 
added the necessary aspect of measux,Aent to the emerging cosmology, and thus 
broke with the qualitative character of thought which, in the earlier periods, 
had sought classification under the dominant influence of Aristotle. After 
Galileo the emphasis clearly became a search for quantitative changes of 
things in motion. Bacon also set the tone for the scientific mentality of 
this epoch by emphasizing keen observation which reveals a regularity of 
sequence. Whitehead remarks that this became the most fundamental aspect of 
the mechanistic conception of nature in the 17th century; that is, the theory 
of periodicity, in which the general recurrences of things becomes obvious 
in our ordinary experiences.4 Patterns are observed, from the prediction of 
Haley's commet to the gestation period of a human being, from the seasons of 
the year to the circulation of the blood, and this provides the notion that 
all of reality must conform to an absolute order. The most striking 
application of this thought is the conception of time in equal lengths of 
days, hours, minutes and seconds based upon the measunzeant of the rotation 
of the earth relative to the stars. The model of the universe was thus easily 
conceived as a clock, wound by God, and set ticking in patterns easily 
discerned by the human intellect. 
Mechanism gained ground quickly because it worked beautifully. 
Given the notion of a mathematically ordered cosmos, the test for scientific 
validity was the discovery of how the various aspects of the phenomenal world 
exemplified this order. Research centered upon how empirical data could be 
reconciled with this hypothesis; and the process proved most successful. Soon 
after Newton had given the cosmology such accurate expression, it was thought 
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certain that all the parts would find their place in the mathematical puzzle. 
The applications here were numerous as the observed facts were elucidated. 
But such scientific achievement required limitation of scope as well as 
neglect of some of the most obvious aspects of our experience. 
Materialism now fits into the picture as a result of Galileo's 
adoption of the atomic theory of matter. Galileo found it convenient to 
assume the notion that matter is resoluble into "infinitely small indivisible 
atoms" which likewise follow the mathematical laws. This was convenient 
because it could explain the changes of solids into fluids and gases, and 
solve the problems relating to cohesion, expansion and contraction.5 But 
Galileo was not alone in the revival of materialism in the 17th century. 
Gassendi and Hobbes both attempted to account for all inanimate changes and 
for sensation on a materialist basis, thus extending the theory over physics 
and psychology. Bacon too had turned to Democritus as a possible substitute 
for the Aristotelianism which had dominated the mediaeval epoch. What was 
rejected with these thinkers was any indication of purpose operating in 
the individual bits of matter. That is, the essentially non -teleological 
character of scientific materialism refused to recognize the activity in the 
world as purposeful in any ultimate sense. The laws of nature, for example, 
do not show the universe as working toward any observable goal, for this 
is an extra -material factor which was thought unnecessary to explain the 
universe. Materialistic atomism was thus incorporated into the mechanistic 
paradigm as an obvious consequence of extending the principles of the motions 
of celestial bodies to apply as well to terrestrial motions. That is, it was 
thought atoms must possess the same mathematical qualities as the planets. 
The problems which emerged from this conception, and which proved the 
most disturbing, concerned the place of man in the scheme of things. Man, 
being a particular conglomeration of matter, must also be mechanistically 
determined; yet he must surely be an exception, in that he has a 'soul' which 
wills and assumes responsibility for his actions. There is also the fact that 
man has the capacity to know the world about him, and to discover its general 
principles of order. 
Galileo paved the way for Descartes in that he provided the first step 
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in separating man from the world of nature by an early formulation of the 
doctrine of primary and secondary qualities, which later became fundamental 
in the philosophy of Locke. Extended substance, matter in motion, was the 
only primary quality operating upon the senses and producing the disturbing 
secondary experiences.6 Hence, the real world was seen to be outside of man 
in its mathematical precision, while man suffered an inadequate representation 
of subjective appearances. Bradley sums up this position by saying that the 
doctrine "...holds that the extended can be actual, entirely apart from every 
other quality ".7 Colors, sounds, pleasures and griefs are, for Galileo, all 
fictions of the mind. 
Descartes sat in the middle of the scientific revolution and the 
Renaissance with a definite aim of breaking away from philosophical thought of 
of the middle ages; yet at the same time, he was in the precarious situation 
of attempting to harmonize his position with certain dogmas of the Catholic 
Church. This was the setting for his metaphysical dualism which postulated 
two types of substance- 'res extensa' and 'res cogitans', thereby accounting 
for a mathematical world of extended matter, and the thinking, perceiving 
immortal soul of man. 
Descartes conceived the physical universe to be absolutely intelligible 
by a geometric -mathematical model. The whole of nature, he thought, may be 
reducible to geometrical qualities since its objects are extended and figured 
magnitudes in motion.8 His invention of analytic geometry, which combined 
geometry or space with numbers in an algebric method, much confirmed his 
vision that the whole of physics may be explained by mathematics. 
As the father of modern Rationalism, Descartes sought certainty through 
pure reason. As sensation afforded no accurate picture of the material world, 
he thought clear and indubitable reasoning must provide the answers. In his 
Principles of Philosophv,he writes: 
Having now ascertained certain principles of material 
things which were derived, not from the prejudices of 
the senses, but from the light of reason, so that we 
cannot doubt of their truth, it is for us to examine 
whether from these alone we can explain all the phenomena 
of nature.9 
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Sensation he calls 'confused thoughts', which account for the illusive 
secondary qualities. But reason discerns the primary geometrical qualities 
which inhere in the objects themselves and remain constant. In his famous 
investigation of a piece of wax in the Meditations he concludes that 
the only permanent qualities in the world are extension, flexiblilty and 
mobility.10 These are the clear and distinct ideas perceived not by sensation 
but by 'intuition of the mind'. As with Galileo, Descartes held that the 
colors, sounds and scents which appear to be in objects are subject to change 
and therefore cannot be part of nature. In fact, they would not exist at 
all if not for our minds. Burtt, however, remarks on this point, that the 
real criterion in Descartes' procedure is not permanence as the main quality 
of 'res extensa' but instead the possibility of mathematical handling.11 It 
is only that the secondary qualities did not fit into his grandiose conception 
of nature as geometrically precise. To the mind of the mathematician, colors, 
sounds, and scents are bound to be obscure and confused given this working 
model of the universe. 
Descartes placed the secondary qualities in an equally real, though less 
important, entity- the thinking substance or cogitating mind. Turning inward 
and reflecting on a completely different type of entity, existing beyond any 
doubt, Descartes discovered the other half of his dualism, which is neither 
part of the extended world nor subject to the principles of mechanical 
operation. The distinct essence of this unextended substance- the cogito- 
is to think, though it does possess subsidiary functions such as perception, 
will, feeling and imagination. The fact that we can apprehend the reality 
of such an entity clearly and distinctly provides the justification for its 
complete independence. Thus Descartes defined substance as that which 
"requires nothing but itself in order to exist ". And this was applied 
equally to thinking substance and extended substance.12 As a result of this 
independence, Descartes is led to the notion that the cogito or spiritual 
substance is not liable to die with the decay of the body. Because no other 
causes are capable of destroying it, Descartes thinks, it must be immortal. 
The impact of this dualism on subsequent philosophical and scientific 
thought in the western world has indeed been enormous. Since Descartes 
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conceived the mind and body as being completely independent of one another, 
the inevitable problem arises as to how there can be a genuine interaction. 
How can one influence the other, or, even more to the point, how can the 
unextended mind have accurate knowledge of extended matter in general? These 
are just two of a multitude of epistemological problems surrounding the 
absolute bifurication which has divided the substance of man from the rest of 
nature. Indeed, as the Cartesian dualism pervades modern thought, and with 
the attempts to absorb one side into the other, the main conflict can be 
put as such: philosophic Idealism now takes charge of cogitating mind in an 
effort to dethrone the primacy of matter, while scientific materialism, or 
more recently physicalism, has concerned itself with extended matter in an 
effort to reduce mind to the stimulus of nerves on the brain. Philosophy 
itself has become a battleground of the two Cartesian substances. But what is 
surely required is a critical examination of the foundations upon which the 
dualism was built.13 
Although Issac Newton, in his tremendous contribution to the 17th 
century cosmology, provided the most detailed and consistent physical theory, 
he too, following Descartes, accepted a dualism by his notion that the mind 
occupies a small portion of the brain called the 'sensorium'. Newton 
represents the culmination of "the century of genius" by providing the most 
systematic account of the material universe in which mechanism is manifested 
in the laws of gravity. In his masterpiece, The Mathematical Principles of 
Natural Philosophy, Newton united terrestrial and celestial dynamics into 
one science by the law of universal gravitation. The one idea which explains 
both the departure of the celestial masses from their uniform motion in a 
straight line and the fall of terrestrial bodies on earth is explained by the 
following equation: any two bodies in the universe will attract one another 
with a force directly proportional to the product of their masses and 
inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them.14 Newton's 
position in his Principia allowed him to solve the dynamical problem of the 
solar system- the problem of discerning the forces at work in maintaining its 
motion by the law of gravitation and three laws of motion. Unlike Galileo 
and Descartes, however, Newton did not think that the world is absolutely 
mathematical by a priori reasoning. Hence, there is the strong empirical 
aspect of Newton's thought which placed great emphasis on experimental method. 
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In fact, in Newton's method, mathematics must be continually modelled on 
experience, whereby deductions from principles remain purely abstract until 
physically verified.15 
Although it will be unnecessary to attempt an exact or full account of 
Newton's physics here, we shall require a brief exposition of the metaphysical 
view implied by the physics. In what follows I shall therefore concentrate 
on the classical atomism and the doctrine of external relations which found 
such a wide acceptance in subsequent philosophical thought. 
We should first note the acceptance of Galileo's and Descartes' 
metaphysics which are presupposed in Newton's work. Though, in his 
positivism, he was vehemently opposed to hypothesis, i.e., empirically 
unverified propositions, he did not manage to escape the body of metaphysical 
beliefs carried by the prevailing orthodoxy of his time. He had accepted 
without question the main structure of the universe as mathematical (even 
though mathematics ultimately served as a tool for Newton), as well as the 
general view of the physical world and man's relation to it. The doctrine 
of primary- secondary qualities, the mind -body distinction, and the theory 
concerning the nature and process of sensation too were accepted without 
critical examination. Also within his system, there are numerous metaphysical 
views such as the nature of absolute space as an infinitely extended, uniform 
Euclidian entity, absolute time as flowing mathematically in equal measures, 
and the notion that Deity imposes the laws of nature. But much of Newton's 
triumph is a result of his stunning explanation of the working of matter 
throughout the universe. His physics dealt with the way material bodies acted 
upon one another, and offered a new approach to the problem of matter's 
inner constitution. 
The universe, for Newton, is ultimately composed of absolutely hard, 
indestructible particles which possess the primary qualities- size, shape, 
position and motion. These concrete particulars are the permanent and 
unchanging atoms at the base of things which behave in accordance with the 
laws, interacting by impact and gravitation. The bodies which we experience 
are a result of their corpuscular nature. That is, the manner in which the 
atoms form different configurations determines the various types of material 
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bodies. Thus all of our perceived changes in nature are to be regarded as 
separations, associations and motions of the permanent and indivisible units 
of matter. The rearrangements of these atoms constitute all being as well as 
the appearance of becoming and passing away. It is little wonder why this 
cosmology is sometimes called the "closed billard table" -model of the universe 
in which bodies, in their restless motions, are forever bouncing off one 
another within an absolute space and time.16 Whitehead's general remark on 
this conception of the universe was that Newton had produced a cosmology which 
was easy to understand but hard to believe. 
In Newton's physics we may discern the ultimate statement of the 
doctrine of external relations which this materialistic atomism requires. If 
the universe is to be conceived as made up of impenetrable and indestructable 
material atoms, indifferent to the changes from one moment of time to the 
next, the relations between the atoms must be understood in terms of their 
position in space. That is all relations must be external because of the 
independent existence of each atom. Each atom is self- contained, self - 
sufficient and understandable in complete disconnection from the rest. 
In the Cartesian language, each requires "nothing but itself in order to 
exist ". These atomic bits simply follow fixed routines imposed by the impacts 
of other externally related atoms. But they would be just what they are 
without reference to such collisions. 
Since there is no hint of teleology in such a system, i.e., that 
the motions of the atoms do not spring from their own nature, the doctrine 
requires that the laws of nature be imposed on the world. Newton himself 
stated that the correlated modes of behavior of the bodies forming the solar 
system required God for the imposition of the principles upon which all 
depended. There is the necessity that God imposes the laws of nature to set 
the world in motion. Such a metaphysical principle of transcendent Deity 
guarantees that the laws of nature will be obeyed throughout the solar 
system.17 
During the 18th and 19th centuries Newton became the personification of 
the cool scientific reason esteemed by the Enlightenment and despised by the 
Romantics, especially Blake, Tennyson, and Wordsworth. As the dualism was 
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further established, it was thought that the world literally ticked away in 
its mechanical precision while human values were regarded as outside of the 
ultimate scheme of things. The sciences and arts were thus divided. Science 
discovered and described the world while art created and delighted in the 
fanciful fictions of the human mind. In retrospect, Ortega y Gasset described 
Newton's work as the greatest achievement and the gravest peril for subsequent 
mankind.18 And Whitehead, on this point, remarks that the following centuries 
"...had got hold of a general idea which it could neither live with nor live 
without ".19 Either way, it was certain that Newton's clarity and consistency 
as a physicist put the final touch to the 17th century cosmology and was 
unavoidable to anyone who thereafter seriously contemplated the nature of the 
universe. 
Perhaps the most forceful reaction to scientific materialism was dealt 
by the poets of the 19th century. The abstract and lifeless character of the 
Newtonian picture was appalling to thinkers who felt their communion with 
nature to be so intimate and alive with feeling. Man was not a mere observer 
to a barren external world, but rather, he shared a sympathetic participation 
with the whole process of creation. Their appeal was to our full concrete 
experience in order that man might enjoy his organic relation with nature once 
again. In repulsion to the dull and even chilling mechanism, they wrote their 
odes to a nature alive with colors, sounds and scents. But despite such 
attempts, mechanism continued to prosper with ruthless efficiency. The 
paradigm gained incredible strength as more research corroborated the scheme 
and as more practical applications were discovered.20 This mechanism even 
went so far as to claim that the problems posed by the apparently ultimate 
plurality of life forms were merely temporary difficulties for the reigning 
physical laws. Indeed, it was just such boldness with which physical science 
applied mechanism to the phenomena of life that prompted the strong reactions 
from poets and philosophers. 
Within science itself biologists took interest in the doctrines of 
vitalism and animism in their revolt against physics. But for the most part 
mechanistic materialism went undisturbed. Following Aristotle, vitalists 
such as Hans Driesch held that life could not be explained solely by 
mechanical principles and must, therefore, involve teleological principles as 
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well. Though mechanism holds throughout the universe with regard to inanimate 
nature, a living organism must be seen as a conscious effort to overcome 
the general laws of inert matter. Life, with its increasing complexity of 
organization, appears to create energy above that of the purposelessness of 
mere matter. Later in the 20th century, Henri Bergson, in his comprehensive 
metaphysics, generalized the doctrines of vitalism and called the source of 
this vital activity in organisms the 'élan vital'. Having won acclaim as the 
philosopher of evolution, Bergson defines life as an evolutionary process of 
unceasing transformation. The 'élan', says Bergson, is transmitted by 
heredity in the same way as the other characteristics of the organism.21 It 
is a burst of pure energy and what we ordinarily think of as matter is the 
decay of this pure potential. This flow of life which we sense as a primary 
inner experience is not to be thought of as voluntary, but rather, as willed. 
Animism was closely aligned with, and ran parallel to, vitalism. 
This line of thought was represented by such thinkers as William McDougall. 
He advanced a theory against materialism by describing the teleological 
determination of events as guidance by purposeful spirits. In this view 
inanimate nature too has an 'inner' or 'psychological' being. However, as a 
serious replacement to the theoretical structure of science reigning in the 
19th century, it received little attention. Although we shall consider this 
idea in some detail (with regard to the panpsychism of Leibniz, Royce and 
Whitehead) later in this chapter, for now the matter at hand is the opposing 
doctrine. 
McDougall, in his Body and Mind, cites three key factors which led 
to the wide acceptance of mechanism in the middle of the 19th century.22 
With the 'soul' at the center of interest surrounding the philosophical 
controversies, physiological animism seemed to have been dealt a final blow 
by: (1) the mechanistic account of evolution suggested by Darwin's principle 
of adaptation through natural selection and by the rapid progress of 
mechanical explanations in physiology; (2) the discovery in physiology that 
the brain is a vast and complex system of reflex nerve paths; and (3) the 
establishment of the law of the conservation of energy which was seen to 
apply to both inorganic and organic nature. 
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The establishment of evolution as an incontestable fact and the 
identification of natural selection as a major element in adaption were the 
two greatest contributions of Darwin to the western world. What made the 
evolution of organisms mechanistic in Darwin's view was the process of the 
elimination of those characteristics which happened to be unnecessary for 
the survival of the species. Selection occurred by the elimination of any 
defective products of this hereditary process. This, however, does not, in 
itself, do away with every teleological implication which might be necessary 
in establishing the purely physical mechanism of evolution. It was, in 
fact, the neo- Darwinians, or, as Driesch has called them, the 'dogmatic 
Darwinians', who pushed Darwin's principles closer to mechanism by arguing 
that the fluctuating variations in organisms were to be explained as merely 
accidental differences of nutrition in the arrangement of the particles of 
matter in the body, and nothing more.23 Psycho -physical parallelism is the 
second major factor made by the emerging science of physiology. It argues 
that physiological brain states and psychical mental states are parallel, 
and resulted from empirical research centering around physiological 
explanations of the nervous system and its biochemical functioning. With 
these discoveries, the assumption was made that all mental processes could be 
explained by the purely mechanistic laws of brain chemistry. Finally, the 
third factor contributing to the popularity of the mechanistic theory as law 
for the whole of reality was the law of the conservation of energy- the first 
law of thermodynamics in modern physics. The first law states that energy can 
neither be created nor destroyed. With the mechanistic laws applying here 
without exception, no truly unique factor can be introduced in the universe. 
Following Newton, then, it seems that all changes are merely rearrangements 
of atoms. Again, what is denied is any notion of purpose guiding reality in 
favor of the mechanistic clock -like nature of physical matter. The total 
activity of the universe itself was thought to be subject to the physical 
laws of thermodynamics, thereby making all the occurrences therein both 
predictable and explainable. Everything is 'blind' adherence to the 
mechanistic laws. 
One rather horrifying consequence of the materialist conception as it 
developed from the 17th century cosmology and on into the practices of the 
19th and 20th centuries is the view that animals are mere automata. Since 
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everything in the universe is subject to the laws of mechanism, it was 
assumed that the animal body simply reacted to the stimuli of the external 
environment. "Each molecule blindly runs ".24 The view begins with Descartes, 
since he expounded a view consistent with the Christian doctrine that the 
lower animals are mere extended matter and do not have immortal souls. It 
ends in the tragic practice of vivisection; as Descartes' theory allowed an 
experimenter to dismiss any qualms he may feel about an animal suffering 
extreme pain in the name of science.25 As the physiological science advanced 
under the mechanistic framework, such practices became widespread to such an 
extent that, until only recently, has there been any serious question of the 
moral implications. Animals were understood to be machines; and all 
apparently purposeful actions were interpreted- as automatic or reflex 
reactions. 
Though I have stated this view concisely, it will suffice as one 
example of the callousness of scientific materialism on questions of mind and 
subjective experience. Other equally unfortunate consequences concern the 
abuse of our environment, but this, in itself, would require a digression too 
far from our central theme. In general, the problem is summed up by Whitehead 
in his conclusion to Science and the Modern World. He remarks that our 
aesthetic needs have been depreciated by the reactions of civilized society to 
modern science. "Its materialistic basis has directed attention to things as 
opposed to values. "26 And this, unfortunately, has resulted in a view that 
nature is there for our manipulation or exploitation. But what is wanted and 
needed to compensate for the imbalance is "...an appreciation of the infinite 
variety of vivid values achieved by an organism in its proper environment ".27. 
That is, as the abstract formulations of the mechanistic science neglect the 
concrete apprehensions of diverse values, the importance of achievement and 
how it is manifest in each living organism becomes pushed aside. 
The efficiency of the. scientific movement has undoubtedly produced 
tremendous advances for modern man. On purely pragmatic grounds it is easy 
to understand how it has gained dominance in an age which places such great 
emphasis on the advancement of technological aims and values. But science 
does not require materialism as its metaphysical foundation, even though 
this satisfied the limited group of facts investigated by the 17th century 
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cosmology. The problem was the claims made regarding its comprehensive 
application. In this respect, its limitations and the recognition of numerous 
negative consequences prompted due reaction from thinkers of a more Idealistic 
sort. Berkeley argued that materialism led to skepticism and atheism, as he 
wished to establish the primacy of mind in the universe. Leibniz accepted the 
scientific account of the universe as perfectly mathematical; but he replaced 
matter and external relations with mental entities, the monads, and described 
them as internal to one another as they mirror the universe. Kant accepted 
the deterministic character of mechanism, but argued that the moral sphere of 
man constituted an exception by his ability to freely choose between right and 
wrong. And Schelling and Hegel established in philosophy the notion of an 
Absolute as the ultimate spiritual reality. This introduction of various forms 
of Idealism during the reign of scientific materialism can be seen as a 
sustained revolt against what we might call a spiritual insignificance of man 
and of the universe as a whole. 
2. The Ontological Quest 
At the onset of the present chapter I mentioned a group of 19th and 20th 
century philosophers, who, following an 'ontological quest' have endeavoured 
to reformulate the foundations of metaphysics by the central role the doctrine 
of 'experience' played in each. Their reaction, generally speaking, is against 
the incoherence of a two substance ontology, especially where the material 
side has gained control of our ideas regarding the character of the extended 
universe. Whitehead goes to the heart of the problem in the following passage 
of Process and Reality: 
All metaphysical theories which admit a disjunction 
between the component elements of individual experience 
on the one hand, and on the other hand the component 
elements of the external world, must inevitably run 
into difficulties over the truth and falsehood of 
propositions, and over the grounds for judgment. The 
former difficulty is metaphysical, the latter epistemo- 
logical. But all difficulties as to first principles 
are only camouflaged metaphysical difficulties. Thus 
also the epistemological difficulty is only solvable 
by an appeal to ontology.28 
Indeed where such a disjunction in metaphysical theory has been advocated 
between two distinct substances, the more interesting questions regarding mind 
- 33 - 
and nature have degenerated into the petty form of the mind -body problem and 
associated problems of perception. But if some new conception of the nature 
of things is accepted, where ontologically all actualities composing the 
universe have the same metaphysical character of experience, then the 
connectedness of one's own immediate experience can be validly used to suggest 
the connectedness of all other actualities. 
Though I shall discuss the epistemological ramifications of this view 
later in this chapter, the question under consideration at present is: Does 
immediate experience reveal any definite ontological unit? 
Following Descartes we shall find that internal reflection provides the 
key to the ontological problem, where, in our own experience we discern the 
existence of a unit entity. When Descartes began with himself as a mentality, 
he found that the consciousness of this fact guaranteed his existence. The 
problem, however, was that Descartes, having already formulated a conception 
of the physical world, believed that the 'cogito' need not constitute any 
physical existence. The assumption throughout his metaphysical dualism is 
that the mental cannot be extended. But why not? There is no sufficient 
reason why there should be two kinds of substance rather than one. The 
resulting gap between man and nature has proved too large for a bridge. We 
are left with materialism or Idealism. But materialism, where the actualities 
which make up the extended physical world are 'dead' and without any element 
of feeling, enjoyment or anything characteristic of experience, has proved 
equally disturbing. How do we arrive at sentience or consciousness by this 
theory? How can there be genuine interrelationships in nature where there is 
obvious harmony and interdependence, given this notion of inert, vacuous matter 
at the base of things? Such problems, we shall see, are solvable when we look 
into our own vivid experience of immediacy for a clue to the real nature 
of reality. The given is immediate experience and this, by the present 
Idealistic doctrine, is the only reality, though it will be understood to take 
on many different manifestations throughout the universe. In short, our 
dictum: 'to be is to experience' will serve as the guiding principle for 
anything and everything real. An obvious consequence here is that the objects 
of experience cannot be of a radically different metaphysical character from 
the subjects having the experience. Hence a non -experiencing reality, i.e., 
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mere extended matter or a vacuous actuality, will be seen as a contradiction 
in terms. 
So far our doctrine has two requirements: (1) that immediate experience 
supplies the key to understanding the basic composition of reality, that is, 
our own experience is extended to apply to actualities 'external' to our 
immediacy; and (2) that such experience reveals a definite ontology of one 
type. Taken together, this brings us dangerously close to panpsychism, as 
one Absolute Idealist, Benard Bosanquet, once described Bradley's leanings.29 
With regard to the first of our criteria, James, Royce, Bradley and 
Whitehead have all provided, with remarkable clarity, the theoretical basis 
of our psychical inner life, which applies throughout reality. However, with 
regard to the second, the interpretation of immediate experience finds two 
alternatives: pluralism or monism.30 Although the conclusions drawn by these 
respective philosophers are indeed radically divergent, they all share this 
fundamental starting point in their metaphysics. The pluralistic alternative, 
following Leibniz, conceives the universe as a multitude of experiencing 
subjects, each in the fashion of the Cartesian 'res cogitans'. The monistic 
alternative, following Spinoza, views the individual cogitating mind as a mode 
of one eternal and unchanging Mind or spiritual Reality. James and Whitehead 
conform fairly well to the former, and Bradley and Royce to the latter, though 
Royce steers a mitigated course between the one and the many, emphasizing the 
individuality of the finite but as a necessary aspect of the eternal and 
unchanging Absolute. 
The necessity of including James and Royce in our present study will, 
I hope, become apparent as our thesis unfolds. Some of the most interesting 
issues and detailed arguments between pluralism and monism emerged as a 
result of continued debate between Bradley, James and Royce, all of whom were 
contemporaries at the turn of this century. James was at the heart of the 
conflict. His radical empiricism was the stark enemy of anything labled 
'Absolute Idealism'; and the outcome of his criticism was clearly absorbed 
into Whitehead's final synthesis. Also the central concept of the 'specious 
present', articulated in James's Principles of Psychology, was no less 
influential on Whitehead's theory of epochal becoming.31 This provides a 
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crucial basis for the notion that relations are directly experienced; and 
Bradley is thereby taken to task. Royce too may be mentioned in this 
connection, since his defense of individuality necessitated a repudiation of 
Bradley's celebrated arguments purporting to establish the unreality of finite 
individuals. Yet Royce is of curious importance for his affinities to Bradley 
as well. Having accepted both a doctrine of the Absolute and a through -going 
commitment to panpsychism, he, along with Whitehead, stresses the importance of 
the individual's becoming or striving for the ideal which perfects or completes 
its being; and, as with Bradley, he recognizes just how each individual finds 
its ultimate unity with the Absolute. It is little wonder why, on this score, 
Royce's work also attracted the attention of Gabriel Marce1.32 His account of 
the intimate and living relationship between the universe and the individual 
is fulfilled by the teleological determination of the will to realize its 
participation in the infinite; an account remarkably close to his European 
counterparts' advocating a theistic existentialism. 
3. Panpsychism 
What pushes the Idealist doctrine of experience toward panpsychism is 
the acceptance of the notion that all physical bodies, or their aggregates, 
have a creative 'inner' life or 'psychical' being, regardless of our inability 
to discover any hint of life in what is usually classified as inanimate. Also 
some hint of consciousness is wanting, as is the requirement that the basic 
constituents exist for themselves. Although panpsychism is not a very 
popular view, especially with our current philosophical climate, the history 
of philosophy is indeed rich in thinkers who have adopted this type of 
ontology. Some of the most prominant philosophers who have held this view, 
in addition to Leibniz, Royce and Whitehead, include: Lotze, McDougall, 
Fechner, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Peirce, Schiller, Alexander and Hartshorne. 
James and Bradley may also be included among this group for reasons to be 
explained later. Among the ancients the position was adopted by Thales, 
Anaximenes, Empedocles, Plotinus and Simplicius; and among modern biologists 
we should mention Teilhard de Chardin, Wright, Agar and Waddington, all of whom 
have found the panpsychist metaphysics to be the most cogent foundation for 
evolution and genetics. 
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The real beauty of the panpsychist theory is its ability to provide 
a smooth and continuous interpretation of the world in terms of the same 
substance. In this regard, Leibniz is something of a paradigm case of 
panpsychism in modern philosophy. He was one of the first philosophers to 
have seen the defects in the Cartesian system, and to have proposed a way to 
overcome the difficulties of both dualism and materialism in his Monadologv. 
Having looked within his own mind to discover the monad, Leibniz found a 
continuous process of activity which he termed perception. "The passing 
condition, which involves and represents a multiplicity in the unit or in the 
simple substance, is nothing but what is called Perception.... "33 Since the 
monads are the ultimate units in the universe, physical bodies must be 
understood as aggregates or compounds of these psychical unities. From this 
perspective, Leibniz obviously refused to admit any such distinctions as living 
versus nonliving or man versus animals as ultimate. The broad jumps between 
the various forms of existence disappear as the world of nature stretches along 
a continuum from the lowest to the highest forms of life, i.e., mineral, 
vegetable, and animal, with imperceptible shadings from one form to its 
neighboring forms. What appears to be inert and lifeless to us is simply 
the limiting case at the lower end of the continuum. These are the simple, 
unconscious monads. But as we move up the continuum to more complex forms 
of life, we find more sophisticated monads which involve various degrees of 
feeling and consciousness until we arrive at human consciousness and, 
ultimately, God. 
Royce has continued this argument with a most challenging contribution 
to panpsychism which slightly modifies Leibniz's doctrine. For Royce it is 
not the case that the apparently inanimate or inorganic is unconscious. It 
is rather a consciousness utterly unintelligible to human perceivers. On 
this view, the whole of nature is the expression of meaning and conscious 
fulfillment of the significance in life. In his major work, The 
World and the Individual, he writes: 
Where we see inorganic Nature seemingly dead, there 
is, in fact, conscious life, just as surely as there 
is any Being present in Nature at all. And I insist, 
meanwhile, that no empirical warrent can be found for 
affirming the existence of dead material substance 
anywhere. What we find, in inorganic Nature, are 
processes whose time -rate is slower or faster than 
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those which our consciousness is adapted to read or 
to appreciate.34 
What is actually different among the different manifestations of finite 
individuality is the apperceptive time -spans experienced. Our anthropocentric 
tendencies force us to conclude that our apperceptive span is the only 
possible one. But Royce holds that it is rational to think that there exist 
an infinity of experiences other than ours, which are characterized by special 
apperceptive spans.35 It may be that, for a consciousness having the same 
content as ours, but which has a different apperceptive span, what seems to 
us to last a second, is stretched out into a series lasting an entire era. 
Though the experience of different durations of time among the 
different manifestations of being remains fundamental in Royce's system, we 
should not conclude that communication is only possible among those which 
share the same apperceptive spans. This would indeed be contrary to the most 
positive principles of Royce's ontology, where intercommunication and 
cooperation among finite individuals form larger wholes. But communication 
here simply means the interdependence of life in the arteries of Being. 
In the past, the most serious objection to panpsychism has been an 
alleged inability to do justice to the hard facts of physical science. The 
idea that an electron behaves as it does as a result of various psychical 
factors inherent in the sub - subatomic particles has, for obvious reasons, been 
unenlightening to the physicist whose task involves objective measurertients and 
calculations. Few will doubt the validity of his objection in this context, 
provided that his limitations are defined in terms of describing and measuring 
physical phenomena. Should he, however, wish to widen his spectrum to a more 
comprehensive level of metaphysics, and wish to speculate as to the ultimate 
constituents of electrons and molecules, it is not at all unreasonable to 
accept the notion that centers of mental energy operate at the base of things. 
When Leibniz recognized the difficulty of making use of such metaphysical 
truths in science, i.e., that the real explanations are psychical or 
spiritual, he insisted on a thorough -going mechanism in physics and physio- 
logy, even though the only real forces are appetitions, desires, emotions or 
purposes. Science, he thought, trust approach the world in terms of apparent 
rather than real forces, referring to phenomena rather than to the inner life 
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of monads. 
The situation today, however, has changed somewhat since quantum 
mechanics and the theory of evolution are hardly mechanical in the sense 
understood by Newton and Leibniz. But this does not mean that science 
now studies the ultimate units of experience, whatever they may be; monads, 
finite centers of experience or actual occasions. Depending on the particular 
scientific specialization, what is studied is the behavior of the aggregates 
formed by such units. For example, physicists will be interested in the 
subatomic realm of electrons, positrons, and in the various effects of 
fission, fusion, etc. Chemists will see molecules as their basic units where 
chemical behavior depends essentially on the arrangements of the smaller 
units, namely electrons; and biologists will investigate the behavior of cells 
and genetic inheritance in living organisms. From here the continuum enlarges 
as the subject- matter of science expands- plants, animals, man, societies, 
planets and star -systems. But fundamentally the metaphysical or cosmological 
investigations will articulate the ultimate base of things, which enables a 
coherent and comprehensive view of the interconnections of all aspects of 
existence to be formed. From this point of view, all enquiry forms a whole, 
and depending on the currently accepted view of reality, progress in a 
particular epoch is understood by the success of the paradigm in its 
consistent interpretations of concrete experience. In our own epoch, the 
paradigm has been the electro- magnetic features of energy; and with this 
Whitehead clearly saw that the time was ripe for a reconcilation between 
science and a panpsychist metaphysics. In this respect, his cosmological 
construction, which derives extension and temporal succession from the 
momentary character of actual occasions, has gone unsurpassed. Psychical 
occurrences became easily reconciled with modern physics once mass as a 
quantity of matter was displaced by mass as a quantity of energy. Events 
and happenings thus became fundamental in this chain of thought; and simple 
location in time and space was replaced by vectors and electromagnetic 
fields.36 
Aside from Whitehead and the attempts of various biologists, most 
thinkers who have proposed a panpsychist metaphysic have not been attracted 
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to the notion for its scientific merits.37 Also, from the point of view 
of common sense, it seems contrary to our basic beliefs. But what common 
sense assumes is that the failure of our perceptions to discover sentience, 
individuality or activity in the inanimate implies their absence from these 
parts of nature. Admittedly, panpsychism is a hypothesis that cannot be 
proved, yet we must equally emphasize that the common sense doctrine cannot 
disprove the theory by the simple failure of perception. Indeed, modern 
physics now tells us that the inanimate is full of energetic vibrations and 
complex individuation. But the actual discovery that the whole of nature is 
basically psychical will forever elude the grasp of scientific knowledge and 
common sense. In this regard, the problem is within the special province of 
metaphysical enquiry; and any conception as to the degree of feeling in the 
rest of nature must remain largely analogical. In fact, what is required in 
order to understand the kind of experience that other actualities have is 
empathy. Certainly we can imagine some sort of rudimentary experience which 
goes on in the most simple creatures. As Professor Timothy Sprigge has 
recently put this point (in a basically Kantian terminology), this is to 
understand 'things in themselves' or the 'noumenal' nature of physical reality 
as opposed to an abstract conception of the structure of physical things or a 
phenomenal description.38 But the lower we descend on the continuum, the less 
likely we are to imagine the kind of concreteness such organisms experience. 
Though it is rather arbitrary as to where we make the exact division, I should 
say that once we go below the animal kingdom, where organisms don't seem to 
have a dominant centre of experience resulting from the synthesis of psychical 
unities, our capacity for empathy fades. That is, having human experience as 
our standard, and as the only possible one, our capacities to understand in 
detail the type of experience that goes on in lower organisms fades from 
realization. 
Let us now turn to the central doctrine of feeling which lies at the 
heart of Bradley and Whitehead's ontology. It is here that metaphysical 
generalization reveals the basic factor of concrete actuality. 
4. Bradley's Finite Centres of Experience 
Bradley surely produced a philosophy characteristic of Idealist 
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reactions to scientific materialism by the central role the concept of 
'feeling' played in his metaphysics. What Bradley realized was that the 
abstract entities described by physical science could never be substituted 
for our full concrete experience of reality as one continuous whole. And it 
is only when we pass away from this primitive harmonious unity to a knowledge 
of related things, of thought, analysis and judgment that we pass from what 
might be called a state of precognitive innocence to the flawed world of 
contradiction. Such a departure from immediacy, from the infrarelational 
level of experience to the relational level of thought, is certainly a 
necessary aspect of human life. However, Bradley insists that we must realize 
how this process will always involve a distortion of the true and the real. 
With this doctrine, one may find a certain affinity to the poetry of 
Wordsworth in which the return to concrete immediacy and the grasp of nature 
as a whole in any particular experience receives such vivid treatment. No 
doubt both Wordsworth and Bradley were reacting against the barren and 
abstract world of scientific materialism which so distorts the life of nature 
we directly experience. Wordsworth's dictum: "we murder to dissect" is 
reiterated by Bradley's "analysis is the death of feeling "; for analysis will 
always involve an abstraction from the continuous mass of felt experience. 
In an early formulation of this concept, Bradley writes: 
It is a very common and most ruinous superstition 
to suppose that analysis is no alteration, and that, 
whenever we distinguish, we have at once to do with 
divisible experience. It is an immense assumption 
to conclude, when a fact comes to us as a whole, 
that some parts of it may exist without any sort 
of regard for the rest.39 
At the moment analysis takes place, we have taken one step back from what is 
actually present in immediate feeling as the intellect discerns objects and 
qualities. The whole background from which abstraction is accomplished is 
necessarily neglected as the precognitive union of feeling gives way to 
thought and an endless web of relations. Reality thus fractures into parts 
and pieces. The problem, however, is putting it back together in such a way 
so as to insure that nothing has been altered. But Bradley clearly recognizes 
the impossiblity of this task. We are no longer referring to concrete 
reality, but rather to isolated aspects cut from its harmonious texture. In 
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fact, Bradley thinks, at this point, that we are working within the realm of 
appearance, and the manipulations of abstracted content fall into degrees of 
truth and reality. 
Even the most simple assertion, which proposes an independent fact in 
the content of experience, cannot be taken as real in any full sense. For 
instance: 'The cat is on the mat'. Don't we somehow sense, lurking in the 
background of this simple fact, the glow of a fireplace, the scent of tea 
brewing, a stormy night outside, and ultimately the whole of Reality pre- 
supposed in the content of this given experience? We can easily imagine, 
on this view, how much more abstraction is involved once we reach a level of 
discussion involving the cells and molecules in the cat's brain. 
The immediate relevance of the doctrine of degrees of truth and reality 
here concerns the notion of a continuum stretching from the fully concrete 
Reality, the Absolute, whose contents are nothing but sentient experience, to 
abstract entities, such as those postulated by scientific materialism. At one 
end of the spectrum, we approach the Absolute through the unity of feeling 
where no contradiction can possibly remain. But the more we depart from 
feeling and affirm the absolute independence of objects, the more we approach 
the relative unreality of a lifeless and abstract matter. Though Bradley does 
not undertake an exact system, showing how the various aspects of appearance 
fall into their proper place on the continuum, he does provide the general 
formula that: 
You may measure the reality of anything by the 
relative amount of transformation, which would 
follow if its defects were made good. The more 
an appearance, in being corrected, is transmuted 
and destroyed, the less real can such an appear- 
ance contain; or, to put it otherwise, the less 
genuinely does it represent the Real.40 
Hence, the more an appearance tends toward internal unification and feeling, 
and the less it is transformed when corrected, the more reality it contains. 
But let us now consider, in some detail, what feeling means in Bradley's 
metaphysics. 
Thusfar we have considered feeling as a unifying principle where we 
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directly encounter Reality. We have seen that it must be precognitive (i.e., 
before immediate experience has been analysed into objects and qualities), 
that it must be non - relational and devoid of contradiction. But what exactly 
is this primitive activity at the base of all experience? 
We should first discard any association with mere sensation, i.e., 
feeling of pain, pleasure, grief or affection. For Bradley clearly says that: 
"Feeling here naturally does not mean mere pleasure and pain; and indeed the 
idea that these aspects are our fundamental substance has never seemed, to me 
at least, worth discussing ".41 Feeling must therefore be more fundamental 
and pure; yet it must not "...be taken as simply one with any 'subliminal' 
world or any universe of the Unconscious ".42 Nor should we identify feeling 
with consciousness. Clearly feeling is wider in the sense that there are many 
influences, of which we are not conscious, which melt imperceptibly into our 
totality of experience. For the most part Bradley uses feeling and immediate 
experience interchangably as when he writes: "I use, in brief, immediate 
experience to stand for that which is comprised wholly within a single state 
of undivided awareness of feeling ".43 Or again: "Feeling is immediate 
experience without distinction or relation in itself ".44 Yet it is not 
synonymous with experience in the general sense, for, firstly, relational 
experience comprises a great many degrees of appearance resulting from the 
very departure from immediacy; and, secondly, there is the Absolute experience 
which is not to be equated with feeling. Feeling opens the road to Reality, 
but Reality itself is not feeling. What Bradley does mean by feeling is most 
clearly disclosed in his essay "On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience ". It 
is in this essay that the notion of a diversity of content felt as a unity, 
the many- into -one, makes its impact as fundamental to Bradley's metaphysics. 
Interestingly enough, Bradley, in one of his few acknowledgements, 
takes the opportunity to state his indebtedness to Hegel's psychology for 
the concept of feeling, as a union of the many and the one.45 This is a 
most curious note when we consider its transition into Whitehead's thought. 
But this we shall see in due course. 
According to Bradley's account, feeling is a unity, but complex in 
its internal diversity of conten.t. It is "...an awareness which, though 
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non -relational, may comprise simply in itself an indefinite amount of 
difference ".46 In feeling there are no relations or terms present as the 
whole of experience comes as the immediate unity of the psychical centre. 
Knowing and being become one in feeling. That is, there is no distinction 
between the subject of experience (that which feels) and the objects of 
experience (that which is felt), as such divisions clearly involve a relation 
of knower to known. As we have seen above, such distinctions are abstractions 
or ideal constructions cut out of immediate feeling. "Experience in its early 
form, as a centre of immediate feeling, is not yet either self or not -self. 
It qualifies the Reality, which of course is present within it, and its own 
finite content indissolubly connects it with the total universe. "47 From this 
perspective, the self, subject or the 'I' of the experiencing relation has not 
yet emerged as a distinctive character. It is simply fused with the diversity 
of content in one mass of felt continuity. Equally, on the other side of the 
relation, the not -self or objects of experience are in a nebulous and 
undistinguished state as not yet consciously focused to attention. The many 
are felt as one; there is only pure being in an undisturbed and undivided 
unity. 
Though it is somewhat difficult to disabuse ourselves of the prejudice 
that feeling is something subjective and private, and thus only affects the 
subject, and not what is properly felt, we find that this dualism dissolves 
when, following Bradley, we understand feeling as the very basis of experience 
which sustains the subject- object, self- not -self relation. In effect, what 
Bradley is saying is that Descartes' procedure, say, the examination of the 
piece of wax in the Meditations, is a later stage of experience where 
consciousness intervenes. Not only the properties attributed to the wax 
itself but the 'I', the indubitable cogito, is also a construction out of the 
fused mass of sentience. As Bradley writes: "Feeling is the beginning, and it 
is the source of all material, and it forms the enfolding element and abiding 
ground of our world ".48 It fills the divided chasm left blank by Descartes. 
Though the self, for Bradley, is not the basic experiencing unit, it 
should be obvious at this point that the many- into -one occurs within some type 
of psychical centre which unifies the diversity of content. Bradley calls the 
basic units of feeling, 'finite centres of experience'; and conceives them as 
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the constituents of the Absolute. But here an immediate objection should 
arise; for is it not the case that Bradley's monism forbids any sort of 
plurality? Strictly speaking the answer is an affirmative one. But this 
applies to the notion of a plurality of independent reals. What we must 
keep in mind here is the idea that the Absolute does have focal points 
through which Reality shines in all its rich and varied manifestations. But 
clearly the finite centres are not completely independent entities, though in 
some sense they are separate from one another. Nor are they considered truly 
real, for ultimately they are internally related in such a way as to form one 
final Individual. How, exactly, this is accomplished is beyond finite 
capabilities. Nonetheless we must conclude (as Bradley argues) that all comes 
together in absolute perfection. 
A clear grasp of Bradley's use of the concept of 'finite centres' is 
crucial in order to understand how the central theme of the many- into -one 
functions at several levels in his philosophy. But, unfortunately, Bradley 
himself is rather unclear about his specific use of the concept. It may 
therefore help to distinguish between an 'enduring' and a 'momentary' sense 
of the finite centres of experience.49 Although Bradley does not actually use 
these terms, his discussion in various places does tend to bring out just how 
the momentary centre may be understood as an aspect of the enduring centre. 
In a reply to a criticism by James Ward, for example, he says that there 
is "...a serious difference between finite centres on the one hand and mere 
aspects of one centre on the other hand... "50 Also Bradley sometimes uses the 
combined term 'prolonged finite centre' in support of what we shall here call 
the enduring centre.51 
Let us first take up the enduring centres of experience. As we have 
said above, these are the focal points of the Absolute. One particular centre 
may be said to be 'enduring' in the sense that it is the character which is 
always felt to be the same, as it becomes unified with some particular 
content.52 (e.g., the unchanging character of my centre throughout the various 
stages of my life.) The fact that it remains one and the same throughout makes 
it a timeless entity. On this point, T.S. Eliot, who wrote his doctorial 
dissertation on Bradley, describes this as having a definite affinity to the 
monads of Leibniz. He writes: "I suggest that from the 'pluralism' of 
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Leibniz there is only a step to the 'absolute zero' of Bradley and that 
Bradley's Absolute dissolves at a touch into its constituents ".53 Indeed we 
need only refer back to Leibniz's view of monads as indestructible psychical 
unities and his theory of perception as 'multiplicity in the unit' to see just 
what Eliot here means. As with Bradley's finite centres and their momentary 
appearances, Leibniz held that the unchanging monads have modifications which 
appear in temporal succession. On this view,the finite centres are very close 
to souls. In fact,in Appearance and Reality the discussion makes little if 
no distinction at all between souls and finite centres.54 But in a later 
essay entitled "What is the Real Julius Caesar ? ", Bradley makes certain 
qualifications. His distinction runs as follows: 
A soul is a finite centre viewed as an object 
existing in time with a before and after of 
itself. And further the soul is a thing distinct 
from the experiences which it has, which 
experiences we take not as itself but as its 
states.55 
Here we find much the same distinction as is made between the self and finite 
centres. The soul must be an entity distinct from the experiences which 
it has. On the other hand, the finite centre of experience cannot be 
distinguished from its experiences. It is its experiences and nothing else. 
And, as Bradley says, it cannot be understood as in time'. "It is temporal 
in the sense of being itself the positive and concrete negation of time ".56 
In the end, (as far as I can understand) Bradley thinks that the enduring 
centres fill that portion of the Universe in a timeless eternity. This gives 
him the notion that the finite centres of Caesar, you, and me, all contribute 
the richness of diversity to the one Absolute; though those portions which 
they fill may not overlap or coincide in a temporal sense.57 
So we have the notion that experience takes place in these essentially 
timeless centres which occupy a certain sphere of the Absolute. But Bradley 
also thinks that their momentary aspects, i.e., their appearance in time, are 
how we come to know their enduring character. What we perceive as process 
in time is the perpetual shifting of content from existence, and, at any one 
moment, the finite content becomes an immediate unity with this existence. 
This is the clue to the second sense of the finite centres: the concentration 
on the immediate character of any one moment forming a psychical unity. 
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As we have seen above, the concept of feeling is most clearly exposed 
in Bradley's essay "On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience ", and it is here 
that we also find his vivid characterization of our psychical life as 
momentary pulses. For example, he writes: 
In any emotion one part of that emotion 
consists already of objects, of perceptions 
and ideas before my mind. And the whole 
emotion being one, the special group of 
feelings is united with those objects 
before my mind, united with them intergrally 
and directly though not objectively.58 
The finite centre, in this sense, feels the diversity of content; of objects, 
perceptions and ideas, as one emotion in a certain temporal quantum. But this 
sense must be understood as an aspect of the enduring centre, as notes are 
to a melody. Bradley, on this point, says that the enduring centre "...can 
contain á lapse and a before and after, but these are subordinate ".59 That 
is, it is only by a breach of the eternal presence of the enduring centre that 
we are able to understand how the emotion of any one moment contributes to the 
life of the centre. And the sense of time and continuance gained from 
meditating on this momentary character remains essentially ideal. 
It may be curious to ask why Bradley chooses to call his basic units 
of experience 'finite', if, ultimately, he conceives of them as the eternal 
or timeless qualifications of the Absolute. We must, however, take the word 
'finite' in this phrase as referring to the finite content taken into the 
wholeness of experience. In Appearance and Reality the discussion centers 
on a distinction between the 'this' and the 'what' of experience. "Reality is 
being in which there is no division of content from existence, no loosening 
of 'what' from 'that'. "60 But such variety of content in the 'what' and the 
momentary character of the 'that' in experience are the finite aspects which 
qualify the whole. 
Perhaps this discussion will help us to understand a further point 
of some difficulty. That is, though nothing, in the end, is real, but what 
is felt in the immediate unity of the finite centre, we must not therefore 
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understand any of this to be equated with Reality. This would be a 
fundamental error in interpreting Bradley. In fact, at several places, he 
stresses the self- transcendent character of feeling, which may be said to 
result from the internal collision of the 'what' with its 'that'. The finite 
form of 'thisness' and its specious unity is, Bradley insists, always short 
lived and must pass beyond itself into something higher and more 
comprehensive: 
For the finite content is necessarily determined 
from the outside; its external relations... 
penetrate its essence, and so carry that beyond 
its own being. And hence, since the 'what' of 
all feeling is discordant with its 'that', it 
is appearance, and, as such, it cannot be real. 
This fleeting and untrue character is perpetually 
forced on our notice by the hard fact of change. 
And, both from within and from without, feeling 
is compelled to pass off into the relational 
consciousness. It is the ground and foundation 
of further developments, but it is a foundation 
that bears them only by a ceaseless lapse from 
itself.61 
It is this very fleeting and ceaseless lapse of momentary feeling which 
Bradley thinks cannot, in the end, be taken as truly real. In spite of the 
apparent self -completeness, the 'this', the very throb of existence, is always 
a member of a wider whole. The 'this- mine', he says, does not exclude 
inclusion in a fuller totality. The immediate feeling is always a more 
remote fringe of experience, which is at once "...the assertion and negation 
of my 'this-.62 
This particular doctrine of Bradley's regarding the self- transcendence 
of feeling, has not only been the central focus of disagreement with James; 
it has also been, in large measure, an issue of much misunderstanding with 
critics of his philosophy.63 But the importance of feeling, for Bradley, is 
that it is the ground and starting point for metaphysical enquiry; though it 
is not to be taken as the end, or thought of as identical with Reality. This 
n'on- relational many- into -one of immediacy is our low and imperfect example of 
what must be the case at the level of the Absolute.64 In short, the immediate 
unity of the finite centre supplies us with the basic principle which, if 
developed to a final self -completion, will provide the general character of 
the supra -relational experience.65 At most, our own example must be taken 
as analogical with the activity of the Absolute, where all experience is 
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harmonized into one final moment of eternity. 
Within this basic context of feeling and finite centres, the 
possibility of panpsychism seems to fall easily into place, and certainly 
Bradley's recognition of this causes him to entertain the idea from several 
perspectives. In the end, however, he stets short of any type of total 
commitment. It is a possible option for his metaphysics, though not necessary 
in order to complete his general conception of the Universe. Let us then 
consider the case for and against. 
Firstly, given Bradley's very general statements concerning the whole 
of reality as nothing else but sentient experience, one could easily take him 
to be advocating a panpsychism similar to that of Leibniz or Royce. "There 
is, he declares, "...no being or fact outside of that which is commonly called 
psychical existence. Feeling, thought, and volition... are all the material 
of existence, and there is no other material, actual or even possible. "66 
But just exactly what this comes to requires closer examination. 
In the chapter entitled "Nature" in Appearance and Reality, Bradley 
says: "Abstract from everything psychical, and then the remainder of existence 
will be Nature. "67 It does, however, soon become clear that there is no such 
remainder. The possiblity of an inorganic Nature he quickly dismisses on the 
grounds that there could not exist an arrangement which somehow escapes or 
lies outside of the experience of the Absolute.68 But the crucial question 
is whether the things of nature are all psychical in character, that is, 
whether the whole of nature is arranged by the volition of finite centres of 
experience. Since this is a genuine possibility for Nature, Bradley remains 
open. He does think, however, that it is surely beyond our capabilities to 
discover its truth. He says that our failure "...to discover these symptoms 
is no sufficient warrant for positive denial ", and he footnotes the 
panpsychist Fechner in this connection.69 Indeed Bradley here realizes just 
how such arrangements of 'personal unities' could very well be organized by 
the Absolute and "...directly connected with finite centres of feeling ". And 
if this is so, what is perceived as the common world with a certain uniformity 
of nature is a result of the will of the Whole.70 
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Bradley's main argument against panpsychism comes at several points 
where he entertains the question: "Is there any Nature not experienced by a 
finite subject ? "71 Or again: "Is there...in the universe any sort of matter 
not contained in finite centres of experience ? "72 If it is possible that 
there are various aspects of the universe which are not reflected through 
finite centres, then panpsychism is not a necessary doctrine for Bradley. 
This would not make those aspects unattached, just unmediated or unfiltered. 
Such qualities, or aspects would still consist of experience, ultimately 
absorbed into the Absolute, but they would not be matter perceived by us as 
nature. The fact that they are not filtered through finite centres makes them 
possible only for the Absolute where they are experienced directly. 
The main reason Bradley takes this question seriously involves his 
repeated claim that the details of Absolute life completely escape the 
capabilities of finite intelligence. As he says: 
We do not know why or how the Absolute divides 
itself into centres, or the way in which, so 
divided, it still remains one. The relation 
of the many experiences to the single experience, 
and so to one another, is, in the end, beyond us. 
And, if so, why should there not be elements 
experienced in the total, and yet not experienced 
within any subordinate focus ?73 
An affirmitive response to the question of panpsychism, then, would seem 
to involve an understanding of details in the Absolute which would exceed 
Bradley's central task of discovering the main features or general principles 
of the Universe. But as we have seen above, this does not involve a denial 
either. 
Though Bradley avoids dogmatism by giving equal weight to both sides 
of the argument, I suspect that he recognized that a commitment to panpsychism 
would have pushed him far too close to a pluralistic metaphysics. What he is 
presumably rejecting is an interpretation of the world in terms of a very low 
level of sentience which would place too much emphasis on the momentary 
centres. But if we take him as denying the possibility of panpsychism, it is 
not at all clear just why finite centres should be confined to human beings 
and animals. Certainly the difficulty here is just where to make the exact 
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cut in nature, (i.e., as to what does or does not have a centre). But in the 
end, it seems that an affirmative response to panpsychism is wanting to push 
Bradley's metaphysics to a fully consistent scheme, despite his claim that 
such questions are unanswerable due to our 'miserably incomplete' knowledge of 
Absolute life. 
5. Whitehead's Actual Occasions 
Although Whitehead's doctrine of experience, which focuses 
primarily on feeling via the positive prehensions of actual occasions, has 
many different sources synthesized into his novel formulation, we shall be 
concerned primarily with its affinity to Bradley's doctrine.74 At later 
points, however, it will be necessary to consider other influences (e.g., 
James, modern physics and biology) in order to make the relevant points as 
to exactly where Whitehead's views diverge from Bradley's. 
The explicit statement of his conformity to the doctrine of experience 
comes as a major principle in the Categoreal Scheme, Part I, Chapter II of 
Process and Reality, the 'Ontological Principle' which, states that outside 
of the experience of actual occasions, there is absolutely nothing. Whitehead 
summarizes by saying: "No actual entity, then no reason ".75 That is, there is 
no reason for existence. Actual occasions are the final real things in the 
universe; there is no going behind them to discover anything more real. They 
are the most concrete elements in existence. All other types of entity are 
derived by abstraction from their concreteness. Whitehead, like Bradley, on 
this point, has insisted on a return to the concrete, and has attempted to 
build a philosophic system based on what is present in immediacy. His 
'fallacy of misplaced concreteness', as it has made its way into the current 
philosophic literature, is a protest against philosophic or scientific schemes 
which attempt to build a system based on the more abstract things, and arrive 
at the more concrete things, (Newtonian mechanics being a prime example). 
For Whitehead, the universe is alive with feeling. It is an 'ocean 
of feeling' in which each actuality contributes its drop and fades into the 
past. The metaphors here ring of both Bradley and James, for Whitehead's 
reconstruction of experience on a process. model incorporated much of their 
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thought, at least at those places where they were inclined to agree. 
As we have stated above in the general doctrine of the 'Ontological 
Quest', the best instance of an actual occasion is to be found in a moment of 
one's own consciousness. From the Cartesian perspective, Whitehead says that 
his actual occasions are all 'res cogitations', and each contributes a quantum 
of extensiveness to the world. In fact, the actual occasion is best conceived 
of as a metaphysical generalization of an initially psychological concept.76 
The introspective discovery of the drop of experience is generalized to apply 
throughout the universe. By this doctrine, the puzzle as to the connectedness 
of nature is solved by appealing to the texture of life, which is always right 
under our own noses. The final actualities are all alike; they are all 
natural units of process, of becoming and perishing. But compared to the 
infinite multitude of actualities which constitute nature, the actual 
occasions which make up human consciousness are highly specialized instances. 
In fact, such occasions are the 'crown of experience' and are therefore 
derivative from a more rudimentary and fundamental level of process.77 
This is where Whitehead and Bradley connect. 
Before experience has been analyzed into actual occasions as distinct 
units of the temporal process, there is the base of this continuous flow, 
which is essentially primitive and unconscious, Experience, in this sense, 
is dumb. It is the momentary throb of feeling where objects and subjects, 
qualities and relations, remain undistinguished. With Bradley, we have 
understood this to be the precognitive unity of feeling, where experience is 
essentially undivided and non -relational. And with Whitehead, we have an 
analogous doctrine with his notion of 'perception' in the mode of 'causal 
efficacy'. On this level, the feelings are "vague but insistent ". There is 
the compulsion of the immediate past forcing itself into the present, and 
continuing into that novel moment. 
The continuity of experience is the key notion here. As opposed to 
the very clear and distinct perceptions of the world, which Whitehead calls 
'perception' in the mode of 'presentational immediacy', causal efficacy 
provides the basic perception of passage. In fact, the former, which 
supplies the details of sensa, (our keen visual perceptions for example) is 
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dependent upon the latter. The very buzz of existence comes first. Causal 
efficacy is that mode of perception which so pervades our experience that it 
is taken for granted: and for Whitehead this means the persistent inheritance 
of brute givenness, of the massive presence of the past in the process of 
merging into the present. The feelings it transmits are vague, inarticulate, 
and simply felt as the efficaciousness of the past. Whitehead, on this point, 
writes: 
Such feelings, divorced from immediate sensa, are 
pleasant or unpleasant, according to mood; but 
they are always vague as to spatial and temporal 
definition, though their explicit dominance in 
experience may be heightened in the absence of 
sensa.78 
Of course where evolution has given us such acute receptors, resulting from 
the highly developed sense organs, we naturally focus attention on the clear 
and distinct. But, as Whitehead suggests, in the absence of such sensa, we 
encounter reality at a level that remains at bottom and fundamental. Our dim 
consciousness of half -sleep, the thumping of our heart -beat, and the visceral 
feelings of well -being all suggest continuous becoming in the mode of causal 
efficacy. Such perceptions, as crude and inarticulate as they are, must be 
as close as we can come to understand what the rest of reality is like. That 
is, what we experience when we meditate on this process of becoming must be 
analogous to lower forms of life which do not possess such refined organs of 
sense. With an eye for the panpsychist doctrine here, Whitehead thinks that 
the variety of organisms which exhibit modes of behavior directed toward self - 
preservation suffice as evidence of feeling and causal awareness with the 
external world. 
A jellyfish advances and withdraws, and in so doing 
exhibits some perception of causal relationship with 
the world beyond itself; a plant grows downwards to 
the damp earth, and upward towards the light. There 
is thus some direct reason for attributing dim, slow 
feelings of causal nexus, although we have no reason 
for any ascription of the definite percepts in the 
mode of presentational immediacy.79 
The point, of course, is that the whole of existence must have a very 
primitive awareness of causal efficacy which lies at the base of experience. 
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Whitehead effectively argues that philosophers, in their analysis 
of perception, have ignored perception in the mode of causal efficacy by 
concentrating on those distict impressions mainly revealed through visual 
perception. The obvious result is that philosophy has attempted to analyse 
perception solely in terms of presentational immediacy, and has had a 
continuous headache with regard to causal relations and the continuity of 
experience. Hume is a prime example of this type of empiricist thinking. 
As Whitehead says: "Hume's polemic respecting causation is, in fact, one 
prolonged, convincing argument that pure presentational immediacy does not 
disclose any causal influence... "80 Hume's doctrine inverts the relationship 
by making causal efficacy as an experience dependent upon presentational 
immediacy. But as long as presentational immediacy remains primary, causal 
relations will continue to be 'metaphysical nuisances'. It unveils the world 
at an instant, and, if taken in itself, will not reveal any intrinsic 
connection with the past or future. The conclusion is that events in the 
contemporary world are causally independent of one another. 
Curiously, the fundamental contrast between causal efficacy and 
presentational immediacy was captured succinctly in Russell's recollection 
of an argument with Whitehead. Speaking of his own philosophy, he writes: 
It was Whitehead who was the serpent in this 
paradise of Mediterranean clarity. He said 
to me once: "You think the world is what it 
looks like in fine weather at noon day; I think 
it is what it looks like in the early morning 
when one first wakes from a deep sleep." I 
thought this remark horrid, but could not see 
how to prove that my basis was any better than 
his.81 
Russell, like Hume, held a doctrine of external relations where independent 
objects and isolated qualities were fundamental to his logical atomism. 
But what he perceived in Whitehead's view of the world, which caused some 
difficulty for his own, was the essentially dumb force of causal efficacy, 
undeniable, yet so vague and inarticulate as to be almost anti -intellectual. 
But the real deception of the atomism which defends completely 
independent and isolated objects (Russell's view of the universe as a 'heap of 
shot') is that our language, with its distinct words for separate objects and 
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qualities, provides an adequate grasp of the basis of reality.82 Language, of 
course, naturally attunes itself to presentational immediacy. But the subject - 
predicate structure of language and thought has a peculiar difficulty when it 
comes to causal efficacy. It can only grasp onto a particular distinctness 
which lingers after the fact. That is, language is a later stage of 
experience where thought attempts to isolate facts from the welter of data 
present to consciousness. But it is surely a delayed reaction following 
closely behind the leading edge of actual occasions. 
Whitehead was quite insistent on the inadequacy of the subject - 
predicate structure of language throughout his philosophical career. In fact, 
his main criticism of modern philosophy is this recurring problem of taking 
the subject -predicate form of statement as conveying a truth which is 
metaphysically ultimate.83 It has a sound pragmatic defense, but in 
metaphysics the concept is sheer error. Somewhere Whitehead says that 
language was designed for the market place; it is pragmatic in that it serves 
our purposes well in handling the static, but it does not capture the dynamic 
reality of immediacy. This was the very reason why Whitehead found it 
necessary to invent terms such as 'concrescence', 'prehension' and 
'ingression' to express the fluid -like character of process. But the result 
of these innovations is that his thought has tended to be regarded as highly 
obscure by the more 'orthodox' schools of philosophy. Much of his having 
been neglected as an important thinker in our century, especially in Britain, 
can be attributed to this fact. 
Now it should be noted that the basis of reality defended by 
Whitehead puts him at one with Bradley in two important senses; (i) the 
correspondence between his concept of causal efficacy and presentational 
immediacy with Bradley's concept of existence and content, and (ii) the 
attack on abstraction as supplying the total truth about things. 
Firstly, throughout the above exposition, the basic parallel with 
Bradley's 'that' and 'what' of experience should be obvious. On the one 
hand we have a precognitive unity of feeling, which lies at the bottom of 
existence. It is simply our intuitive grasp of continuity as one momentary 
throb of feeling continues into another. And on the other hand we have the 
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specific content, the universals, which are already contained in the facts of 
passage. Neither can be truly separated from the other, even though it is 
possible to distinguish these two aspects which contribute to the totality of 
experience. One way of putting the common doctrine would be to say that as 
long as we dwell in the realm of clear and distinct qualities and spatial 
relations, i.e., within presentational immediacy alone, we will remain on a 
fairly abstract level of thought which entertains isolated objects in purely 
external relations. It is this, Bradley says, that loosens the 'what' 
from the 'that' and removes us from the immediacy of feeling. Similarly, 
for Whitehead, this one -sided analysis of experience will never supply any 
information as to our primary perception of the connectedness of experience. 
Either way, what we find is an attempt in both thinkers to restore the balance 
to our distorted world -view by establishing the primacy of feeling which 
sustains any derivative form of existence. 
This brings us directly into our second point of contact between 
Whitehead and Bradley. The result of having the primacy of feeling as the 
basis of reality is that we must not be deceived by the apparent completeness 
of any statement which abstracts from the totality given in any one 
experience. Though Whitehead does not have an explicit doctrine of 'degrees' 
of truth and reality, he does hint at something very close to this when he 
discusses 'half- truths', and the fact that our finite capabilities make the 
total truth quite inaccessible.84 Conscious discrimination and analysis zeros - 
in on those clear and distinct details given in any one totality. But such a 
process and the resulting judgment about those facts must be regarded as 
highly abstract. That is, it can never do justice to the harmonious unity 
which is there in feeling. As Whitehead says in his very late work, Modes 
of Thought: "These relations, thus abstracted require for their full 
understanding the infinitude from which we abstract. We experience more than 
we can analyse. For we experience the universe, and we analyse in our 
consciousness a minute selection of its details ".85 
Though it would be misleading to suggest that, at this level, the 
parallels between Whitehead and Bradley are complete, we do have a point of 
contact for the interpretation of feeling in their respective philosophies. 
Whereas the discrepancies will be dealt with in the following chapters, at 
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present, we are looking for the broad metaphysical picture. There is, 
however, one crucial difference we must point out now before moving on to 
consider the essential characteristics of the actual occasions, and how they 
compare with Bradley's finite centres of experience. 
Whitehead says that his philosophy of organism is an inversion of 
Bradley's doctrine of actuality. Instead of regarding the actual occasion as 
a mode of a more genuine Individual, the Absolute, the occasion is the final 
reality. That is to say, Whitehead's finite units of fact are the genuine 
individuals of the creative process. For Bradley, on the other hand, the 
finite facts are indeed present in process, but taken as imperfect 'modes' 
of one perfect and all- embracing Absolute. Whitehead writes: "The final 
actuality is the particular process with its particular attainment of 
satisfaction. The actuality of the universe is merely derivative from its 
solidarity in each actual occasion. "86 This is the essential pluralist thesis 
by which Whitehead has rejected Bradley's notion that the individual moment of 
experience is inconsistent if taken as fully real. It also explains why 
Whitehead considers feeling to have a particular emotional tone (e.g., 
pleasant or unpleasant), depending on the character of each actual occasion. 
As a consequence of this fundamental contrast, Whitehead's 
interpretation of Bradley's concept of feeling has focused solely on 
the momentary finite centre of experience. Much of this comes clearly 
to surface when he directly quotes from Bradley's essay on "Immediate 
Experience ".87 This means that Whitehead has purposely neglected some of 
Bradley's most important points regarding the self- transcendence of feeling 
and the relative unreality of the fleeting moment. Furthermore, there is 
nothing in Whitehead's metaphysics which corresponds to the enduring centre 
of experience. In other words, there is no eternal and timeless centre in 
the sense of the Leibnizian monad. The actual occasion exists only in the 
sense of the moment which becomes and perishes. 
Within this context, what Whitehead does find in Bradley's theory, 
which accords so well with his own reflections, is that, at the base of 
experience, this continuous process of the many becoming one is achieved by 
feeling. If we keep in mind Bradley's essential point regarding the 
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diversity of content felt as a unity, at the level of the momentary finite 
centre, we shall find much agreement in both thinkers. Compare, for example, 
the following passage of Whitehead which takes on a distinctive Bradleian 
tone: 
Each monadic creature is a mode of the process 
of "feeling" the world, of housing the world in 
one unit of complex feeling in every way 
determinate. Such a unit is an "actual occasion "; 
it is the ultimate creative derivative from the 
creative process.88 
Although Bradley does not describe his finite centres as creative in quite 
this sense, the basic point is clear. Each actual occasion becomes a complex 
unity by feeling the world, and by including the diversity of content within 
itself. Whitehead calls this function of the universe 'creative' because it 
involves an activity of synthesis. In fact, this function of the universe 
forms the most general and comprehensive principle of Whitehead's metaphysics: 
the 'Category of the Ultimate' which states that, at each successive moment, 
...the many, which is the universe disjunctively, become the one actual 
occasion, which is the universe conjunctively ".89 That is, each actual 
occasion becomes a novel synthesis by 'feeling' the disjunctive diversity of 
its immediate past. Life is thus born anew with each conjunctive unity. The 
present occasion transforms what is settled in the antecedent universe as it 
actively selects or chooses from the multitude of data.90 It creates with 
what is given, the objects of the immediate past, to produce in its subjective 
immediacy a new entity which will become an object for the future. 
Now sometimes Whitehead uses 'feeling' in a very general sense, 
giving the suggestion of life operating in every single actuality throughout 
the universe. It is here that Whitehead adopts Bradley's term with approval, 
and says that "...this whole metaphysical position is an implicit repudiation 
of the doctrine of 'vacuous actuality' ".91 Without a doubt Whitehead accepts 
Bradley's claim that feeling is the beginning and the source of all material 
forming the enfolding element and abiding ground of our world. It is the 
essential defining characteristic of each and every actuality whereby the many 
become one. But at other times, Whitehead's use of 'feeling' takes on a much 
more specific and technical meaning than we find in Bradley's metaphysics. 
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This is not to say that it is inconsistent with Bradley's meaning, but that it 
is much too detailed for the general scheme put forth by Bradley. In this 
sense of the word, Whitehead defines a feeling as a 'positive prehension', 
which means an uncognitive apprehension of the data of the past. It is 
consistent with Bradley in the sense that it literally means to grasp onto the 
data of the world, and to include those characteristics within its present 
constitution. That is, such data become internally related in the present 
occasion by what was positively taken from it and re- enacted in the life of 
that moment. But it is certainly a modification of Bradley's doctrine, in 
that Whitehead has described 'prehension' as the most concrete mode of 
'relatedness' forming the component elements of actual occasions. He 
therefore insists, contrary to Bradley, that relations are present below the 
level of consciousness. (This is a purely logical matter to be taken up in 
chapter IV.) Also there is the fact that Whitehead has distinguished a 
'negative prehension' which finds no parallel in Bradley. This is the 
activity of eliminating characteristics or data which are incompatable with 
the aim of the present subject. The data is considered, but not included in 
that particular determination. The concept here is somewhat akin to 
'elimination' in the genetic sense. 
Throughout this chapter we have seen how Bradley and Whitehead reject 
the materialist -dualist approach to metaphysics in favor of a comprehensive 
psychical ontology. It is, therefore, obvious that the traditional notion of 
'substance' is replaced by the primacy of events, and what lies at the very 
heart of this ontology is the concept of feeling, which is the common 
denominator between Whitehead and Bradley. But also we have discovered 
certain qualifications of Bradley's doctrine in that Whitehead has placed 
great emphasis on the novelty of creative choice and the reality of the 
temporal process. Such considerations mark a fundamental contrast which will 
occupy much of our discussions in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCE 
1. Introduction 
Having now brought to surface the basic context of metaphysical 
principles common to Whitehead and Bradley, we shall, in this chapter, 
consider some of the details of immediate experience in a more or less 
psychological framework. The very fact that we attempt such an analysis of 
experience does become rather problematic for our comparative study, for 
clearly there is nothing in Bradley's philosophy which corresponds to the 
exhaustive analysis of feeling central to Part III of Whitehead's Process 
and Reality. As we have hinted above, the intricate detail of Whitehead's 
system here far exceeds any discussion in Bradley's metaphysics, and this 
is so for two reasons. Firstly, we must repeat Bradley's plea that our aim 
in metaphysics is a general and theoretically tenable view of reality, which 
does not require the filling in of all the details of the Universe. Such a 
scheme, he thinks, would be quite impossible for finite beings. And secondly, 
we must keep in mind that, for Bradley, any analysis of feeling will result in 
its destruction. He explicitly says that feeling "...does not offer itself 
as intelligible ".1 What is left, once analysis has cut into its harmonious 
unity is not Reality, but abstractions and contradiction. 
In the first case Bradley is surely right about the inability of finite 
intelligence to comprehend the Universe in total. In his view, philosophy 
itself is a finite and imperfect attempt to describe the infinite perfection 
of the Absolute. But if we simply substitute 'universe' for 'Absolute' to 
denote the whole of existence, we may find that Whitehead was no less humble 
on this matter either. In fact, Whitehead repeatedly criticized the attempt 
to encapsulate the universe in any one system. "Philosophy ", he says, "is the 
attempt to express the infinity of the universe in terms of the limitations of 
language ".2 This was the very reason why he conceived the proper method in 
metaphysics to be hypothetico- deductive. Still Whitehead's recognition of such 
limitations of finite systems did not constrain his own attempt to provide a 
detailed cosmology which would serve the purpose of guiding the special 
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sciences. Even though Whitehead and Bradley seem to be saying the same thing 
on a meta -metaphysical level, their differences concern mainly the question of 
cosmological construction. This was our problem in chapter I regarding the 
pure and hybrid approach to metaphysics.3 The hybrid approach is, of course, 
more concerned with pragmatic consequences. 
As to the second problem, regarding the possibility of analysis, we seem 
to have a more serious objection. If causal efficacy, or feeling in the more 
general sense, refuses to satisfy the demands of intelligence, it does seem 
that Whitehead's program may be dubious. But here we shall find that he has 
broken away from Bradley, and that he has moved a bit closer to the type of 
empiricism expounded by James. What is quite clear is that Whitehead does 
agree that the lower level of experience, the rudimentary and vague sense of 
becoming, is not open to the type of clear and precise analysis in the mode 
of presentational immediacy. Causal efficacy, in this sense, does remain 
unanalysable. But at the higher level of experience, i.e., human 
consciousness, the units of becoming are discerned and such occasions of 
experience are open to analysis, even though some damage must be admitted. 
At least at this level, Whitehead holds that more specific metaphysical 
principles can be formulated, and that these must apply to the lower levels 
as well. That is, since our experience derives from a natural world of 
throbbing actualities, what is discerned at the level of consciousness must 
be seen as a highly illuminated version of the basic stuff of becoming. 
But the real problem confronting us now is just how our flow of 
experience, which Bradley describes as a continuous undivided harmony, may be 
made up of a sequence of discrete moments or acts of experience. We have 
seen that for Bradley this is not Reality, but an ideal construction. To 
discover a process of individuals is to depart from the general sense of 
feeling. This problem brings us right to the concept of the 'specious 
present'; an old controversy between Bradley and James. 
2. The Specious Present 
In the Principles of Psychology, James had focused his discussion on 
our perception of time; and he attempted to answer the question: "What is the 
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original of our experience of pastness, from whence we get the meaning of the 
term ? "4 We commonly divide the course of time into past, present and future, 
but the "...prototype of all conceived times is the specious  present, the 
short duration of which we are immediately and incessantly sensible ".5 James 
attacked the idea that the present can be an instantaneous flash between the 
immediate past and future. "Let any one try, I will not say to arrest but to 
notice or attend to, the present moment of time. "6 Indeed it is only as an 
'ideal abstraction' that such a notion is possible. What is experienced, 
however, is a short duration in which some elements are experienced as 
past, some as present and some as about to occur in an ongoing flow of 
experience.? With characteristic clarity he writes: 
. the practically cognized present is no knife - 
edge, but a saddle -back, with a certain breadth of 
its own on which we sit perched, and from which we 
look in two directions into time. The unit of 
composition of our perception of time is a duration, 
with a bow and a stern, as it were- a rearward- and 
a forward -looking end. It is only as part of this 
duration -block that the relation of succession of one 
end to the other is perceived. We do not first feel 
one end and then feel the other after it, and from the 
perception of the succession infer an interval of time 
between, but we seem to feel the interval of time as a 
whole, with its two ends embedded in it.8 
According to James, then, the specious present is a duration -block or an 
observed unity which realizes itself as the totality of its temporal parts. 
The present is 'specious' in the sense that it is never just here -now. It is, 
rather, a temporal stretch which overlaps and includes bits of the past as 
well as anticipations of the future. But the important point to keep in mind 
is that there are definite atomic quantums discerned by consciousness and 
felt as whole moments. This is the essential psychological basis for James's 
later metaphysical theory, his radical empiricism, in which the 'drops of 
experience' become the ultimate units in a pluralistic universe. All forms 
of existence must be understood as either extracts cut out from these pulses 
or wholes composed of a number of them woven together by their felt 
transmissions. 
Though James recognized such definite units of experience as 
ultimate, he placed equal emphasis on the continuity between them. Each 
pulse is an experience for itself; but also feels its continuity in a 'stream 
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of experience'. The divisions between the moments of consciousness are not 
sharply separated from one another but, rather, they flow together with such 
ease that we hardly notice a difference.9 But surely, when we reflect on the 
specious present 'now', it is not the same one of the moment past. Each drop 
has its own character and duration. Each drop 'enjoys' a momentary presence, 
and fades as a novel drop continues where it left off. 
Bergson too must be mentioned in this connection since he held a view 
remarkably close to James when he advocated the use of intuition, as opposed 
to intellectual analysis, as the only means of unveiling the flowing stream of 
reality. Intellectual analysis, he thought, would give, at best, a science 
which portrayed reality as instantaneous deterministic cross -sections. But 
this concept of a homogeneous time series is a pure abstraction, only useful 
for scientific investigations where it becomes an independent variable. 
Bergson, like James, held that reality has no such measurably neat divisions. 
The heterogenous moments which we experience as having varying durations, some 
longer, some shorter, are the concrete building blocks for our theories. 
The metaphors of 'running water', 'drops' and 'streams' to depict 
reality were natural associations for these philosophies of process. I have 
myself found these notions to be the most convincing and accurate images of 
the event - character of experience. Just as the multitude of drops melt 
together to form a flowing stream, innumerable throbs of emotion melt 
together to form the natural rhythms of our experience. The feeling is 
not one of a solid substance, but a very fluid and rushing stream. 
Now Bradley had advanced a criticism of the instantaneous and 
homogeneous concept of 'time', well before both James and Bergson, in his 
Principles of Logic. He is, however, quite opposed to any attempt to break 
up our psychical life into a succession of individuals; and he is therefore 
unwilling to settle for durations as the ultimate units as well. Bradley 
insists that there is only the unity of feeling, not feelings.10 And here 
we must keep in mind that his own finite centres, so far as they exist as 
objects, and endure in time, are made and subsist by ideal construction.11 
For Bradley, our tendency to set up the momentary appearance (however 
- 63 - 
long or short) as atomic and individual is surely mistaken. Any attempt along 
this line will lead us right into the endless web of terms and relations. 
Though we must refrain from plunging straight into these arguments here, there 
is one conceptual problem upon which Bradley centers his attention: the 
concept of the 'specious present'. In the Principles of Logic he takes up 
the problem of discerning the individual moment of time in order to locate the 
subject of an analytic judgment, (i.e., a judgment in which the idea refers to 
what is given in perception). But when we attempt to isolate the present we 
are unable to discern the subject due to our inability to grasp adequately the 
individual unit of that experience. As a temporal phenomenon, the present 
either has no duration and time at all, or we discover that the duration 
itself has a temporal diversity which would result in an infinite regress of 
nows. He writes: 
For no part of space or time is a final element. 
We find that every here is made us of heres, and 
every now is resolvable into nows. And thus the 
appearance of an atomic now could not show itself 
as any one part of time. But, if so, it could 
never show itself at all. Or, on the other hand, 
if we say the appearance has duration, then, like 
all real time, it has succession in itself, and it 
would not be the appearance of our single now.12 
Like James, Bradley agrees that the concept of an 'instantaneous present' is a 
pure abstraction. Atomic instants do not occur in immediate experience. But 
as we can clearly see from this passage, Bradley rejects the duration as an 
atomic individual as well. Any attempt to locate an individual (other than 
the one universal Individual) is an abstraction from that continuous whole 
present in feeling. To make this point Bradley entertains the stream -metaphor 
in an attempt to show the inadequacy of the concept of the 'specious present'. 
Even though this was quite some time before the publication of James's 
Principles of Psvchologv and the phrase 'specious present' is not explicitly 
mentioned, it does become quite clear that Bradley is rejecting any picture of 
the given as an event with fixed boundaries marked by similar events on either 
side.13 
Let us fancy ourselves in total darkness hung 
over a stream and looking down on it. The 
stream has no banks, and its current is 
covered and filled continuously with floating 
things. Right under our faces is a bright 
illuminated spot on the water, which cease- 
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lessly widens and narrows its area, and shows 
us what passes away on the current. And this 
spot that is light is our now, our present. 
We may go still further and anticipate 
a little. We have not only an illuminated 
place, and the rest of the stream in total 
darkness. There is a paler light which, both 
up and down stream, is shed on what comes before 
and after our now. And this paler light is the 
offspring of the present. 
.The result, which at present we have 
wished to make clear, is that the now and here, 
in which the real appears, are not confined 
within simply discrete and resting moments. 
They are any portion of that continuous content 
with which we come into direct relation. Examin- 
ation shows that not only at their edges they 
dissolve themselves over into there and then, 
but that, even within their limits as first 
given, they know no repose.14 
So for Bradley, the illuminated spot on the stream is simply an image meant to 
show our inability to extend the reality which lies on either side of it. It 
is our limited scope through which we view the Real. 
What is rather odd about Bradley's interpretation of this metaphor 
is the fact that he does not see the subject in question as immersed in the 
rushing flow of the stream, but merely observing what is passing on it. 
We should here note the difference from the Jamesian 'stream of experience' 
in the sense that the observer and the stream are not identical. But still 
this would not affect Bradley's main point that we must not take what is 
present in the momentary appearance as the sole reality. Reality continues 
far beyond what we experience in any one moment. 
Curiously enough, at times, Bradley does seem to argue in accordance 
with the concept of the 'specious present'. For example, in the same passage 
just quoted, he says: "The appearance is always a process of disappearing, and 
the duration of the process which we call our present has no fixed length ".15 
This would seem to suggest agreement with both James and Bergson on the point 
regarding the heterogeneous character of the drops of experience. But here we 
must not confuse his psychological reflections on the finitude of the human 
condition with his ultimate metaphysical views. Where James sees the duration 
as an experienced unity of temporal parts, Bradley sees an infinite regress of 
nows. The present, for him is the filling of that duration in which Reality 
appears and can therefore be seen as the negation of time. That is to 
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say, Reality does not exist in time; it only appears there and creates the 
fiction of an atomic now.16 
Having now seen how James and Bradley deal with the problem as to how 
our continuous experience can (or can not) be made up of a succession of 
discrete individual pulses, we now turn to Whitehead, who, in my opinion, 
provided the most convincing solution in his theory of 'epochal becoming'. 
But before we see just how Whitehead solves this problem in his metaphysics, 
we require some preliminary background from his earlier investigations in the 
philosophy of science. 
In his Enauiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge and 
in the less technical exposition of these views presented in the Concept of 
Nature, Whitehead devoted much of his attention to the problems of our 
perception of temporal passage and spatial relatedness, in order to discern 
the ultimate data for natural science. Much of his critical analysis focused 
on the concept of an instantaneous and homogeneous time, i.e., the traditional 
Newtonian view of time as flowing equally in measurable lapses.17 This is, 
he thinks, the source of all our difficulties of physical explanation, for 
if such a concept of instantaneous nature is accepted, our science must 
abandon all claim to be founded upon observation.18 
In his philosophy of nature, Whitehead proposed that the ultimate units 
which characterize the creative advance of nature should be 'events'. This, 
he held, was the only way out of the confusion; for our perception of time 
is as a duration, and within this duration we can always discriminate 
constituent events. That is, our recognition of events, and the objects 
situated in these events (e.g., a red patch of color which recurs in the 
temporal passage), occur within the ultimate datum for sense -perception, the 
specious present.19 Here Whitehead, like James and Bergson, appeals to what 
he calls 'instinctive' or 'naive' experience, as opposed to the intellectual 
theory of time as a moving knife -edge. The apprehended event must be the 
content of a specious present of some observer. This is obviously the only 
way in which events and their objects could be known. 
By choosing events as the ultimate constituents, Whitehead wished to 
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demonstrate the very rich and diverse aspects of nature. He loathed the 
idea that nature is homogeneously divided into portions of time, space and 
matter.20 Nature is not clock -time but experienced time, and this comes in 
duration- blocks or stretches of varying lengths. The event, he says, is 
"...the most concrete fact capable of separate discrimination ".21 It is never 
merely in time, but always constitutes a four -dimensional continuum of space - 
time, and is therefore never limited to the instantaneous present. Point - 
instants are understood only as ideal, and are arrived at by a 'method of 
extensive abstraction'- a progressive narrowing of perceptible durations 
whereby the logical limit is derived.22 
At various points in the Concept of Nature, Whitehead's discussions on 
our perception of time cannot fail to remind us of James.23 Also he says, "We 
may speculate... that this alliance of the passage of mind with the passage of 
nature arises from their both sharing in some ultimate character of passage 
which dominates all being ".24 This is, however, a speculation Whitehead had 
worked out in his philosophy of nature. In fact, he explicitly says that 
this is the very distinction which separates natural philosophy from 
metaphysics.25 What we must keep in mind is that his earlier investigations 
are concerned only with the object side of the knowing relation, even though 
some psychological speculation was necessary in order to explain his theory 
of events. But at the onset of the Concept of Nature, Whitehead had 
anticipated much of his later thought when he said that "...the values of 
nature are perhaps the key to the metaphysical synthesis of existence ".26 
And indeed the concept of the 'actual occasion' was exactly what was required 
in order that the events of nature, i.e., the physical world, take on the same 
character as the specious present of the observer apprehending those events. 
In Note II (written in 1924) to the second edition of the Principles 
of Natural Knowledge, Whitehead said of the first edition (1919) that "... 
the true doctrine that 'process' is the fundamental idea, was not in my mind 
with sufficient emphasis ".27 In this book, there is little indication as to 
how events become, or how they are related to one another. We know that they 
overlap by whole -part relations and connect together by temporal ordering (as 
with Minkowski); but the manner in which they penetrate and carry their 
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objects is not fully developed. Surely these are considerations which are 
beyond the scope of the early works; but much of the detail does become clear 
by the time Whitehead had developed the idea of the 'actual occasion'. 
In Process and Reality, the 'actual occasions' are closely related to 
the earlier 'events', and 'eternal objects' to the earlier 'objects'. The 
determination of the exact relationship between these two pairs of categories 
is a difficult problem. But aside from the addition of the subjective basis 
of actual occasions, the important point to bear in mind is that an event 
becomes a 'nexus' of actual occasions in the metaphysics. That is, the nexus 
is a succession of actual occasions forming our experience of continuity. 
What we perceive as change is the differences between the individual 
characters of the occasions forming such an event. 
Now Whitehead begins with James in his analysis of continuity by 
adopting the idea that the individual units of experience must come in 'whole 
moments' or 'epochs'.28 Interestingly enough, this notion, consistent with 
energy describes becoming as an extensive quantum leap 
which is not a continuously predictable moment in a sequence. Each occasion 
of experience becomes a whole, not in pieces which complete a whole. On this 
level, Whitehead takes Bradley's infinite regress argument as a serious threat 
to becoming. Though he explicitly refers to Zeno's 'Arrow' paradox on this 
matter, it is quite clear that the problem is much the same. Whitehead 
explains: 
Consider, for example, an act of becoming during one 
second. The act is divisible into two acts, one during 
the earlier half of the second, the other during the 
latter half of the second. Thus that which becomes 
during the whole second presupposes that which becomes 
during the first half- second. Analogously, that which 
becomes during the first half- second presupposes that 
which becomes during the first quarter- second, and so 
on indefinitely.29 
So, if the present moment which we call "now" is divisible into an indefinite 
number of "nows ", then the paradox of becoming is a valid objection and 
nothing can become. However, if the occasion of experience as a perceptible 
amount of change, comes all at once, then there is no longer any mystery about 
becoming. This Whitehead takes to be a fundamental solution to the problem. 
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What has been established by Zeno's and Bradley's argument is that there 
cannot be a continuity of becoming.30 That is, time cannot be a continuous 
unfolding of portions or acts of becoming, due to the fact that any particular 
portion or act can be divided further. The problem here is the combination 
of two incompatible notions- 'supersession' and 'continuity'.31 Continuity is 
therefore rejected as a metaphysical feature of the occasions of experience. 
They come all at once or not at all. This is the basis for atomism in 
Whitehead's theory. In the succession of the unit becomings or epochal wholes 
what becomes is continuity. Thus Whitehead writes: 
The conclusion is that in every act of becoming there 
is the becoming of something with temporal extension; 
but that the act itself is not extensive, in the sense 
that it is divisible into earlier and later acts of 
becoming which correspond to the extensive divisibility 
of what has become.32 
Though the act of becoming is not continuous, extensive or in physical 
time, it delivers a definite temporal quantum to the world. The act must 
therefore happen in a quasi -temporal realm Whitehead calls the 'genetic 
process'. He emphasizes: "...the genetic process is not the temporal 
succession: such a view is exactly what is denied by the epochal theory 
of time ".33 
To illustrate Whitehead's point here let us consider a diagram of 
moments composing an event.34 In the succession of occasions of experience 
A,B,C,D, each occasion becomes an epochal whole which constitutes the 
continuity of time. 
DIAGRAM A 
event as a nexus of occasions 
A B C D 
genetic process of unit becomings 
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continuity of 
time 
In this diagram, A,B,C,D, taken together, form an event of perceptible change 
in the world where the uneven lengths in the continuity represent the 
unpredictable character of the moment as enjoyed by the subjective immediacy 
of that particular occasion. This continuity of time presupposes the genetic 
process which underlies our perceptual experience of events. Our experience 
of time as a continuous whole must therefore be constituted by the 
discontinuous succession of atomic, epochal becomings. 
Bradley, as we have said before, certainly comes close to such 
notions regarding the unity of feeling as whole epochs of becoming. In his 
Essays on Truth and Reality, we have seen that he defines immediate 
experience as "...that which is comprised wholly within a single state of 
undivided awareness or feeling ".35 This harmonious unity of immediacy is 
an undivided awareness of the living emotion. Again in the Principles 
of logic, he writes: "If we are content to take the facts as they come to 
us, if we will only leave them just as we feel them, they never disappoint 
us ".36 Indeed "just as we feel them ", they are undivided unities becoming 
now and passing away from the present into the past. But what Bradley 
means, in the end, is that the universe happens as one epochal Whole. 
With his monistic interpretation he therefore denies that feeling can be 
a plurality. This is where the real divergence in reasoning occurs between 
Whitehead and Bradley. The crucial point concerns just how the whole units 
of feeling are linked together to form our continuous experience. Bradley 
continues: 
They neither hang by these airy threads from the 
past, nor perish internally in a vanishing network 
of never -ending relations between illusory units. 
The real, as it comes to us in sense, has nothing 
of all this.37 
But this is exactly Whitehead's position. How can we deny that this intuitive 
feeling of transition is anything else but an awareness of our 
experience of 
the immediate present as perishing and yet still part of our continuous 
living 
emotion? Here some type of relatedness between the penetrating 
moments must 
be admitted if we assert that the facts which compose our experience are 
whole 
units which become and pass away. But even though I shall 
touch on this 
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below, such considerations must be reserved for the following chapter which is 
devoted solely to the problems raised by Bradley. For the present let us 
return to the analysis within any one moment of experience. 
3. Genetic Analysis and the Component Elements 
Now that we have seen how genuine individuals are possible for 
Whitehead, we shall see what he considers to be the essential component 
elements of actual occasions. As I mentioned at the onset of this chapter, 
the analysis of the activity within one occasion of experience is a highly 
abstract procedure in Whitehead's metaphysics. Given the notion that the 
occasion becomes as an epochal unity of feeling, the attempt to dissect it 
into component elements does have a certain air of artificiality about it. At 
this point, however, Whitehead does realize that we cannot do anything with it 
unless we provide some type of analysis. But it must also be emphasized that, 
in analysis, the occasion can only be understood as a process itself; that is, 
a process of growth in which it acquires its data. 
Once again we are concerned with the activity whereby the many become 
one. This is the problem, Whitehead says, which consciousness solves.38 
"The analysis discloses operations transforming entities which are 
individually alien into components of a complex which is concretely one. "39 
Analysis discovers that the occasion is many things by virtue of the 
complexity of feelings or prehensions constituting its existence. In this 
respect, the occasion is divisible into component parts. But if something is 
divisible, it does not necessarily follov that it is therefore divided. As 
an epochal whole, the occasion is one thing, synthesizing the many elements 
into an undivided unity by its subjective aim- the final cause of the process 
of growth. Indeed it is in virtue of this subjective aim that the occasion 
produces one thing. It provides the ideal which the occasion attains or 
approximates. 
So we have the notion that the actual occasion is a 'cell' 
by virtue 
of the vast complexity of prehensions, but also, an undivided atomic unity by 
virtue of its subjective aim. Though the feelings may be many, 
there is only 
one subject. 
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Before I begin to explain the process of 'concrescence' and the 
manner in which an occasion acquires its data, we should keep in mind 
Whitehead's fundamental distinction between two ways of considering the actual 
occasion; the 'genetic' and 'morphological' analysis. Above we have seen a 
trace of this distinction when we touched on the genetic process of actual 
occasions which underlies our perceptual experience of continuity. 
Genetically, we are concerned with the various elements of the universe out 
of which the occasion arises. These encompass: (i) the actual occasions 
felt, (ii) the eternal objects felt, (iii) the feelings felt, and (iv) the 
subjective forms of intensity; and they involve the various phases of 
selection and elimination of such data. Morphologically, we are concerned 
with the completed actual occasion, spatialized and functioning as an object 
for subsequent prehensions. In this respect it is said to be the terminal 
unity of the concrescent process because it has perished. This is also known 
as a 'satisfaction' in Whitehead's terminology. 
Perhaps another way of explaining the difference between the genetic 
and morphological analysis is to say that the former is microscopic while 
the latter is macroscopic. One is concerned with the formal constitution 
of the actual occasion while the other is concerned with the givenness of 
the actual world considered as 'stubborn fact'. In this section of the 
present chapter, I will be attempting to elucidate Whitehead's analysis of 
the genetic process; that is, the process of achieving the satisfaction. And 
though largely expository, this section will be an important point of 
reference for subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
The concrescence of an actual occasion is the process of growing 
together with the other occasions which have already achieved satisfaction in 
the temporal process. A completed concrescence is an occasion that has become 
concrete in physical time. Within this concrescence, there is a process of 
moving from the spark of subjective immediacy, whereby the antecedent universe 
is synthesized into a novel arrangement, to the completed object. But 
Whitehead's use of 'object' here must not be taken as an enduring substance. 
When an occasion functions as an object in the process, it is a possible 
choice for the subjective immediacy of all subsequent occasions. Accordingly, 
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Whitehead uses the combined term 'subject -superject' in an attempt to avoid 
confusing his doctrine with the traditional conception of 'subject' and 
'object'. He says: 
An actual entity is at once the subject experiencing 
and the superject of its experiences. It is a 
subject -superject, and neither half of this description 
can for a moment be lost sight of. The term 'subject' 
will be mostly employed when the actual entity is 
considered in respect to its own real internal 
constitution. But 'subject' is always to be construed 
as an abbreviation of 'subject- superject'.40 
So we see that the 'subject' has been retained but the 'object' or 'superject' 
is to be understood as the outcome or completion of the concrescence. The 
emphasis is, of course, focused on the activity of becoming and perishing. 
For the sake of lucid exposition, I shall first discuss the 
concrescence as two phases; the initial phase and the supplemental phase. 
Then I shall continue to break down the latter into three stages of activity; 
namely, conceptual feelings, simple comparative feelings and complex 
comparative feelings.41 
Generally, as the concrescence moves to its satisfaction, there is a 
passage, characterized by a passive reception of the antecedent universe to an 
active selection from this data whereby the novel individual is formed. By 
this we understand that the ground or origin of the concrescent process is the 
multiplicity of data in the universe which enter into the present actuality 
and become elements of its own internal constitution. The initial phase is 
said to be 'passive' or 'conformal' in order to express the way in which the 
multitude of data enter into the subjective immediacy of the occasion without 
any decision affecting the final outcome. It is merely receptive and 
indeterminate as the past merges into the present. At this point, the 
initial prehensions are purely physical prehensions; they are simple physical 
or causal feelings which merely conform to what is settled in the past. The 
following supplemental phase, on the other hand, is determinate and active as 
the process of self- creation begins to take place. From the welter of data 
felt in the conformal phase, the occasion now molds itself by selection and 
elimination. The data which are positively prehended are taken into the 
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constitution of the present actuality as compatible with its subjective 
aim. Such elements have value for the occasion and become its essential 
ingredients. Those elements which are not part of this selection are called 
negative prehensions. They are eliminated from this particular determination 
even though they may be positively prehended by other contemporaries. The 
main point for any one occasion, however, is that the achievement of its aim 
will always involve elimination. This gives the occasion its particular 
character and thereby constitutes a novel individual in the universe. 
In Whitehead's view, the data which are positively prehended by an 
actual occasion obtain 'objectification' in that occasion. That is to say, 
the individual facts absorbed into the internal constitution of the 
subject achieve an 'objective immortality' beyond their perishing in the 
immediate past. They are, so to speak, reinacted in the life of the present 
moment. This is essentially what Whitehead means when he says that "...the 
philosophy of organism is mainly devoted to the task of making clear the 
notion of 'being present in another entity' "; for the present must include 
the past with some degree of definiteness.42 This distinguishes his view 
from a mere representative theory of perception, i.e., the fact of inclusion. 
But it should be clear that no actual occasion survives as a whole beyond its 
present immediacy; only its individual prehensions become objectified as each 
successive moment of the universe moves from disjunction to conjunction. 
In certain respects, this principle of 'selection and elimination' is 
very close to Leibniz's notion that each monad mirrors the entire universe by 
the combination of its clear and confused perceptions of all the other monads. 
Leibniz here is also concerned with a principle whereby certain properties or 
qualities define an individual. But unlike Leibniz's monads, Whitehead's 
actual occasions have a momentary existence, and the defining characteristics 
are those elements prehended into its subjective immediacy. Wolfe Mays, 
in his Philosophy of Whitehead, remarks on this point: 
The logical argument that the predicate is contained in 
the subject led Leibniz to the denial of interaction 
between substances, and to his theory of monads, the 
monads being modelled on the subject -predicate form of 
proposition- as independent substances with inhering 
qualities.43 
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But as we saw in chapter II, the subject - predicate form of proposition was 
explicitly rejected by Whitehead. His metaphysic is modelled more on the 
polyadic relations of modern logic, whereby the relations imply the immanence 
of the past in the present. With this in mind we might also add that 
Whitehead was very much thinking of process in terms of the theory of 
evolution. In fact, his concept of 'prehension and objectification' can 
be regarded as a generalization of genetic inheritance in biology. Where, in 
the metaphysical doctrine the emphasis is placed on the elements compatible 
with the subjective aim of the occasion, the upshot in biology is the adaption 
of an organism by natural selection. 
Finally, to complete our discussion on these general factors of 
the concrescence, we must consider the 'subjective form', which is how 
the occasion feels its data. This involves the inheritance of a certain 
emotional tone from the immediate past. It is how the 'character' of the 
prehending subject conforms to the 'character' of the feeling of the datum. 
To 'feel' a datum as an object is to have a feeling conforming to the feeling 
of the datum. A general example which Whitehead gives of this aspect of the 
concrescence is the inheritance of anger in a man from one moment to the 
next.44 The subjective form, in this respect, supplies an essential aspect of 
continuity to experience. 
We should now discriminate between the different types of entity which 
constitute the data of the antecedent universe. Thusfar the term 'data' has 
been employed in a loose and somewhat vague sense of everything that is 
there and available for prehension. But Whitehead is quite clear about the 
various types of entity and how they are prehended. We are now returning to 
break down the supplemental phase of the concrescence. 
In the supplemental phase, Whitehead distinguishes two stages, one of 
'conceptual feelings' and another of 'comparative feelings'. But the latter 
of these two may, for the sake of exposition, be divided further into 'simple' 
and 'complex' comparative feelings thereby giving us three stages to work 
with. Also Whitehead says that there is a twofold aspect of the creative urge 
operating within the phases of the concrescence. By this he means that the 
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actual occasion has two poles, the mental and the physical. But despite this 
unfortunate choice of terms by Whitehead, we must not take this dipolarity to 
mean anything like a mind -body division within each occasion. (Whitehead 
himself later regretted that he had chosen these terms.45) Also we must be 
quite clear not to confuse the mental pole with consciousness. It involves 
valuation but not consciousness. 
Now where in the phases of the concrescence, Whitehead is thinking 
of a linear or horizontal succession, he now adds this vertical dimension 
of poles which prehend the data. (This image is, of course, entirely for 
illustration.) In our discussion thusfar we have considered the physical pole 
of the occasion whereby throbs of emotional energy are transferred from one 
moment to the next. We found that, in the conformal phase, what is purely 
physical inheritance of this emotional energy is, in the supplemental phase, 
essentially accompanied by creative or aesthetic synthesis. This is, in 
fact, the activity of the conceptual feelings via the mental pole of the 
actual occasion. These feelings have eternal objects as their data and, 
unlike physical feelings which must prehend all actual occasions, they can 
simply dismiss the eternal objects as irrelevant or unwanted for the final 
satisfaction.46 Again, in the conformal phase, the physical pole has absorbed 
the nexus of actual occasions 'clothed' in the specific forms of definiteness, 
the eternal objects. Whitehead says that the mental pole starts with the 
conceptual registration of the physical pole and reacts to what has entered 
into its subjective immediacy. This is where conceptual choice takes place, 
and the colors, sounds and shapes of the past are now molded to fit the ideal 
form of its subjective aim. But what is particularly unique about the mental 
pole here is its ability to entertain alternative possibilities in abstraction 
from their particular mode of realization. It has the ability to introduce 
something new from the welter of atemporal potentials, i.e., some form of 
definiteness not yet realized in the temporal process. Accordingly, Whitehead 
says: 
Every actual entity is 'in time' so far as its 
physical pole is concerned, and is 'out of time' 
so far as its mental pole is concerned. It is 
the union of two worlds, namely, the temporal 
world, and the world of autonomous valuation.47 
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So not only does it reproduce the ingredient eternal objects in the physical 
prehensions, it also introduces novelty for future prehensions. Hence we 
find that this stage of the concrescence is indispensable to the activity of 
self- creation of an actual occasion. Otherwise, Whitehead thinks, there would 
be nothing new. 
Another qualification must be added. Whitehead has also found it 
necessary to introduce a principle of dominance to the poles where the 
relative importance of the mental pole differs in different actual occasions. 
This means that there is an intensity of creative choice and valuation where 
there is a dominance in the mental pole, and a lack of such activity in 
occasions which have a dominance in the physical pole. The multitude of 
actual occasions in a stone, for example, have a relative lack of conceptual 
activity and therefore have a dominance in the physical pole. With little 
change from day to day, year to year, there is simply an inheritance of the 
eternal objects present in the physical prehensions, and little expectation 
of a novel addition to this inheritance. 
Although we have omitted from our discussion some of the essential 
theological considerations involved in the conceptual feelings (these will 
certainly occupy much of our attention in chapter VII), we should here mention 
that Whitehead thinks that the subjective aim is supplied by God's 'ideal' of 
what is possible in its immediate situation. He provides the lure for the 
best outcome, though, in the end, there is an autonomous decision by the 
mental pole as to how far it will be realized. 
We now move on to the next two stages of the concrescence, which apply 
mostly to actual occasions with a dominance of the mental pole. In Process 
and Reality, these stages come under the chapters entitled "Propositions and 
Feelings" and "The Higher Phases of Experience ", and in certain instances they 
involve the more special occasions of human consciousness, specifically in 
the last stage of 'intellectual feelings'. Although it is beyond 
the scope 
of this thesis to consider and evaluate every detail of the 
full complexity 
of Whitehead's theory here, I shall attempt to bring to surface the more 
general aspects of these last stages. 
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At the end of the stage involving conceptual feelings, if a new eternal 
object has been introduced in the concrescence, it must, in some way, be 
integrated with the inherited physical feelings. This is accomplished by what 
Whitehead calls 'comparative feelings', of which there are two general types. 
These are distinguished as stages of 'simple' and 'complex' comparisons, or 
comparisons, and comparisons of comparisons. Here the prehensions are said 
to be 'impure' or 'hybrid' because they are prehensions of pure prehensions- 
conceptual and physical. These last two stages move the concrescence toward 
further unification. That is, there is a comparison of the mental and 
physical poles which produces an integration of their data into the novel one. 
A simple comparative feeling is a feeling that compares, or holds in 
the unity of a contrast, a simple physical feeling from the conformal phase, 
and a conceptual feeling from the supplemental phase, which is normally the 
conceptual counterpart of the physical feeling derived from it by conceptual 
valuation.48 This means that there is a comparison of what was physically 
felt, with what was conceptually felt, in terms of an 'integrated datum' or 
'generic contrast' in the concrescing subject of this stage. There are 
two types of simple comparative feelings, namely, 'physical purposes' and 
'propositional feelings'. The physical purposes terminate at this stage 
since they occur in the more primitive actual occasions which inhibit 
further integrations. The propositional feelings provide a lure for further 
integration, i.e., the next stage of complex comparative feelings. 
With physical purposes what is felt is a contrast between the fact of the 
"physical feeling, and the valuation of an abstract possibility embodied in the 
conceptual feeling. The contrast here is felt as being either compatible or 
incompatible with the subjective form. But whatever the choice, the result 
is that the datum ceases to be a lure for feeling, and the concrescence of the 
subject terminates. Generally, this stage of physical purposes is the stage 
by which the transmission of feeling from one occasion to the next gains a 
stability that makes 'enduring objects' possible; it is the stage in which 
there is an "...association of endurance with rhythm and physical 
vibration... "49 The propositions, on the other hand, are the "...lures for 
feeling, and give to feelings a definiteness of enjoyment and purpose which is 
absent in the blank evaluation of physical feeling into physical purpose ".50 
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They mark a stage of existence between the physical purposes and the conscious 
purposes of intellectual feelings. The contrast here involved is between the 
nexus of actual occasions, termed the 'logical subject', and the complex 
eternal object forming a 'predicate'. But the eternal object is a pure 
abstract possibility, and thus remains transcendent and indeterminate even 
though it has its character enhanced. In the proposition, it is always a 
"sheer fact for possibility ".51 The very fact of its transcendence from the 
concrescence is what provides the lure for realization beyond itself. 
If a proposition has been felt in the stage of simple comparative 
feeling, an 'intellectual feeling' may arise in the final stage of the 
concrescence. As Whitehead says: "In an intellectual feeling the datum is the 
generic contrast between a nexus of actual entities and a proposition with its 
logical subjects members of the nexus ".52 This he calls the 'affirmation - 
negation contrast'- a contrast between what is in the actual world and what 
is sheer possibility, transcendent and indeterminate. On the one hand, 
there is the 'in fact', the nexus of actual occasions as objectified in the 
physical feeling, and on the other, the 'might be', which is the lure of the 
proposition. As we have seen, the proposition itself is already a comparative 
feeling. So now we have a comparison of that comparison, and this is the 
'intellectual feeling'. 
Though we shall not require a detailed examination of Whitehead's 
theory of judgment connected with the intellectual feelings, we should 
take notice of the importance of the subjective form which operates as 
a result of this contrast. This is, in fact, the stage in which consciousness 
arises. Whitehead says: 
The subjective form of the feeling of this 
contrast is consciousness. Thus in experience, 
consciousness arises by reason of intellectual 
feelings, and in proportion to the variety and 
intensity of such feelings.53 
But it should be obvious that the conscious feeling appended to the 
last 
stage of the concrescence includes all the feelings 
from the prece, ding 
stages. Here there is agreement with Bradley; for consciousness 
presupposes 
experience, and not experience consciousness. It illuminates 
experience, 
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yet it contains those more rudimentary phases and sub -phases (stages) of the 
concrescence. It is the triumph of experience, the 'crown' as a finishing 
touch. But such occasions which do function with this intensity of feeling 
are highly specialized instances, and are few by comparison with those which 
form moments in the life -histories of enduring objects- (e.g., planets, 
stones, plants, and most animals). 
At last, we have come to the completed concrescence whereby the occasion 
perishes with respect to its subjective immediacy, and then contributes its 
novel synthesis to the world. Whether the occasion has terminated with the 
physical purposes, a propositional feeling, or in the special instance of an 
intellectual feeling, the result is a satisfaction. The concrescence has 
built up to a fully determinate entity, and there is a tinge of anticipation 
that the novel object will have some value beyond the passing moment. As 
Whitehead puts it, the occasion "... really experiences a future which must be 
actual, although the completed actualities of that future are undetermined. 
In this sense, each actual occasion experiences its own objective 
immortality. "54 
By comparison with James or Bradley, Whitehéad's theory, at this point, 
seems excessively complex with regard to all the intricate details within the 
concrescence. It is certainly not the 'down to earth' type of empiricism that 
James expounded. However we must keep in mind that, for Whitehead, these 
stages of growth are not in time, and that their analysis is "purely 
intellectual ". In any case, it is just these aspects of Whitehead's thought 
which have attracted so much attention in recent years. What is at the heart 
of his appeal is a type of synthesis which has for so long been needed- a 
bridging of the gap between the natural sciences and aesthetics. As Victor 
Lowe sees it, what is truly remarkable is the manner in which efficient 
causation and teleology are linked in this cosmology: the former expresses 
the 
transition from the completed past to the nascent becoming, while 
the latter 
expresses the urge toward completion.55 The most important 
point, however, is 
that the teleology of aim and satisfaction are placed back 
into nature with 
Creativity as the master principle governing the becoming 
of experience. 
C.H. Waddington and David Bohm have argued in accordance 
with these principles 
when they claim that "nature is more like an artist 
than an engineer ", for 
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beauty is the unconscious aim of each moment.56 Experience cannot be devoid 
of value; the two are necessarily connected in the scheme of things. 
4. Whitehead's Interpretation of Bradley 
Having now become somewhat familiar with the more special terms of 
Whitehead's metaphysics, we are able to consider a few passages of his 
Adventures of Ideas where he has shown, in a most curious way, an 
indebtedness to Bradley's doctine of feeling. He says, of course, that there 
are "grave differences" between his own doctine and that of Bradley, but he 
is here illustrating his general adherence to the doctrine, and not attempting 
a detailed exposition of his differences. In this part of our study, however, 
our purpose will be to understand exactly how Whitehead has treated Bradley's 
doctrine, and to see exactly what these grave differences might come to. It 
should also be noted that this chapter entitled "Philosophic Method" is the 
only place in Whitehead's writings where he has given any considerable 
attention to Bradley. 
From Bradley's essay on "Immediate Experience" Whitehead quotes: "In my 
general feeling at any moment there is more than the objects before me, and 
no perception of objects will exhaust the sense of a living emotion "57; and 
says: 
In accordance with this doctrine of Bradley's 
I analyse a feeling [or prehension] into the 
'datum', which is Bradley's 'object before me', 
into the 'subjective form' which is Bradley's 
'living emotion', and into the 'subject' which 
is Bradley's 'me'. 
Furthermore, he goes on in some detail to explain just how he agrees with 
what 
he considers to be Bradley's conception of the function of 'subjective form' 
on two interpretations: 
My reason for using the term 'subjective 
form' 
is that I stretch its meaning beyond 
'emotion'. 
For example consciousness, if it be present, 
is an element in the subjective form. 
This is, 
of course, a grave divergence from 
Bradley. 
Subjective form is the character assumed 
by the 
subject by reason of some prehended 
datum. 
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But on the whole I conform to Bradley's 
conception of the function of subjective form. 
For example, "These puzzles are insoluble unless 
that which I feel, and which is not an object 
before me, is present and active. This felt element 
is used and it must be used in the constitution 
of that object which satisfies me'.58 
From my point of view there is an 
ambiguity in this statement, but I adhere to 
either alternative meaning. 
The component of feeling 'which is not an 
object before me' is the subjective form. If 
Bradley is stating that the subjective forms of 
feelings determine the process of integration, 
I entirely agree. The result, as Bradley states, 
is the 'satisfaction' which is the final feeling 
terminating the onset of the creative process. 
Bradley, however, may mean by this phrase 
"that which I feel, and which is not an object 
before me" what I term a "negative prehension '. 
Such a prehension is active via its contribution 
of its subjective form to the creative process, 
but it dismisses its 'object' from the possibility 
of entering into the datum of the final satisfaction. 
This final complex datum will be what Bradley calls 
"that object that satisfies me '. Again I agree.59 
From this analysis Whitehead has made it quite clear how his 'actual occasion' 
and what we have called Bradley's 'momentary finite centre' link up in terms 
of their common use of feeling. Surely both agree that feeling sustains any 
derivative form of existence. And indeed so long as we are confined to the 
analysis of any one moment of experience, there is much agreement. This is 
also suggested by Whitehead's concluding remarks on Bradley's essay, when he 
discusses the unity within an occasion of human experience.60 But there are 
several aspects of this analysis which strike us at once as either discordant 
with Bradley's doctrine of feeling (as explained in this study at least) or 
unrecognizable. 
Firstly, and most importantly, is the fact that, for Bradley, feeling 
is the intuition of Reality beyond the momentary process. It is only when we 
depart from the general sense of feeling that we are aware of the perpetual 
shifting of process. On the other hand, for Whitehead, there is a closer 
alliance between feeling and process. In fact, feeling captures the essence 
of process and thus functions as the connecting principle whereby the 
immediate past becomes reinacted in the present occasion. Secondly, Bradley 
would have never thought of these statements (as quoted by Whitehead) as 
containing such analytic detail, even though Whitehead does admit that he is 
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'stretching' the meaning of the terms beyond what Bradley intended. And 
thirdly, there is some reason to believe that while Whitehead has captured the 
gist of Bradley's philosophy, he has pushed Bradley's doctrines much too close 
to his own metaphysics; especially when he says that he adheres to either 
alternative meaning of Bradley's conception of subjective form. In order 
to understand how this has occurred let us turn to Bradley's essay on 
"Immediate Experience" for a brief explanation. 
What we have in this essay e several thought experiments of a psycho- 
logical sort, some of which are very obscure, though enlightening in terms of 
isolated remarks regarding his definition of 'feeling'. In the main these 
thought experiments (e.g., attention and introspection), are directed towards 
a solution to his main problem: How can immediate experience know itself and 
become for us an object ?61 Now in the passages Whitehead has quoted, 
particularly those in which he finds agreement with his doctrine of subjective 
form, we find Bradley entangled with the problem as to how one can observe 
what one feels without destroying its felt character. In describing an 
actual emotion, we objectify it at once, such as when we move from despondency 
to despondency observed. But with this objectified feeling the whole 
background of the self from which it was taken does not cease to continue. 
The self- conscious feeling or objectified emotion attended to does not cancel 
the felt background from which it was abstracted. As Bradley says: "In order 
to have an object at all, you must have a felt self before which the object 
comes. "62 And this whole of the felt self can never be turned into an object. 
This is what I take Bradley to mean when he says: "These puzzles are 
insoluble unless that which I feel, and which is not an object before me, is 
present and active. "63 Immediate experience acts as the whole background of 
the felt self; it remains at bottom and fundamental, and this is what is "not 
the object before me ". This whole background is much larger than a mere 
element contained in feeling. 
It is indeed a curious feature of Bradley's essay that there is an 
ongoing discussion which does seem fairly close to what Whitehead calls 
'subjective form'. For example, when discussing introspection of the 
present moment, Bradley says: "...the persisting feelings can be felt to jar 
or to accord with the result of observation ".64 And further: 
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.when I pass psychically from despondency to 
despondency observed, I have not only a general 
sense of change to something new, but I feel 
more specifically the presence or absence of 
novelty and an agreement or a jar with the 
object before me.65 
With this in mind it is easy to understand how Whitehead finds a 
correspondence with what he calls the 'aversion' or 'adversion' of the 
subjective form. In the former there is some degree of attenuation of the 
importance of the data, whereas, in the latter, the valuation insures the 
continued importance of the data. In this regard, it is more likely that 
Whitehead's first interpretation of Bradley is closer to his meaning since 
the second is ruled out by the fact that, for Bradley, there cannot be 
anything which is excluded from feeling, i.e., what Whitehead calls a 
'negative prehension'. But even on the first interpretation there is nothing, 
as far as I can tell, that gives us any indication of a 'satisfaction' in 
Whitehead's sense of the term, especially when understood as "...the final 
feeling terminating the unrest of the creative process ". 
When Bradley speaks of "that object which satisfies me ", I think he is 
referring to a type of correspondence between the mood and its description. 
And this is not the 'satisfaction' in Whitehead's sense of the word- that is, 
the completion of any particular occasion of experience in its concrescence. 
Later in his essay, Bradley finally arrives at the conclusion that 
immediate experience must seek a higher Reality in which to complete itself. 
The very fact that it cannot become an object for itself points to something 
higher. He is thus led to the idea of an object which utterly satisfies, the 
idea of a complete reality which does not have anything "...outside it in the 
form of an 'elsewhere' or a 'not-yet-.66 And this is the all- inclusive 
Reality- the Absolute, which can be the only 'satisfaction' in Bradley's sense 
of the term. As he says, this idea seems to "meet our demand" and "appears to 
be the ground on which satisfaction is possible ".67 
Although there is some agreement on this final conclusion (cf. chapter 
VII belduv), it seems fairly obvious that Whitehead has read far too much into 
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Bradley's doctrine. I have often thought much the same when he expresses his 
indebtedness to Locke as having most fully anticipated the main positions of 
the philosophy of organism. But others have come to this conclusion as well. 
Professor Dorothy Emmet, a student of Whitehead, has said: 
I doubt if Whitehead has really absorbed Bradley's 
Appearance and Reality, or the Logic. The Essay 
on "Immediate Experience" gave him a line to develop, 
but he does it in his own way. I doubt if he is ever 
as indebted to anyone as he says he ís.68 
Lowe also shares this opinion when he says that Whitehead has 'overestimated' 
his indebitedness to Bradley.69 The main point we should recognize, however, 
is that when Whitehead seems to disclose an influence on his doctrines, it is 
much more the case that he wished to draw an analogy in order to clarify his 
position.70 But, as we have seen above, these analogues are not always very 
accurate. This being so, it seems that Whitehead is far more original in his 
metaphysical scheme than he himself was willing to recognize. He was, 
however, not one for scholarly detail. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RELATIONS: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 
1. Bradley on Relation and Contradiction 
In the above chapters we have dealt with various aspects of Bradley's 
'infra- relational experience' (feeling) and, to some extent, the 'supra - 
relational experience' (the Absolute), in addition to the various points of 
contact with Whitehead. We now turn our attention to the relational level of 
experience which forms a crucial focal point for the present thesis. 
Bradley, in fact, has made a name for himself in Western philosophic 
thought, especially as a Monist, for his very rigorous criticism of relations, 
and for his insistence that the self- contradictory character of this reasoning 
must, in the end, lead us to the acceptance of a non -relational Absolute which 
contains all finitude in one all- absorbing Whole. Whitehead, on the other 
hand, has insisted that the prehension of the past, the most concrete form of 
relatedness, is the essential defining characteristic of each actuality in the 
creative universe. We are thus led to a head -on collision between the two 
thinkers, and a detailed analysis and evaluation of the arguments is now a 
necessity before we proceed any further. 
We shall first expose the thrust of Bradley's arguments as a whole and 
then consider various objections or modifications in light of the Whiteheadian 
scheme. Also, in the course of this chapter, we shall have recourse to some 
of the debates at the early part of this century Bradley provoked with James 
and Russell. In some way or another the results of these arguments have 
become central to the formulation of process thought, implicitly recognized 
by Whitehead and defended most vigorously in the work of Charles Hartshorne. 
I shall only occasionally dip into the enormous amount of secondary literature 
that has been generated by Bradley's arguments in this century. As relevant 
as much of it may be, it is indeed impossible to deal with it at all 
adequately in one chapter. This, in itself, should indicate the central 
nerve Bradley has hit in philosophic thought; for no metaphysics or ontology 
with any pretensions to adequacy can ignore Bradley's analysis of the 
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relational. 
As we have said before, the problem of relations forms a type of 
axis in Bradley's philosophy.1 It is, in fact, the focus of Appearance 
and Reality, whereby his analysis of philosophic topics thereafter becomes 
easy game; that is, once the central thesis of the self- contradictoriness 
of relations has been established, such themes as time, space, motion and 
activity easily fall to Bradley's dialectic. Once we have entered the 
relational level, he insists, we have departed from the relative safety of 
feeling into a realm of thought and an endless web of terms and relations. 
The more we affirm the complete independence of objects, the more we fall 
hopelessly into contradiction and unreality. 
Bradley arrives at the theory of relations expounded in chapter III of 
Appearance and Reality, "Relation and Quality" by way of an examination of 
the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and the distinction 
between substantive and adjective; the two ways in which "...we try to 
understand the universe ". But these two turn out to be unsatisfactory ways 
of approaching reality, for no real unity can be found existing outside of 
these qualities or within them, and thus the classification of things into 
properties turns out to be theoretically unintelligible. It is in this 
connection that Bradley embarks on his discussion of relations and qualities. 
In the course of this chapter Bradley provides four very condensed 
arguments which he hopes will encapsulate the subject from all possible 
perspectives. Wollheim, on this point, has provided an illuminating insight 
into Bradley's thought when he describes the strategy of this chapter as an 
almost Kantian symmetry of exposition. He writes: 
For each of the two elements [qualities and 
relations] he seeks to prove, first, that it 
is impossible without the other, and, secondly, 
that it is impossible with the other: and he 
does this first from the side of the terms, 
then from the side of the relations.2 
Bradley argues that: (1) Qualities are nothing without relations, 
for qualities are different from one another. "Their plurality depends on 
relation, and, without that relation, they are not distinct. "3 We cannot 
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even think of a quality without conceiving it as possessing a distinct 
character as different from other qualities. This difference itself implies 
relation. (2) On the other hand, qualities taken with their relations are 
equally unintelligible. For clearly qualities cannot be reduced to their 
relations. The qualities must support their relation, and in this sense, 
they make the relation. But here we are led to a diversity within each 
quality. As Bradley says: "Each has a double character, as both supporting 
and as being made by the relation ".4 A quality 'A' has a ground 'a' and a 
consequent 'a" of the relation. One is the difference on which distinction 
is based while the other is the distinctness which results from their 
connection. These two aspects are not each the other; nor is any one of them 
taken by itself 'A'. Both are necessary to the constitution of 'A'. But the 
question arises as to how 'a' and 'a" are related; and so we are led to 
postulate a further diversity of grounds and consequents within each, such 
that 'a' becomes 'aa' and 'a" becomes 'a'a " , and so on ad infinitum. 
Their seeming solidity is dissipated by what Bradley calls a "...principle of 
fission which conducts us to no end ". (3) From the side of relations it is 
obvious that relations without qualities are equally impossible. Something 
must be related to make the relation, and this something must be the 
qualities. And finally, (4) if we consider how the relation can stand to the 
qualities, that is, with the qualities, we clearly see that new connecting 
relations must be introduced to relate the qualities to the original 
relation. For example, if two qualities A and B are joined by a relation C, a 
fresh relation D is then required to relate A to C, and so on ad infinitum. 
In many ways the rigid structure of Bradley's style here has 
sacrificed the type of lucid exposition that is needed to grasp the full force 
of his arguments. With the examples and further clarification provided in his 
other writings, however, one can see just how Bradley supports his claim that 
any form of relatedness must ultimately fail to represent the rea1.5 
The main thrust of these four arguments can be clarified if we take (1) 
and (3) as directed towards proving that external relations are contradictory, 
and (2) and (4) as directed towards proving that internal relations are also 
contradictory. 
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An external relation generally means that the terms of the relation 
are independent of each other. Bradley, however, has construed the main issue 
of external relations in terms of the independence of the qualities from the 
relations, and vice versa. This consideration will engage our attention 
later in this chapter with ,regard to various objections. Our real concern 
now is to understand how Bradley derives a contradiction from consideration of 
the elements of a relational situation without each other, and how the other 
two arguments are logically dependent upon this conclusion.6 
Taken from either side, qualities and relations are clearly impossible 
without one another. Obviously any attempt to arrive at a quality without 
a relation (1) or a relation without qualities (3) is doomed to failure. 
Even in complete abstraction this remains a conceptual impossibility. In 
argument (1), which amounts to the same thing as (3) from the other side, 
the contradiction arises as a result of the two clashing points; (i) if 
two qualities are different from one another, there must be something outside 
of them which accounts for their difference, yet (ii) if what accounts for this 
simply falls between the then the qualities can be 
conceived without the relation. External relations, then, cannot be real 
because of the assumption that such relations fall between their terms 
and at the same time form part of their terms. 
So now that the failure of the mutual independence between qualities 
and relations has been established, the next two arguments (2) and (4) are 
advanced on this conclusion. That is, since qualities and relations cannot 
be independent, they must be dependent and therefore internally related. But 
still they prove to be contradictory for Bradley. These two arguments are 
both characterized by an infinite regress; one within any one particular 
quality in the relation, and the other between any one quality and the 
original connecting relation. 
Since a relation that is internal implies that the terms of the relation 
cannot be conceived apart from the relation, (2) the conception of a quality 
in such a relation implies the existence of something distinct from the 
relation while at the same time forming part of the relation. This creates 
an internal division within each quality; that is, each quality 
divides into 
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two elements which are conceivable apart from the relation in which they stand 
to each other. This new division means that the terms of internal relations 
consist of parts that are externally related to each other, and this process 
of division is infinite. So internal relations cannot be real because of 
the assumption that such relations both are, and are not distinct from their 
terms. From the other side, (4) the conception of a relation in this 
situation cannot be a mere adjective of the qualities, and being something 
substantial, it cannot accomplish the necessary linking. As Bradley 
emphasizes: "If you take the connection as a solid thing, you have got to 
show, and you cannot show, how the other solids are joined to it ".7 Other 
links must therefore be introduced between the connection, and this ends up in 
a hopeless web of relations of relations, and so on. Here, internal relations 
cannot possibly be real because they simply do not relate. One solid thing; 
the relation,does not link another solid thing, the quality. The contra- 
diction is that it cannot be nothing, yet it cannot be something. 
Hence, we see that for Bradley both external and internal relations 
are contradictory and cannot belong to ultimate reality. As he 
himself says in a later essay: 
To take reality as a relational scheme, no matter 
whether the relations are 'external' or 'internal, 
seems therefore impossible and perhaps even 
ridiculous. It would cease to be so only if the 
immediacy of feeling could be shown to be merely 
relational.8 
There is, however, a certain qualification of Bradley's doctrine here 
regarding the status of internal relations. We may distinguish in his- 
philosophy another level of experience between the relational level and the 
supra -relational level in which all relations are internal. That is, on 
the 
strata of his degrees of reality, the internal relations fall closer 
to 
representing reality as one, rather than many, and are therefore 
more real. 
At least we are here moving away from the extreme pluralist 
thesis of a 
universe of self- contained individuals to a view which emphasizes 
mutual 
dependence. And indeed we must realize that for Bradley, 
relations do exist 
and, in some sense, qualify the Absolute, but in a 
distorted way: internal 
ones distorting it less than external ones.9 
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Finally, to complete this section, one important point we should notice 
about the four arguments of Appearance and Reality is that they are mainly 
focused on a general Empiricist outlook. What Bradley calls the 'relational 
complex' (i.e., the arrangement of qualities and the connecting relation), is 
an abstraction from any one moment of experience which comes before the mind 
as a complex impression. For instance, when one considers, say, the relation 
between two shades of blue, one might be abstracting a relational complex 
from a variety of books on a shelf. But even though Bradley's arguments, with 
their emphasis on qualities and relations, are primarily concerned with a 
type of spatial relatedness, it is quite clear that he intends his arguments 
to apply to all forms of terms and their relations. He does, in fact, use 
some of the same general arguments in the Principles of Logic with regard to 
units of feeling and their temporal relations. This is indeed central to 
our present thesis, for we shall be concerned mostly with the movement between 
discrete moments of experience, the actual occasions and their temporal order. 
In any case, whichever way the arguments are applied, Bradley's contention 
is that any form of relatedness always presupposes, and is therefore 
dependent upon an underlying unity.10 They are at best an invention of 
thought, useful for our practical understanding, but never fully real. 
2. Concrete Relatedness and Prehension 
Throughout this thesis we have appealed to what I have called an 
'Ontological Quest' with the introduction of the doctrine of feeling in 20th 
century metaphysics. In this respect we have examined Bradley's finite 
centres of experience, Whitehead's actual occasions, James's drops of 
experience, and to a lesser extent, Bergson's durations. All point to the 
same concrete facts of immediate feeling. But we have also seen that the 
rationality inherent in this flow of experience takes on radically different 
interpretations. In one sense all agree that the intellect does harm to 
the intuitive grasp we have of this reality. For Bergson the intellect 
"spatializes" because it cannot deal adequately with time; for James the 
intellect can only deal with a type of retrospective "patchwork" or "post- 
mortem dissection" since it cannot ride the crest of immediacy; for Whitehead 
the problem centers on language and the difficulties of expressing this 
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dynamic character of reality; and for Bradley the leap into the relational 
level always distorts that continuous whole present in feeling. The main 
point seen by each is a certain injustice done to concrete experience once 
analysis has cut into what is essentially alive and harmonious. But with the 
various attempts of these thinkers to construct a system from this basis, 
Bradley has denied that this flow of experience can be made up of genuine 
individuals and their relations. The main challenge from the side of 
pluralism, then, is to show that relations are contained in immediate feeling. 
Bradley, in fact, saw this himself when he said that the unreality of 
relations "...would cease to be so only if the immediacy of feeling could be 
shown to be merely relational ". And this is exactly where James provided some 
of the most pointed objections against Bradley in his later works, The 
Essays in Radical Empiricism and A Pluralistic Universe. 
With respect to Bradley's attack on the relational, two of the most 
curious aspects of these arguments to arise are their very abstract character 
and their appearance of completeness. But once one has penetrated the 
obscurities and come to grips with this abstract character, this completeness 
disappears and a certain sophistical air comes to surface. Indeed the 
Parmenidian workings of Bradley's thought are most clearly discerned in the 
methods he employs in deriving a contradiction from the elements of a 
relational situation. This was the general line James took when he argued 
against the intellectualist logic of Absolute Idealism. 
But before we move on to the Jamesian objections, let us consider 
what has been established by Bradley's anti -relational arguments. Surely an 
extreme pluralism of self- contained, self- sufficient individuals and purely 
external relations would be contradictory. In this regard, Bradley's 
arguments (1) and (3) are effective in showing the absurdity of terms without 
relations, and relations without terms. The relations and the terms must be 
more intimate, and in some sense dependent upon one another. The terms 
must involve the relation, and the relation must involve the terms. 
The very roots of this problem (as we have seen in chapter II) are to be 
found in Descartes' dictum- "that which requires nothing but itself in order 
to exist" rigorously applied to each of Hume's clear and distinct impressions 
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of sensation. Hume recognized the problem of relations when he asked; 
"What is the necessary connection between distinct impressions ? "; but he 
came to the very opposite conclusion from Bradley when he defended their 
separate existence.11 But individual independence construed in this way does 
make the problem of relations a "metaphysical nuisance ". Two terms and an 
abstract universal, the relation, simply do not accomplish the necessary 
linking. In effect, what is required for our continuous experience is some 
type of penetration and possession by the terms. And in this sense, 
pluralism, to be consistent, must make certain concessions to Bradley. 
As early as the Concept of Nature, Whitehead had expressed his doubts 
about the doctrine of external relations and its ability to account for the 
system of nature. As he put it: 
The false idea we have to get rid of is that of 
nature as a mere aggregate of independent entities, 
each capable of isolation. According to this 
conception these entities, whose characteristics 
are capable of isolated definition, come together 
and by their accidental relations form the system 
of nature... 
The explanation of nature which I urge as 
an alternative ideal to this accidental view of 
nature, is that nothing in nature could be what it 
is except as an ingredient in nature as it is.12 
This was, in fact, the crucial divergence from Russell just after the 
period of their collaboration on Principia Mathematica and it is here that 
Whitehead begins his appeal to a more Bradleian type of thought, but one 
which includes both internal and external relations. 
Standing between the radical pluralism of Hume and Russell and 
the radical monism of Spinoza and Bradley, James and Whitehead have both 
defended what James has called "the legitimacy of the notion of some ", for 
as James has argued: "...each part of the world is in some ways connected, 
in some other ways not connected with its other parts, and the ways can be 
discriminated... "13 James sought some mediated course between the two 
extremes; absolute independence and absolute mutual dependence. This mediated 
position he calls 'radical empiricism', a position where rationalism and 
empiricism can live together without tipping the balance over to one side or 
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the other. He asks: 
May not the flux of sensible experience itself contain 
a rationality that has been overlooked, so that the 
real remedy would consist in harking back to it more 
intelligently and not in advancing in the opposite 
direction away from it ?14 
The real question is, of course, how the things of this world can have any 
connection among one another without denying that they exist in some sense 
in their own right. 
Unlike Bradley, James begins with the parts, the individual drops 
of experience, and arrives at conjunctive relations through the continuity 
between these penetrating moments. James therefore insists, contrary to 
Bradley, that these relations are experienced as continuity. For him, the 
Absolute is an unnecessary hypothesis to explain the connection of things. 
It is, in his view, a being of the second order resulting from the over - 
intellectualist tendencies of transcendentalism. For James the problem of 
internal and external relations is reformulated as 'conjunctive' and 
'disjunctive' relations. Conjunctive relations are those which occur within 
my or your stream of experience; each drop interpenetrates among the other 
members of my or your consciousness; while disjunctive relations seem to be 
the difference between our two streams, and for that matter, everything else 
that we come in contact with. In this latter type of relation, a break is 
made from the thing lived (i.e., the continuity of my own experience) to 
another thing only conceived; but this break itself, says James, is positively 
experienced and noted. 
According to this account both disjunctive and conjunctive relations 
are just as real as the terms which they relate.15 And in an appeal to the 
reality of relations of every type, James says: 
Every examiner of the sensible life in concreto must 
see that relations of every sort, of time, space, 
difference, likeness, change, rate, cause, or what 
not, are just as integral members of sensational flux 
as terms are, and that conjunctive are just as true 
members of the flux as disjunctive relations are.16 
In the process of time, innumerable individual terms become and are super- 
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seded by others which follow upon them by transitions of both conjunctive 
and disjunctive content. And these relations themselves, being integral 
components of the process, must be accounted as at least as real as the terms. 
But at this point, James seems to have a difficulty in accounting for 
the relations "between" the terms which he claims are themselves actually 
experienced. What is the relation and what is the matter related are indeed 
most difficult to differentiate in the vibrant flow of experience. It all 
seems to melt together. This problem can be resolved, however, by the sense 
in which we take the relation itself. 
Bradley, of course, has rejected James's account of conjunctive and 
disjunctive relations on the grounds that such distinctions cannot possibly 
belong to immediate experience.17 Our first awareness of temporal and spatial 
diversity is, he argues, not experienced as having a relational form, but 
rather as a fluid whole. Relations are distinguished for him at another level 
of conceptual activity. But James in his analysis of the relational 
situation, has shown quite well how Bradley has muddled the relation between 
the conceptual form and the perceptual form, instead of showing how they 
supplement one another.18 The relational must be an integral part of 
immediate feeling. But the point is to show just how this is possible. 
James insists that continuity itself is a definite sort of 
experience. We feel the difference between two distinct emotions and we feel 
the transition as one continues into the other. As he put the point in his 
Psychology: "...the feeling of the thunder is also a feeling of the silence 
as just gone... "19 Such transition and immanence of one moment in the next is 
continuity and relatedness. And this is the experience of the fluid whole of 
which Bradley speaks. 
For James, the fault with the anti -relational arguments lies in 
Bradley's understanding of the relation as a purely "external go- between" 
which cannot logically connect. In several places he attacks Bradley's 
argument (4), which he thinks is the best example of a reductio ad 
absurdum.20 Instead of taking conjunctive relations at face value, Bradley 
asks for some ineffable union in the abstract: How does a relation relate? 
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But clearly this approach is bound to lead to contradictions. Instead of 
hooking A to B, and bridging the original chasm, the relation C itself 
requires another hook to bridge the second chasm created by this 
process, and so on ad infinitum. But a relation taken in this way is 
nothing more than an abstraction from the concrete relatedness of moments in 
time. 
Many who have argued against Bradley have failed to refute his 
arguments mainly because they have gone about their refutations within the 
same context in which Bradley has set up the problems. Although I do not 
have the space here to show, how, in each case, the same abstract approach 
is adopted, it seems that many of McTaggart's and Russell's objections fall 
into this category.21 James and Whitehead, however, in their approach to 
the problem of relations via immediate feeling, hit the very heart of the 
matter. 
Although there were many influences on Whitehead in his formulation 
of the doctrine of 'prehension' (such as the concept of the flux of energy in 
modern physics)22, James must certainly be mentioned for elucidating the basic 
psychological groundwork for the metaphysical principle. For Whitehead, as 
for James, Bradley's two levels of experience (the infra - relational and the 
relational) are telescoped into one level of process.23 Here the rationality 
discerned in immediate experience provides understanding instead of 
contradictions. 
Both James and Whitehead appeal to the simplicity of the "plain 
conjunctive experience" in their attempt to understand the linkage of moments 
in the passage of time. It is here that a crucial distinction arises 
regarding two very different types of relations; one concrete sense in which 
they are parts of the terms, and another abstract sense in which they are seen 
as universals or logical connectives. With James we have seen that a relation 
C cannot be a purely "external go- between" in accomplishing the linkage of two 
moments A and B. That is, it cannot be seen as a distinct entity separate 
from the moments to be related. If this was so, the relation simply would not 
be experienced as part of the flow. Anything in between or outside of the 
primary experiential units must therefore be given up as an abstraction. On 
- 96 - 
this point, the objection to Bradley runs fairly close to one of the better 
points made by Russell when he said that, "Bradley conceives a relation as 
something just as substantial as its terms, and not radically different in 
kind ".24 James, of course, never put the point in quite this way, but a 
certain reading of him tends in this direction. Lowe, for example, in a paper 
entitled "William James and Whitehead's Doctrine of Prehensions ", has made a 
somewhat similar point when he reformulates James's conclusion, that "The 
parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are 
themselves parts of experience ", to mean; "The drops of experience hold 
together from next to next by transitions that are felt as components 
contributing to the drops of experience ".25 Here the relations are not 
themselves entities of some sort, but rather aspects of the drops which 
connect them together. They are parts of the internal mechanism of process. 
Whitehead saw this when he said something to the effect that: There is no 
objection to the purely logical use of the term 'relation'. Relations are 
universals such as 'between', 'believing' and 'greater than'. In this sense 
the connectedness of occasions may be said to exemplify an abstract universal, 
but such connection is not itself a universal; it is a "real particular fact" 
in the history of the world.26 Prehension and felt transmission are therefore 
better understood as the real connection of things, though the term 'relation' 
is often used in a generic sense to cover both the abstract and concrete. 
This line of thought, emphasizing the reality of the individuals and 
their concrete relations, is characteristic of much of the 'New Realism' which 
reacted against Absolute Idealism.27 When Bradley says that a relation cannot 
account for the fact of relatedness, he is confusing the abstract universal 
with the concrete connection of things. That is, in conceiving terms and 
relations, he gives the relation the same ontological status as that which he 
gives the terms. Bradley emphasizes in several places that a relation exists 
only "between" terms.28 He asks: "If relations are facts that exist between 
facts, then what comes between the relations and the other facts ? "29 And 
elsewhere he says: "Take a relational situation and examine it. You cannot 
say that the terms are the relation, or the relation is the terms. "30 But 
why can't we have just the terms which themselves involve "relatedness" as 
an essential defining characteristic? 
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In Whitehead's ontology what is fundamental is the actual occasion as 
the concrete unit of experience. And, as we have seen, the essence of the 
occasion, as a natural unit of pulsation, is its prehension- the relatedness 
of past to present immediacy. Whitehead, in his metaphysical scheme, 
therefore avoids the notion of an ontological entity in the form of a 
relation that comes between actual occasions. There is nothing between actual 
occasions but other actual occasions. Relations "between" are nothing more 
than a derivative abstraction from the concrete process. Thus, logically 
speaking aRb is read "the relation of.a to b" not "a in relation to R in 
relation to b ".31 
Given the above argument, it should be quite clear what the general 
problems are with Bradley's analysis of the relational complex, and how, 
specifically, his argument (4) is seen to be fallacious by both James and 
Whitehead. We have not, however, addressed the problems raised by his 
argument (2) in which an infinite regress occurs within each term. Having 
done away with the unnecessary entity, the relation, the argument could still 
hold when we consider the difference between two terms as related to one 
another. As we recall, Bradley's argument was that by being in relationship, 
A is not simply what it is, but what it is as related to B. A, then, is both 
the ground and the consequent of the relationship, which is to raise the 
problem of the relationship between A as ground (a) and A as consequent (a'), 
and so on. 
Though Whitehead (and to my knowledge, James) has not explicitly 
referred to the problems raised by this argument, his solution, I think, can 
be found in the doctrine of becoming and perishing- the double character of 
the passage of time. In the case of two occasions A and B related by their 
temporal order, A must be understood as having perished with regard to its 
subjective immmediacy even though it does exist as an object to be prehended 
by the initial stage of B's becoming. But here we must be careful. That 
is, too much emphasis on the succession of discrete moments can create 
insurmountable problems for prehension of the past.32 In other words, how 
can a present occasion prehend what is no longer there? What occurs in this 
transition must therefore be much more fluid and moving. At the end -point 
of A's satisfaction, it merges into and passes opportunity off to a passive 
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(conformal) stage of B. That is, as A perishes, it hurls itself into a new 
transcendent fact. But 'perishing' here does not mean that it disappears. On 
the contrary, it is at this point that A appears as a determinate entity and 
becomes available to the initial prehensions of B. It should therefore be 
clear that in this temporal sequence, B is not determinate in the same sense 
as A. That is, A and B are not simultaneously existent but rather the 
former has perished as subject yet merged into the novel becoming of the 
latter. 
With this in mind, Whitehead must agree with Bradley that each occasion 
is both ground and consequent, cause and effect of a relationship; but this 
does not necessarily involve a regress within each occasion. The fact that 
the occasions perish prevents their internal fission. 
The doctrine of the 'subject- superject' means that each actual occasion 
is a conditioned subject becoming effect. It arises out of decisions already 
made in the antecedent world, and it determines the possibilities for its 
successors. As Whitehead says: "The cause is objectively in the constitution 
of the effect, in virtue of being the feeler of the feelings reproduced in the 
effect with partial equivalence of subjective form ".33 But the passage of 
occasions in time differentiates their representation as a mere line of self - 
contained entities. 
Bradley, of course, understands quite well that a world of finite 
entities would have to be one in which the entities either hang together by 
threads from the past or perish internally in a vanishing network of never 
ending relations.34 But what he failed to consider was how the moments of 
experience themselves could be contained in one another. In one place, for 
example, he says that as far as we know, finite centres of feeling, while they 
last, are not directly pervious to one another.35 But this consideration was 
not crucial for him since the Absolute provides the basis for their unity. 
Whitehead, on the other hand, has articulated the ground for unity in the 
universe by the prehensions in each occasion. One occasion of experience is 
not simply related to another by airy threads. It is, rather, immanent in 
that occasion, if it occurred in its past. This is Whitehead's central point 
about his 'actual occasion' being an inversion of Bradley's doctrine of 
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actuality. Each occasion contains elements of the whole of past history just 
as, for Bradley, the Absolute contains everything in one single Experience. 
But in what has just been said, we must make certain qualifications 
regarding Whitehead's claim. The many occasions arise by the way in which 
they feel all the rest. Each occasion forms a new and unique synthesis of its 
relations to the rest of the world from its own perspective, and is partially 
determined by its own unique subjective aim. This, of course, involves 
selection and elimination in order that the exact degree in which the present 
moment contains the past can be determined. Each occasion is present in every 
other, but only in a transmuted and partial sense. Thus, as Whitehead says, 
"... if we allow for degrees of relevance, and for negligible relevance, we 
must say that every actual entity is present in every other actual entity ".36 
This, however, does not include contemporaries or successors which are not 
available to the occasion in question. At the moment in which the occasion 
becomes, its immediate predecessors are the only actualities which are there 
to be included in the initial stage of its concrescence; and these occasions 
include bits of the whole of cosmic history. 
3. Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Relations 
One of the most serious objections to Bradley's notion of an all - 
inclusive Absolute is the inability of the theory to deal adequately with 
the problems raised by the fact of asymmetrical relations. Russell and 
the proponents of the 'New Realism' were first to formulate the criticism 
against Bradley, and much of this strand of thought has continued into process 
philosophy, though with considerable modification. 
Unlike Moore, who focused his attention on the refutation of Idealism, 
Russell was preoccupied with the refutation of monism. Such a theory, he 
thought, could not possibly accommodate itself to asymmetrical relations, 
which are fundamental to various aspects of experience and reality. At the 
heart of the matter, Russell attacked what he called the doctrine of internal 
relations- that each part of reality has a nature which exhibits its relations 
to every other part and to the whole.37 He linked this doctrine with both the 
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monadistic theory of Leibniz- that a relation between two terms is a property 
of them, and the monistic theory of Bradley- that every relation implies a 
property of an inclusive whole.38 But leaving Leibniz aside for the moment, 
let us concentrate our attention on his objections to Bradley. 
One of the most important grounds which Russell advanced against the 
monistic theory of relations is the difference of order which occurs in 
asymmetrical relations, and this means that at least some relations must be 
external. An asymmetrical relation 'aRb', Russell says, implies a unique 
irreversible order. How can a whole which includes such a relation account 
for the uniqueness, say, in as being larger than b? In such a situation 
there exists an irreversibility of order and a distinction of sense which 
raises a difficulty for a monistic theory of relations. Even if we say with 
Bradley that in the Absolute, the relation (ab)R contains diversity of 
magnitude, the question still remains as to whether 'a is larger than b' or 
'b is larger than a'. 
Russell also claims that the monistic theory fails to explain relations 
between whole and part which are necessarily asymmetrical in nature. If, for 
example, we take the proposition which states 'a is a part of b', the monistic 
theory cannot distinguish between the whole composed of (ab) and the whole 'b' 
which contains 'a' as one of its parts. As Russell says, the difficulty is 
that if we regard the proposition about the new whole to be one which does not 
concern whole and part, then "...there will be no true judgments of whole and 
part and it will be false to say that a relation between the parts is really 
an adjective of the whole ".39 On the other hand, if the proposition does say 
something about whole -part relations, we find ourselves in an infinite regress 
in which the proposition always presupposes another whole. 
Such criticisms were crucial to Russell's early work where he was 
concerned largely with a theory of mathematics. His contention was that, 
until his time inadequate or incorrect theories of relations hindered both the 
development of logic and philosophy in general, and that the ground cleared 
in his Principles of Mathematics would give new direction and impetus to 
these fields of study. The problem with the monistic and monadistic theories 
is that they made mathematics inexplicible. But external relations and 
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specifically those of an asymmetrical sort are essential to a theory of 
mathematics where we must be able to make distinctions of order and sense 
for quantative differences. Our real question for Russell, however, concerns 
the extent to which such relations serve as a basis for a theory of reality, 
and this we shall investigate in what follows. 
Bradley's replies to these objections are contained in a few sketchy 
and incomplete notes appended to the posthumous essay on "Relations ". 
But even though he did not specifically address the two problems raised by 
Russell, he did offer a general reply. As to whether asymmetrical relations 
disprove monism, Bradley's expected response is that no relations can possibly 
be ultimate, asymmetrical or otherwise. Firstly, as we have emphasized in 
our discussions above, Bradley never admitted any sort of genuine individuals 
and their relations into feeling. His continuous Absolute cannot therefore 
be understood as individuated into parts. No whole is really a simple whole. 
And this is why predication of qualities of the whole are untrue and, in the 
end, fall short of the rea1.40 Secondly, Bradley insists that there is a 
definite difference between the unity present in feeling and mere asymmetrical 
relations. "Feeling ", he says, "contains everything, which clearly 
asymmetrical relations do not. "41 And feeling, in this sense, is non - 
relational and directionless. Thirdly, whatever is distinguished at the 
relational level of experience cannot be understood as representative of the 
Absolute. Bradley admits that there are these two classes of relations: 
symmetrical and asymmetrical, and that order and direction are involved in the 
latter. But relations are, of course, always an abstraction from our actual 
experience, and cannot therefore be expected to exist as such in the 
Absolute.42 That is, if asymmetrical relations are discerned in the flux of 
experience, they must be grounded in a wider whole, for their diversity seen 
here clashes with the given unity of feeling. Once again, they may serve our 
practical understanding (e.g., larger -smaller, whole -part, before -after) but 
they distort our conception of reality if taken as ultimate. 
So we see that Bradley can defend his monism against the charge of 
asymmetrical relations by invoking his notion of levels of experience in which 
distinctions are made at the relational level of perception and thought, but 
become transmuted and indistinguishable in both the infra -relational level of 
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feeling and the supra - relational level of the Absolute. But on the other 
hand, the real issue at stake is that, if one rejects Bradley's analysis of 
the relational level, and accepts the arguments for pluralism as put forth by 
James and Whitehead, then much of his argument falls apart. The concrete 
relations which we experience from one moment to the next are the same as 
feeling, and once this is realized the great mystery in Bradley's theory 
dissolves. 
The Russell - Bradley problem put in a certain way asks: Are relations 
external or internal to their terms ?43 If there are many 'reals' and they are 
purely internally related, there can be no real independence between them. On 
the other hand, if they are purely externally related, there can be no real 
togetherness and dependence of things. Either side taken to its extreme leads 
to incoherence. But what about both internal -external relations, dependence - 
independence taken together? Bradley says: "Pluralism, to be consistent, 
must, I presume, accept the reality of external relations ".44 True. But 
does this exclude the possibility of internal relations? In fact, internal 
and external relations require each other if either is not to collapse into 
meaninglessness, or with Bradley, into unreality.45 
Perhaps the best arguments for this combination are those of Whitehead 
and Hartshorne who have synthesized the seemingly opposed doctrines into a 
pursuasive and coherent scheme of process. The novel formulation of this 
view belongs, of course, to Whitehead, though it has been strengthened by the 
very clarity with which Hartshorne has stated and defended the position.46 
The most fundamental thesis of this event -pluralism is that 
the universe evolves by an asymmetric process of causality in which former 
actualities are prehended by latter ones, but not vice versa. The 
temporal ordering of occasions by their causal prehensions provides a genuine 
directedness of experience where dependence is conceived as one -way; an actual 
occasion of the immediate present is dependent on those of the past, having 
prehended the objects for its novel synthesis, but a past occasion is not 
dependent upon those of the present. That is, a previous actual occasion, 
having perished, cannot prehend the present and is therefore not dependent 
upon what follows its completed synthesis. Consider our diagram again as a 
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simple nexus of causal prehensions: 
DIAGRAM 8 
continuity of time 
\ 
: prehensions 
A B C D 
past3 past2 pasti present 
An immediate past occasion C is internally related to D, having contributed 
its datum to the creative choice in the future, but is externally related to 
A and B in its past. D is therefore dependent upon A, B and C in its past, 
but A, B and C are independent of D, which occurs in their future. C, for 
example, in this sequence, could not have prehended what, in its subjective 
immediacy, did not exist, namely, the occasion D. But D, arising into 
existence through causation is the accumulation of the process by its 
positive prehensions of C and all other occasions which were contemporaries 
of C. The elements which were negatively prehended by D were eliminated, 
yet they remain relevant by the fact that they were considered in the final 
determination. Also these negative prehensions would most probably have been 
prehended positively by the many contemporaries of D. 
Contemporary occasions (i.e., occasions which do not occur in the past 
or future of the subject in question) happen in causal independence of one 
another. Since an immediately concrescing subject can only prehend what is in 
its immediate past, its contemporaries are too still immersed in the genetic 
process and are therefore unavailable. Also according to this principle, 
an actual occasion cannot prehend itself. An occasion becomes public only 
when its private self -creation is completed. This contemporaneity and causal 
independence of the present is the ground for pluralism and freedom in the 
world. That is, we find ourselves among the many; each individual existing in 
its own right. Contemporary occasions in the immediate present cannot prehend 
one another in a symmetrical relationship. Whitehead, for example, writes: 
"It is the definition of contemporary events that they happen in causal 
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independence of each other. Thus two contemporary occasions are such that 
neither belongs to the past of the other ".47 There is, however, for 
Whitehead, an indirect sense in which contemporaries may be connected.48 
The mutual independence of contemporary occasions 
lies strictly within the sphere of their teleological 
self- creation. The occasions originate from a common 
past and their objective immortality operates within a 
common future. Thus indirectly, vía the immanence of 
the past and the immanence of the future, the occasions 
are connected. But the immediate activity of self - 
creation is separate and private, so far as contemporaries 
are concerned.49 
Contemporaries, then, are indirectly immanent with regard to their prehensions 
of a common past, i.e., a common overlapping of their causal antecedents and 
the extension beyond to the anticipation of their causal consequents. In the 
overlap of the actual world of two contemporaries A and B, both prehend a 
third occasion C (or nexus of occasions) in the antecedent environment. This 
makes C common to A and B, and provides a ground for an indirect immanence of 
A in B and B in A. That is, they share in a common immediacy by prehending 
the same datum, and are therefore in a unison of becoming. Also, a fourth 
occasion D in the immediate future will prehend the objects of A and B, and 
thereby provide a further ground for their immanence. 
To sum up then, the result of the above analysis is that actual 
occasions are internally related at one end and externally related at the 
other. This is the modification of the Jamesian doctrine of conjunctive - 
disjunctive relations which we spoke of in the last section. Whitehead holds 
that the internal -external dichotomy is not simply one in which internal 
relations occur only within any one stream of experience while external ones 
occur outside of that stream. Rather, internal and external relations are 
grounded in the temporal asymmetry of process where, at each successive 
moment, the world moves from disjunctive diversity to conjunctive unity. 
And this is the basic many- into -one function of each actual occasion. 
However in accordance with the Jamesian spirit of the world connected 
in some ways and not connected in others, we see how process philosophy steers 
a mediated course between two extremes: radical pluralism and radical monism, 
to formulate what Hartshorne has called, in opposition to New Realism, the 
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'New Idealism' or 'realistic Idealism'. Fundamentally, this is the result 
of a most persuasive combination of panpsychism and event -pluralism. 
In Hartshorne's analysis of the principles of symmetry and asymmetry 
which have occured in the systems of our philosophical inheritance, he 
concludes that regardless of such issues which have divided one from another 
(Idealism, realism, monism, pluralism), the "fallacy of misplaced symmetry" 
has prejudiced our ability to see reality as directional and open at one 
end.50 To take one case of especial interest, Hartshorne, for example says: 
Bradley and Russell for process philosophy fall 
into the fallacy of taking as symmetrical what 
is essentially one way. Bradley's arguments 
against the reality of relations assume symmetry. 
(Either A and B mutually interdependent or 
mutually independent- a false axiom). Russell 
and Hume accept the dichotomy but prefer the 
second or radically pluralistic alternative. 
Nearly all parties overlook the asymmetrical 
one: A dependent on B, but not vice versa.51 
On the one hand 'external', has always meant external to both terms, and 
complete independence; while 'internal' has meant holding at both ends, and 
complete mutual dependence. As we saw in section 1 of this chapter, this 
was exactly the context in which Bradley argued for the unreality of both 
external and internal relations. Arguments (1) and (3) assumed mutual 
independence, while arguments (2) and (4) assumed mutual dependence. The 
whole formulation of the problem assumes symmetry. Russell, on the other 
side, used the asymmetrical case against Bradley, but only from the point of 
view of external relations. He did not see the issue of relativity involved 
in the internal -external, dependence- independence dichotomy, and therefore 
failed to generalize his complaint that the asymmetrical case had been 
neglected. 
According to Hartshorne, this prejudice is so deeply ingrained in 
our thought patterns that even those who accept the asymmetrical principle 
as fundamental, unconsciously fall into a language which assumes symmetry. 
James and Bergson speak of the flow of reality as 'interpenetrating' or 
'melting together'. Whitehead too, often says that his actual occasions are 
'interdependent'. But the prefix 'inter', which suggests both -way influence, 
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is inconsistent with the idea of occasions penetrating one -way. Nature is an 
ocean of feelings, as Whitehead puts it, but the crucial qualification on this 
idea is that the feelings in nature which are given to our experiences are 
independent of those experiences. Our feelings, therefore, are always 
feelings of feelings; the former refers to our experiencing as such, while the 
latter refers to what we experience, i.e., what is already there in nature.52 
4. Extensive Relations and Abstraction 
Our discussion of the Whiteheadian view of relations has been 
somewhat simplified in order to clarify the exact points of disagreement with 
Bradley. It should be emphasized, however, that the concrete relatedness of 
actual occasions, though an essential basis for process thought, is not the 
whole picture. We have concentrated our discussion primarily on the causal 
asymmetry of actual occasions which results from an analysis in the perceptive 
mode of causal efficacy. It is here that we found a defense of the "reality" 
of causal relations. But we now require some explanation of the full 
complexity of Whitehead's theory by an analysis of the extensive relations 
discerned in the perceptive mode of presentational immediacy. Taken together, 
these two modes provide a cosmological structure concerned with the systematic 
order of the entities of his "Categoreal Scheme ". Once again it will be 
evident how this system far exceeds the ideal of the Bradleian metaphysics. 
Some preliminary discussion of Whitehead's earlier preoccupation may, 
perhaps, prove illuminating as a background for his idea of an 'extensive 
continuum'. That is, in Principia Mathematica, Russell and Whitehead had 
revolutionized mathematics by showing how cardinal and ordinal numbers could 
be deduced from a general theory of classes and relations.53 With this shift 
of emphasis, mathematics was no longer regarded as the science concerned with 
number and quantity, but rather as a type of formal reasoning concerned with 
patterns or relations in general. This idea was to suit Whitehead's later 
speculations quite well, especially as a metaphysician desiring a very broad 
basis for understanding the universe. 
Mathematics is essentially the study of pattern in the realm of 
possibility; it studies pattern abstracted from the particulars which are 
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patterned.54 But also in our analysis of the physical world, complex 
mathematical relations are discerned in the order of things. That is, all 
scientific analysis and measurment concerns the systematic real potentiality 
out of which actualities arise.55 And according to Whitehead, as the 
universe evolves and actuality continually weaves itself among the patterns 
of possibility, it is in virtue of one ultimate system that an intellectual 
comprehension of the physical universe is possible.56 
Let us then proceed to see how Whitehead works out such a general 
system of order in the universe. 
As we recall from an earlier chapter, Whitehead's notion of 
'presentational immediacy' refers to the mode of perception in which the 
contemporary world presents itself as clear and distinct extensive relations 
of time, space and sensa. What is, however, presupposed by this perceptive 
mode is the notion of an 'extensive continuum', beyond the four -dimensional 
order of our particular cosmic epoch. As Whitehead defines the continuum in 
one particularly clear passage, he writes: 
This extensive continuum is one relational complex 
in which all potential objectifications find their 
niche. It underlies the whole world, past, present, 
and future. Considered in its full generality, apart 
from the additional conditions proper only to the 
cosmic epoch of electrons, protons, molecules, and 
star systems, the properties of this continuum are very 
few and do not include the relationships of metrical 
geometry. An extensive continuum is a complex of entities 
united by the various allied relationships of whole to 
part, and of overlapping so as to possess common parts, 
and of contact, and of other relationships derived from 
these primary relationships.... This extensive continuum 
expresses the solidarity of all possible standpoints 
throughout the whole process of the world.57 
The extensive continuum can be conceived in two principle ways: (i) 
in terms of increasing social order, until finally we arrive at the notion of 
'pure extensiveness', and (ii) in terms of 'general potentiality'. Here we 
shall be concerned primarily with the notion of 'general potentiality', 
though our discussion will presuppose the notion of a society constituted by 
the most general sort of order, namely 'pure extensiveness'. The extensive 
continuum, from the point of view of increasing social order, that is, whole - 
part relations or general -special characteristics, must be reserved for our 
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following chapter on the theory of society and cosmic epochs. 
From the point of view of general potentiality, then, we have the 
notion of an 'abstract structure'- "one relational complex" which provides 
the general conditions for the becoming of experience. Whitehead says it 
is 'real' because "...it expresses a fact derived from the actual world and 
concerning the contemporary actual world ".58 But the model here is certainly 
mathematics- i.e., a complete system of abstract relations. In another place 
Whitehead had expressed this idea in terms of a "harmony of logic" which 
"...lies upon the universe as an iron necessity ".59 The continuum as 
mathematical involves the properties of indefinite divisibility and unbounded 
extension. "There are always entities beyond entities because non -entity is 
no boundary ".60 Thus, the universe, according to Whitehead, is infinite from 
all standpoints. But it must be emphasized that the continuum itself is 
merely potential. That is, we do not directly experience the continuum as 
indefinitely divisible or unbounded. As Mays has put the point, we are not 
even aware that the passage of events "...weaves itself upon a background 
of logical relations ".61 The extensive continuum is abstracted from our 
experience in order to provide a skeletal structure in which everything 
actual must conform. "It is not a fact prior to the world; it is the first 
determination of order- that of real potentiality- arising out of the general 
character of the world. "62 As real potential, it tells us what the general 
conditions are for all becoming, and this includes actual occasions and cosmic 
epochs which may never become actualized. 
Since actual occasions atomize the continuum, they make real what was 
antecedently merely potential. With the becoming of each occasion, there is 
the production of a certain quantum of extensiveness, of physical time and 
physical space. But the novel occasion must conform to the structure alreadly 
implanted in the actual world from which it came. This is why Whitehead says 
that the extensive continuum underlies the whole world; past, present, and 
future. It doesn't tell us anything about those events as regards their 
content. But each occasion, regardless of its more special characteristics, 
must be systematically related according to the general properties of whole 
and part, and to various other types of geometrical order- the iron necessity. 
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The potential becomes actual as possible actual occasions in the future 
form a bond with the structure in the already settled past. 
This purely extensive sort of order also limits the genuine 
possibilities of the realm of eternal objects. That is, the extensive 
continuum determines which of the eternal objects are real as opposed to pure 
possibilities. In the contemporary world we discern clear -cut definitions of 
sensa, located in definite spatial regions. These are the relational eternal 
objects which have been prehended by the mental poles of the multiplicity of 
occasions in the contemporary nexus. They have become real possibilities by 
the fact that they were compatible with the requirements of this special sort 
of order in the immediate past, i.e., requirements which were laid down by the 
past functioning as objectively immortal. On this point, Whitehead writes: 
"The actual occasion is the product of the interplay of physical pole and 
mental pole. In this way, potentiality passes into actuality and extensive 
relations mould qualitative content and objectifications of other particulars 
into a coherent finite experience ".63 
Eternal objects, as real possibilities, are prehended by the mental pole 
of an actual occasion, and not through the physical pole except, as mediated 
by the mental pole of another past occasion. But it is only such occasions 
with a dominance of the mental pole that have such conceptual feelings of 
novel eternal objects. Others simply inherit the same eternal objects from 
the past. In general, actual occasions prehend eternal objects, but 
conversely, eternal objects have 'ingression' into actual occasions. Once 
again this relationship repeats the principle of asymmetry. That is, the 
relation is external as regards the eternal object, and internal as regards 
the actual occasion.64 This obviously follows from the idea that the present 
occasion prehends the already determinate past which of course includes 
eternal objects as its essential content. And if the eternal object is a 
novel one, conceptually prehended from the realm of eternal objects, it is 
equally determinate, and this asymmetrical relationship holds as well. 
Now, when Whitehead is preoccupied largely with the role of eternal 
objects in the concrescence of actual occasions, we have no indication as to 
how they relate to one another. How, for instance, does red relate to purple? 
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Or how does middle C relate to the chord CEG? In Science and the Modern 
World, Whitehead attempted just such an analysis of eternal objects, as 
purely abstract entities in various relational schemes. This analysis 
includes eternal objects as both pure and real possibilities which are 
arranged into patterns of relatedness depending on the various general types 
of eternal objects- colors, sounds, geometrical forms, emotions, tastes, 
smells, etc. Also, from these types, Whitehead distinguishes two species of 
eternal objects; those of the subjective species, and those of the objective 
species. The former are objects such as red, middle C and the emotion of 
anger, which ingress into the subjective form of a prehension; while the 
latter, primarily geometrical shapes, can only ingress into the objective 
datum.65 
As opposed to the real potentiality of the extensive continuum, the 
realm of eternal objects is pure potentiality. Whitehead places this realm 
in the primordial nature of God- an eternal actual entity moving with 
the whole of creation. This is why he conceives of the objects as having 
an eternal (atemporal) character. That is, as eternal, the objects endure 
throughout all time because God is always conceptually prehending them. 
These relations among the eternal objects are those in God's conceptual 
realization.66 
Considered as abstract entities, eternal objects are, he says, 
comprehensible without reference to actual occasions. But this transcendence 
from the concrete process does not entail disconnection from it. Here 
they have an individual essence and a relational essence. That is, as an 
individual, we discern what the eternal object is in itself, and as 
relational, we see how it involves a reference to other eternal objects 
In their relational essence, they are purely internal relations. Whitehead 
makes the point thus: "Since the relationships of A to other eternal objects 
stand determinately in the essence of A, it follows that they are internal 
relations ".67 This is what he sometimes calls "pattern" or "diversity ".68 
Since these relations do not involve the particular character of time, or 
the creative advance (i.e., the special internal- external asymmetry sketched 
above), they are in every way determinate and mutually dependent. 
This analysis of eternal objects as purely internal relations 
should remind us of Bradley's argument (2); especially since the formulation 
is so close to Bradley's analysis of the relational complex composed of 
qualities and their internal relations. How then does Whitehead propose 
to solve the problem of an infinite regress within each eternal object? 
We cannot appeal to a doctrine of 'perishing' at this level as we did in 
the case of actual occasions. 
It does seem that Whitehead has in mind the difficulties of monistic 
Idealism when he considers how it is possible to know anything about 
individuals internally related without knowing everything about all the 
others.69 His solution here involves the distinction between the individual 
essence and the relational essence. We can understand A as an individual 
essence in the general scheme of relationships, without having to understand 
the uniqueness of all the other relata; that is without having to understand 
all the other individual essences. And surely some eternal objects are more 
"relevantly" related than others depending on their relative proximity. For 
instance, blue and green of the same intensity and value are surely closer 
than red and yellow of different intensity and value. So, as Whitehead puts 
it the scheme itself is "...analysable into a multiplicity of limited 
relationships which have their own individuality and yet at the same time 
presuppose the total relationship within possibility ".70 Such relationships 
are ordered into an 'abstractive hierarchy' in which eternal objects are 
arranged into grades or types. At the base, there are simple eternal objects 
(those which cannot be analysed into a relationship of components, and hence 
cannot be divided further- e.g., a primary color, red), and building upwards, 
there are grades of complex eternal objects which are arranged depending upon 
the level of complexity of their components. Here we should be reminded of a 
similar project in Principia Mathematica where functions are arranged into 
logical types, but this analogy should not be pushed too far. The theory of 
types was proposed in Principia in order to solve the formal contradiction 
concerning the class of all classes. Whitehead, in his abstractive hierarchy 
of eternal objects, is only thinking of grades of complexity. And there is no 
formal contradiction involved in the latter. 
Sg it seems that Whitehead's answer to Bradley involves the idea 
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of a base of simple eternal objects which prevents an internal regress 
ad infinitum. A complex eternal object (some shade of turquoise, or the C 
major triad CEG) may involve a multiplicity of other simpler eternal objects, 
but these are finally resolved into a finite number of relationships once the 
level of simples is reached at the base of the hierarchy. 
Admittedly, Bradley simply could dismiss this solution as ad hoc 
because there remains the question of how the simple eternal objects are 
related. And to call them 'simple' does not solve the problem of a regress 
within each. No matter how simple or primary the color red may be, its 
relation to any other simple still results in a regress of grounds and 
consequents. 
It is not at all clear whether Whitehead recognized this problem; 
and, indeed, Bradley may have a point. But Whitehead's whole project here 
was to show that the simple eternal objects are abstractions which are not 
at all likely to have ingression into actual occasions. Because of their 
simplicity, they remain pure possibilities, while on the other hand, the 
complex eternal objects are more likely to find their way into the concrete 
process. Indeed, it is evident that the simple eternal objects are not 
the sensa of presentational immediacy. That is, they must remain pure 
possibilities in the primordial nature of God, and are only discerned by us 
as objects of conceptual analysis. 
Many have seen enormous difficulties with Whitehead's realm of eternal 
objects, and have criticized the doctrine as a "needless complication of 
process thought" and as "unwanted metaphysical baggage ".71 Why can't eternal 
objects be emergent simply in the same way as actual occasions? And if the 
pure possibilities are never to find their way into the concrete process, why 
are they needed at all? Much of this turns on various questions concerning 
the nature of God as keeper of the self -identical objects throughout all time. 
Though we shall touch on some of these questions in our final chapter, we 
must reserve judgment on the purely theological concerns for now. Obviously, 
Whitehead saw a complex interdependence of structure in the universe where 
actuality and change require reference to possibility and permanance. This 
very point is, in fact, emphasized in his essay "Mathematics and the Good" 
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when he says: 
The notion of the essential relatedness of all things 
is the primary step in understanding how finite 
entities require the unbounded universe, and how the 
universe acquires meaning and value by reason of its 
embodiment of the activity of finitude.72 
But the crucial point regarding this interplay is that possibility (the 
unbounded universe) is mere vacancy apart from the intrinsic value added to 
the World by each actual occasion. Actuality and finitude add definiteness 
and value to what was merely unrealized potential. 
Throughout this chapter we have seen how various forms of relatedness 
constitute the essential structure of Whitehead's metaphysics. Our central 
focus was Whitehead's notion of the concrete asymmetry of actual occasions, 
from which the more complex and increasingly abstract forms of relatedness 
were derived. But whether or not the more abstract analysis proved wholly 
satisfactory, it is still quite clear that Bradley's anti -relational arguments 
must be rejected. Analytic thought does tell us something important about 
reality and the structure of feeling; it gives order to the blooming, buzzing 
confusion. It enriches our interpretation once we descend back to immediacy 
again. As Professor Emmet has said: "Relational thought could tell us 
nothing, nor even be of practical value, unless its symbolism had some kind -of 
relevant reference to distinctions in the real ".73 Thought must be a symbolic 
representation of the forms and distinctions within reality itself; conceptual 
form and perceptual form must complement one another in the central task of 
understanding the universe. Of course, Whitehead was never dogmatic about 
perfecting such symbolic representations. "Seek simplicity and distrust it." 
Like Bradley, he is well aware of the limitations of finite knowledge and 
the distortion involved in the analytic slicing of experience. But, unlike 
Bradley, he held that the voyage of philosophy, and of thought, as it 
develops from epoch, to epoch, not only involves the discovery of the higher 
generalities, but also the discovery of the finer, subtler distinctions. 
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CHAPTER V 
EXTENSION AND WHOLE -PART RELATIONS 
1. Events and Objects 
In Process and Reality, Whitehead makes the claim that "... the 
emotional appetitive elements in our conscious experience are those which 
most,closely resemble the basic elements of all physical experience ".1 We 
shall assume that by 'resemble' Whitehead here means some degree of psychical 
experience or bare emotion which characterizes the most rudimentary facts of 
physical existence. But our main question is, can such an ontology of 
psychical 'events', of throbs of emotion, ranging from the most basic to a 
complexity of the sort which make up human consciousness, form the basis of 
the enduring objects of our common experience? Put another way, how can our 
basic ontology of actual occasions, the elusive moments of experience, make up 
the hard material bodies of our everyday world and account for the system of 
nature? 
Insofar as Bradley remained neutral on the question of panpsychism, 
but most definitely held that the basis of all reality is psychical through 
and through, he can be said to be in agreement with us here. But the causal 
character of events we shall argue here obviously goes beyond Bradley's 
initial claim. Since, for Bradley, nature is but one part of the feeling 
whole which is the object side of the centre of experience, physical objects 
in extension are but convenient abstractions from this immediate whole.2 
In large measure this chapter will be an expansion and defense 
of the introductory sections: 'The Ontological Quest' and ' Panpsychism' of 
chapter II. The central focus is the doctrine of 'event -pluralism' versus 
the 'materialist' or 'substance' ontology. Also now that we have cleared the 
ground in our last chapter on relations, we shall pursue a full -blown theory 
of extension and whole -part relations via Whitehead's theory of society and 
the more speculative side of this theory on the nature of cosmic epochs. In 
the end, this theory is important because it contrasts the way in which 
Whitehead conceives of the universe as an infinite plurality, as opposed to 
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Bradley's conception of the Absolute as the final container and end of 
relations. But before this receives too much of our attention, let us pursue 
the basic contrast between the theory of events and the theory of material 
substance. 
Professor P. F. Strawson has argued at length for an ontology of 
material substance in his influential book, Individuals. In fact, Strawson 
defends the concept of material substance in explicit contrast to that of the 
event. Here he argues that objects or material bodies are primary, and that 
events which characterize these bodies in one way or another are adjectival. 
Following Aristotle, Strawson holds that the particulars which make up the 
framework of space -time are bodies such as men, trees, houses, animals, 
plants, etc. These are the basic particulars or individuals because they 
satisfy the essential conditions of reference, namely identification and 
reidentification. 
One of Strawson's crucial points about basic particulars is that to talk 
sense we must talk about worldly things, both individually and specifically, 
and be able to identify what we are talking about. By the use of demonstrative 
terms, we identify this individual or that one as unique. And as he points 
out: 
We can make it clear to each other what or 
which particular things our discourse is about 
because we can fit together each others reports and 
stories into a single picture of the world; and the 
framework of that picture is a unitary spatio- 
temporal framework, of one temporal and three spatial 
dimensions. Hence, as things are, particular- identi- 
fication in general rests ultimately on the possibility 
of locating the particular things we speak of in a 
single unified spatio - temporal system.3 
In short, identification by demonstrative terms rests on a certain linguistic 
agreement among a community of language users which share this unified spatio- 
temporal system, and this constitutes a common conceptual framework of basic 
particulars. Furthermore, in order to secure the unitary scheme of this 
kind, the basic objects of reference must be capable of reidentification. 
That is, we must be able to make the same reference to such unique 
individuals, and identify them as the same as those encountered on a previous 
occasion.4 
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Now, in claiming that certain particulars are basic in any ontological 
scheme, we mean that all other particulars are ultimately reducible to them. 
Everything else which we describe as existing in some sense of the word is a 
construction out of them. Hence, from Strawson's point of view, the material 
bodies which are accessible to observation, occupy a public space -time 
framework and endure through time as the same individuals, are the basic 
particulars from which everything else is derived. They are identified 
independently of particulars of other categories; but the particulars of these 
other categories cannot be identified without a reference to them.5 Strawson 
argues, therefore, that such things as theoretical constructs, processes, 
events and subjective states of consciousness depend essentially on 
identifying references to the larger corporeal bodies of our perceptual 
experiences. For instance, talk about electrons and protons depends on 
identifying references to the electromagnetic effects of, say, magnets and 
chunks of uranium ore, while talk about private experiences and states of 
consciousness- pain, happiness, boredom, etc, depend on identifying references 
to the larger class of corporeal bodies, namely 'persons'. 
At this point it should be obvious how Strawson's category preference 
and his criteria for locating basic particulars run in direct opposition to 
the ontology we have defended in this thesis. But Strawson's whole program 
strikes us at once as defending common sense and ordinary language to the 
point of total naivete about the nature of reality. Of course, Strawson 
claims to be doing 'descriptive metaphysics' which, by his own definition, 
rules out any detailed explanation or enquiry into the origin and nature of 
the universe. But in metaphysics we seek to understand the most general 
aspects of reality in some coherent and systematic fashion, and this is 
exactly what Strawson's system denies us. By contrast, his method allows us 
nothing more than the attempt to lay bare the most general features of our 
conceptual structure; yet it is just this structure of commonplace thinking 
which is challenged by a metaphysics which seeks comprehensive applications. 
Let us then proceed to see whether Strawson's system holds up to the 
opposing doctrine. 
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Firstly, we should investigate the claim that material bodies are the 
basic particulars from the point of view of identification. It will be easier 
here to confine our responses to a basically Whiteheadian point of view, 
though on many points, as mentioned before, Bradley will be in close accord. 
Also we should note that the specific sense of the term 'event' used by 
Whitehead is a nexus of actual occasions forming the historic route in the 
life of some physical object. As he says: "An actual occasion is the limiting 
type of event with only one member ".6 But, for our purposes here we shall use 
the generic term 'event' as interchangable with 'actual occasion'. 
By his emphasis on identity -by- reference, Strawson falls into the trap 
of taking what is clear and distinct to presentational immediacy as 
fundamental. This is indeed one of the striking facts about his approach to 
category preference, i.e., his defence of the grosser physical bodies 
immediately present to perception. But are these the true individuals? For 
Strawson, the point largely hinges on the ability of a community of language 
users to specify what their discourse is about. They must be able to identify 
and reidentify the basic objects of reference. But it is painfully naive that 
linguistic agreement should serve as the ultimate metaphysical criterion for 
identifying the basic particulars of reality. Just because we do not have the 
intricate vocabulary to describe and refer to event -processes or flows of 
experience, this does not mean that the particulars discerned here cannot 
possibly constitute the basis of reality. It only says something about the 
development of language in serving our most practical needs. 
From the point of view of the event ontology, identity -by- reference is 
not the real issue at stake. The physical bodies identified and reidentified 
throughout a given period of time need not be self - identical in any absolute 
sense. We refer to these bodies as more or less the same- 'Professor Smart 
has lost more hair'; 'My brother has grown two inches'; 'That cup has lost 
much of its original color'. We have no trouble recognizing process and 
change in enduring bodies, but it is only for the most practical purposes that 
we refer to these bodies as 'the same'. In fact, if it were not for certain 
recurrent features of process (the eternal objects in Whitehead's system - 
colors, sounds, shapes, etc.), we would not be able to reidentify physical 
bodies at all. In the continuous flux of events, it is a dominance of 
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inherited characteristics which is recognized by a speaker who reidentifies 
that body as the one he identified before. But the sense -objects recognized 
here are not the basic particulars. The objects are ingredients, the 
what's of events. They provide structures for event -sequences, but they 
are not the basis of their own survival. 
Strawson might attempt to counter this move by saying that the 
subjects of the above sentences have already introduced a particular into the 
proposition (Professor Smart, My brother, That cup), while the predicate 
qualifies the change or process that has occurred to the self -identical 
individual. In other words, say, in the example of the cup, the subject has 
introduced a particular into the proposition which is sufficient to identify 
the particular, whereas the predicate 'has lost much of its original color' 
does not of itself presuppose any fact.? But, as we have stressed before, the 
subject -predicate distinction itself is a totally inadequate approach to 
metaphy >ics . 8 
Two points must be made in this connection, and both center upon 
different aspects of Whitehead's general claim that ordinary language does 
violence to immediate experience and hinders our ability to get at the very 
basis of reality. Firstly, the very means of identifying subjects and 
predicates tends to reinforce our habits of viewing the world in terms of 
static individuals qualified by various properties. The tendency of natural 
language is, first to isolate a substantial material entity, and then go on to 
describe it by its accidental changes. But this basic dualism inherent in the 
the subject -predicate form of statement cannot possibly grasp the very dynamic 
character of process. And secondly, the isolation of individuals by ordinary 
language suggests the complete abstraction from any environment. The problem 
is that such abstraction from immediate experience neglects the whole 
background from which the individuals are taken. It is on this point that 
Whitehead's philosophy of language most agrees with the basic premise of 
Bradley's logic. The delusive completeness of simple 'facts' in demonstrative 
propositions (Bradley's analytic judgment of sense) cannot possibly express 
anything ultimate from the point of view of general metaphysics. Such simple 
facts or individuals in propositions require the entirety of relations in the 
systematic environment in order to determine the exact truth value, and this 
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is quite impossible. As Whitehead puts the point: every proposition 
proposing a fact must, in its complete analysis, propose the general character 
of the universe required for that fact.9 
Whitehead would not wish to deny that the grosser enduring objects 
and their properties are our primary objects of discourse; but this, in 
itself, is no ultimate criterion for deciding what the ultimate entities are 
in the universe. Clearly we are dealing with two very different issues: one 
concerning the usefulness of ordinary language, and the other concerning basic 
particulars from which the rest of a satisfying ontology is constructed. 
As we have argued, the essence of reality will always elude the grasp of a 
language designed to describe static objects in various spatial relations. 
It was on this point that Whitehead, at the expense of great obscurity, 
attempted some 'revisionary metaphysics' by creating a language to fit his 
novel vision of a dynamic world of processes and events. Contrary to 
Strawson, then, we do not examine the actual use of words to uncover the basis 
of reality. Language is the tool required by philosophy, but it is always 
subject to revision. It is absurd to think that the metaphysician should 
be a slave to the ordinary man's faith in the adequacy of language in 
describing reality. We fashion our language and concepts to fit reality, not 
the other way around. In effect, Strawson has it backwards when he says that 
the revisionary metaphysician is at the service of the descriptive meta- 
physician; for the latter is confined to the dictionary, while the former 
expands the existing repetoire by adjusting the language to new meanings. 
Strawson's basic argument against an ontology of events (insofar 
as there is an argument there at all) is that such states or conditions are 
always of particulars of other types, namely material bodies. Births and 
deaths happen to particular creatures. Bangs, flashes and battles are all 
products, so to speak, of material bodies in motion. But are these the unit - 
events we have defended throughout the course of this thesis? It is obvious 
that Strawson has not considered how the material bodies themselves could be 
composed of aggregates of events by the fact that the types of events he 
chooses to discuss are not the unit -events which could make this ontology 
possible.10 For instance, in his chapter on "Sounds ", Strawson wishes to 
construct an ontology in which material bodies are not the basic particulars, 
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and concludes that a purely auditory world would not make discourse possible 
because we would not be able to distinguish between ourselves as subjects of 
experience and other items in the world which were not ourselves. But this 
conceptual problem of the possibility of a "No -Space World" in which all the 
sensory items are auditory, is misconceived as an argument against events. 
Clearly, events which make up the physical world cannot be deprived of their 
extensive relations in space. The whole experiment is doomed from the start, 
mainly because sounds are poor examples of the events which could possibly 
replace an ontology of material bodies. In short, the kinds of events 
Strawson discusses throughout his book are merely phenomenal and cannot 
therefore challenge the validity of event- pluralism.11 
Much of the difficulty, I think, in getting beyond the merely phenomenal 
events to the type of events we have in mind for basic particulars surrounds 
the issue of what is known most clearly to immediate experience. Strawson, 
if I understand correctly, would claim that there is no such thing -in- itself 
or noumenal reality which is to be identified with private experiences or 
subjective states. And even granted the existence of such states, he argues 
that they are "the most obviously inadmissible" candidates for basic 
particulars because they depend on the identities of the persons to whose 
histories they belong.12 But obviously, if one insists that the identity of 
the private experience is never known as having its own inherent character, 
but, rather, always in reference to something else, then there will always be 
this basic stumbling block to seeing how the event immediately present to our 
experience is the best candidate for a basic particular which constitutes the 
very backing of all phenomenal reality. 
In a very recent defense of the primacy of psychical events, largely 
consistent with the type of ontology we advocate here, Professor Sprigge, in 
his book, The Vindication of Absolute Idealism, argues that it is, in fact, 
our own flow of experience which presents an essence which is transparent to 
us as is nothing else. And in accordance with Locke's conclusion he says: 
"... it is the physical, if anything, which is a something -we- know- not -what 
lying beyond the immediacies of consciousness, not the converse ".13 On this 
view, the basic particulars happen as moments of experience and are known by 
our living through their very concreteness. What we have first is a knowledge 
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by acquaintance from which we proceed to a knowledge by description. But the 
latter is no substitute for what is known in its most direct and purest form. 
That is, any purely phenomenal or abstract structural description of an 
individual will never quite grasp what it is actually like being that 
individual. But our ability to empathize with the type of concreteness 
experienced, whether it be the experience of another person, animal or lower 
form of being, is the best we have to understand the reality of that 
individual. 
Having grasped the full force of this argument, we see that Strawson's 
category preference is turned upside down, for it is the grosser physical 
bodies which are dependent on the more determinate and complete moments of 
experience which form the basis of their existence. On this point Hartshorne 
has argued that the logic which drives us from genus to species to individual 
is the same logic which should drive us one step further to the event.14 
Just as the individual is more determinate than the species, so is the event 
more determinate than the individual. Strawson seems to have largely accepted 
the rather arbitrary definition of an individual which serves various 
scientific or social purposes, but even the biologists recognize that the 
system of classification is a man -made structure of pigeon -holes, serving the 
pragmatic purpose of recording observations in a convenient manner.15 In many 
respects the clusters which we label 'genus' and 'species' are not always 
clear -cut. And, even if we confine ourselves to individuals, the definitions 
are often vague. At what point in the life of a tadpole does it become a 
frog, the caterpillar a butterfly? Similarly, when does the embryo become 
a foetus, the foetus a 'person'? When does a human being cease to be a 
'person'? Religious and state institutions, in their attempt to define an 
individual, have not found adequate answers to these last few questions. 
Why should we accept the conventions of ordinary language? The evidence 
seems to point to a more determinate basic particular than the individual. 
If we accept the metaphysical argument that the primacy of the event 
is secured on the basis of the occasions known most clearly in our own 
experience, we find that individuals can be defined in terms of a certain 
dominance of character or recognizable sameness of pattern passed within the 
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event - sequences which form the basis of the physical body or personality. What 
we recognize are the eternal objects. They are identified and reidentified in 
definite space -time regions, but the events which contain them are only here 
and now and never again. The self- identity of a physical object or person 
across time which Strawson seeks to vindicate is merely an unwarranted survival 
of the concept of substance from Aristotle and the scholastic tradition. It is 
a presupposition required for all social intercourse, but metaphysically it is 
unfounded. If we require a basis for moral responsibility or ownership in 
legal theory, all that is needed is that a person or physical object remain 
more or less the same by the fact that his or its unique line of inheritance is 
traceable; an earlier event is internally related to the present one, but 
there is nothing which is wholly the same individual. 
2. Cosmological Outlook 
The event ontology is no doubt an alternative to established orthodoxy. 
But it is one, which, I argue, provides the most cogency for our conception of 
physical objects and the space -time framework. That is, instead of conceiving 
of material bodies as the basic particulars which constitute the framework of 
spatial and temporal relations, an ontology of events means that physical 
objects are constructs of event -particulars in a space and time of their own 
making. This ontology takes seriously the meaning of the 20th century concept 
of space -time, for the becoming of each event carries with it a definite 
quantum of extended space -time, and each discloses a causal background from 
which it came. 
Working from the unit -event as our basic particular, we can construct 
various levels of physical objects, from the microscopic subatomic level all 
the way up to star - systems and cosmic epochs, by the manner in which events 
are united by their more special or general characteristics. This was a 
central aim in Whitehead's cosmological theory in which he attempted a 
unification of the special sciences in terms of one coherent and systematic 
account of social organization. 
His own attempt to build up physical objects from the basis of events 
seems to have been highly influenced by the promising developments in physics 
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at the turn of this century. While James had supplied the psychological basis 
for the connectedness of experience in his radical empiricism, the concept of 
the flux of energy in an electromagnetic field seemed to provide the necessary 
physical analogue for the doctrine of prehension. We shall discuss two 
important aspects of the physical theory here, namely, the implications for 
the concept of space -time and the dematerialization of nature. 
When J.C. Maxwell formulated the equations governing the propagation of 
waves of radiation in the electromagnectic field, the unexpected result for 
the scientific community was the elimination of bits of matter as the self - 
identical supports for physical properties. This was the beginning of the 
breakdown of the old dichotomy of atoms and the void; for the concept of a 
'field of force' means that space is made up of various stresses and tensions 
which transmit energy. And this means that the notion of 'empty space' as the 
mere vehicle of spatial interconnections is also abandoned as a fundamental 
principle in physical explanations. The field is rather a medium by which 
electric or magnetic objects can have an effect over a distance. It is 
something which pervades space and contains recognizable routes of energy. 
These routes are sometimes called 'energy vectors' because, at each point, the 
passing of energy in the flux has a quantitative flow and definite 
direction.16 
As Whitehead points out, the concept of 'continuity' was dominant in 
Maxwell's theory. It seemed as if the concept of a 'field' had done away with 
the atomistic conception of nature dominant in classical physics, but when 
J.J. Thompson and Ernest Rutherford detected the protons, electrons and 
photons as unit charges of electricity, the atomistic conception emerged again 
as an indispensable part of science. These subatomic particles were 
introduced to account for the many different chemical elements formed by 
various combinations of the basic types of subatomic particles. (For example, 
the number of electrons revolving round the nucleus in an atom defined the 
numerical place occupied by the given element in the Periodic Table.) But of 
course the story does not end here. 
With the introduction of the quantum theory in the beginning of this 
century, the atomistic conception seemed to be dissolved again by a certain 
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insubstantial and unthinglike behavior of elementary particles. This theory 
was developed to account for phenomena which were previously unexplained. 
(e.g. Why does emission of radiation occur at some definite intensities and 
not at others? And why do different elements emit radiation at distinct 
wavelengths ?) 
According to the quantum theory, such phenomena are explained by the 
notion that energy of all types occurs in quanta or minimal packets. Atoms 
are then to be understood in terms of waves of radiation which they can emit 
or absorb, and this occurs at non -uniform spans of time. The reason why a 
simple 'particle' theory of the atom, using ordinary mechanics and electro- 
magnetic theory does not succeed is that the electron cannot be considered 
simply as a particle. That is, since it cannot have both a well defined 
position and velocity, it must be seen in part as a wave.17 The orbits of 
electrons are to be regarded as series of detached positions rather than 
continuous lines. This is what is meant by quantum 'leaps' or 'jumps'. 
What went out with this theory was the idea that the particles have the 
definite size, shape and position which classical mechanics had given them. 
The emphasis now turns on pulses of energy which have an approximate location 
of space -time, and interact in fields which bear and transmit the forces of 
nature.18 This idea seemed to correspond with the earlier idea of vectors 
describing routes of transmission, but the routes are now discontinuous. That 
is, the idea that light and other electromagnetic radiations are transmitted 
as continuous trains of waves is replaced by the idea that radiation can only 
be emitted in pulses. 
Now it must be mentioned that much of Whitehead's thought took shape 
before the detailed elaboration of quantum physics had been achieved. His 
interpretation derives from the earlier atomic models and theories of Planck 
and Bohr, not the new quantum theory of 1925 -27 proposed by Heisenberg and 
Schrödinger.19 But it is quite clear that he had attempted to integrate much 
of the field and quantum theories into the structure of his general 
cosmological outlook. 
Firstly, in Whitehead's theory, we recall that the extensive continuum 
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provides the general framework of real potentiality rendered specific or 
actual with the becoming of each event. This means that the whole system of 
space -time literally grows out of the way that events are systematically 
related to one another in nature. Since each event carries its own quantum of 
space and time, the void is clearly impossible. It is, in fact, explicitly 
ruled out by the 'Ontological Principle' which requires everything to be 
somewhere in actuality.20 According to Whitehead, even the so- called 'empty 
space' is filled with activity; it is just that such events involve no 
specialized characteristics resulting from the negligible amount of eternal 
objects.21 So it seems that the universe is one endless 'field' of 
interaction, though, in Whitehead's view, the electromagnetic features are 
only characteristic of our limited cosmic epoch. 
Secondly, the emphasis on pulses of energy in physical theory seemed to 
suggest that matter had been identified with energy, and energy with sheer 
activity.22 With the displacement of matter from its primary position, 
nature is therefore to be understood in terms of dynamic processes standing in 
various complex relations. Whitehead remarks that: "In place of the 
Aristotelian notion of the procession of forms, [this new concept] has 
substituted the notion of the forms of process ".23 
The metaphysical analogue to the physical concept of an 'energy vector' 
is Whitehead's concept of 'prehension' where routes of influence or emotional 
energy are passed from event to event. In his metaphysics, events or actual 
occasions account for the atomistic aspect of nature, while the subjective 
form accounts for the continuity between such events. But like the quantum 
theory, Whitehead holds that all physical experience happens in leaps or 
definite epochs of becoming. Curiously enough, this theory has come into 
close accord with the concept of the 'specious present' in psychology where 
the whole of the duration is required in order that there be any extensiveness 
at a11.24 But what is particularly revealing about the findings of quantum 
mechanics is that, at the base of things, the discontinuous existence of 
fundamental particles forms the continuous existence of the larger physical 
bodies. Undoubtedly, Whitehead found this idea crucial in explaining how 
his basic ontology of events could form the various levels of enduring 
'societies'. He says, in fact, that his cosmological theory is "...perfectly 
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consistent with the demands for discontinuity which have been urged from the 
side of physics ".25 Physical reality is, at most, quasi- continuous, as 
successive leaps or vibrations of energy fuse together to form physical 
objects perceived by us as continuous. 
Now this first level of rudimentary physical activity, that of 
subatomic particles, is not to be identified with the 'basic events' or 
'actual occasions' of Whitehead's metaphysics. What is observable to the 
physicist, i.e. the effects of subatomic particles in the electromagnetic 
field, is, on Whitehead's view, multiple interactions of events with an 
electromagnetic character. And as he argues: 
The notion of physical energy, which is at the 
base of physics, must then be conceived as an 
abstraction from the complex energy, emotional 
and purposeful, inherent in the subjective form 
of the final synthesis in which each occasion 
completes itself.26 
Scientific enquiry obviously involves very high degrees of abstractions 
which remove us from the concrete real things of nature. From this it should 
be clear that Whitehead would not appeal to physics to seek the final word on 
the metaphysical primacy of events. That is, since physics deals in high 
abstractions, the substance -event issue cannot be settled here. Indeed, in 
physics it seems that both the particle and wave concepts are required to 
explain the relevant phenomena investigated. But Whitehead seems to imply 
that physics (at least that of his day) had come to conclusions which were in 
much more accordance with a metaphysics which gives the concept of an event a 
primary place. 
In our discussion of Whitehead's conformity to various findings in 20th 
century physics, we have, to a large extent, avoided the issue of the specific 
psychical character of events, in order to concentrate on the more general 
cosmological implications. Physicists may indeed accept the idea that the 
fundamental constituents of reality are events, but the objectivity required 
here will, I expect, never reveal the psychical unit at the base of things. 
As we have argued earlier, this issue belongs to the special province of 
metaphysical enquiry.27 Admittedly, the hardest gap for the panpsychist to 
fill is that between the occasions of experience immediately present to 
- 127 - 
consciousness, and the first level of physical activity. On the one hand, 
there is the emotional energy entertained in life, and, on the other, the 
physical flux of energy in nature. But, as Whitehead continually argued 
throughout his later metaphysical works: "... neither life nor physical nature 
can be understood unless we fuse them together as essential factors in the 
composition of 'really real' things whose interconnections and individual 
characters constitute the universe ".28 
3. Transmutation and the Theory of Society 
At no point in the writings of Bradley do we encounter an analysis or 
explanation of the way in which nature forms various levels of wholes and 
parts in the organization of physical reality. Since for the most part, 
Bradley remains open as to whether the whole of nature is composed of various 
degrees of finite centres of experience (i.e., those of a non -human sort), no 
such explanation is required in his metaphysical system. If it were so, 
perhaps Bradley would have offered some type of theory bordering on cosmology, 
but it remains doubtful. At most we are to understand that finite centres and 
their consciousness of themselves as parts finally lose their independent 
natures once "transmuted and suppressed" in one all- absorbing experience of 
the Absolute, but the detailed apprehension of this fusion is for finite 
beings quite impossible.29 As Bradley himself says: 
There really is within the Absolute a diversity 
of finite centres. There really is within finite 
centres a world of objects... These things are 
realities, and yet, because imperfect, they are 
but appearances which differ in degree. That 
they are supplemented and without loss are all 
made good absolutely in the Whole we are led to 
conclude. But how in detail this is accomplished, 
and exactly what the diversity of finite centres 
means in the end, is beyond our knowledge.30 
So, for Bradley, we might say that the how is always unnecessary once the 
general principle is forced upon us.31 And this not only means how the final 
unity is accomplished by the Absolute, but also how the whole of nature is 
arranged by finite centres, human or non -human. 
Though, in the end, the notion of transmutation of finite actualities 
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in one all- absorbing experience will be an all- important doctrine for our 
final comparison between Bradley and Whitehead (Chapter VII), it is our 
contention that Bradley's agnosticism regarding the variety and linkage of the 
centres is given a reasonable basis in Whitehead's system. Much of this 
hinges on the general position taken on relations, and if, as we have argued, 
relations are indeed 'real', various levels of social organization in nature 
can be constructed by relations of whole and part. 
Other Absolute Idealists, particularly those inclined toward a 
panpsychist interpretation of the world, have attempted to give some 
explanation as to how various levels of sentience form wholes which may or 
may not themselves be sentient organisms. Royce, for example, held that 
everything 'enjoys' a certain sentience, but depending on the arrangement in 
the scale of organic and inorganic forms, the specious present experienced 
varies in different stretches. In his view, the life of experience pulsates 
throughout the arteries of Being.32 Such an interpretation, which emphasizes 
a certain individuality within the Whole, is much more inclined to provide 
some explanation as to how the 'arteries' are arranged. At least here some line 
of thought is open to the monist who has not been restrained by the more 
radical conclusions. 
Whitehead, on the other hand, has given a very detailed account as to 
how his actual occasions form 'societies' by their common characteristics, 
and these are arranged into various levels of organisms and environments. We 
have already discussed how Whitehead conceives of the first level of physical 
activity as multiple interactions of electromagnetic occasions forming 
routes of energy. But this is still the microscopic world as far as human 
perception goes. What we require is an explanation of how the occasions 
form various layers of organisms of organisms (electrons, atoms, molecules, 
cells,...), until we arrive at the enduring bodies available to perception 
(stones, plants, animals, planets,...), and finally, cosmic epochs and pure 
extension. 
But before we proceed any further, one point should certainly be clear. 
That is, societies are the things which endure, but they must not be confused 
with the completely real things which are the actual occasions.33 This 
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was the central mistake of Strawson and others following Aristotle. 
What, then, needs to be explained is why, in any one moment, we do 
perceive the tables, chairs and trees, and not multitudes of actual occasions 
in the immediate environment. (Analogously, this point applies equally to the 
purely physical interpretation of the world in terms of electrons or routes of 
energy.) Whitehead makes the transition from the microscopic world of actual 
occasions to the macroscopic world of our perceptual experiences by his notion 
of 'transmutation' whereby the occasions in any one physical body are 
prehended as a unity.34 That is, when we perceive any macroscopic entity, he 
argues that we prehend an aggregate of many occasions as one final unity. An 
'individual' is discerned in the mass of actual occasions present to any one 
moment by the way in which the perceiver integrates the many members of the 
society and produces one transmuted feeling. This is possible because the 
members of the society share a certain dominance of characteristics, i.e., the 
identity of pattern of the ingredient eternal objects. Hence, we are able to 
pick out the chair, as opposed to the 'empty space' around it, because of the 
dominance of certain eternal objects shared by the members of the chair and 
prehended by us as a unity. 
This idea of the many- functioning -as -one is not, perhaps, altogether 
different from the way the eye fuses together a multiplicity of dots which 
make up a picture. The French Impressionist, Georges Seurat, in fact, used 
this technique in painting where dots of color blend together to form more 
complex colors, and at just the right distance from the canvas, the admiring 
onlooker perceives figures and shapes instead of the individual dots. The 
final result is one transmuted feeling- the emotion of that particular 
painting resulting from the synthesis of colors and shapes. 
So for many purposes, a nexus of actualities can be treated as 
though it were one actuality. This is what happens at several levels of the 
extensive continuum where some particular entity or group is isolated for 
the investigation at hand- molecules, cells, a piece of rock, the human body, 
or the planet Mars. But what is quite clear to Whitehead is that, in this 
process of abstraction, we should not neglect the importance of the inter- 
relations within nature which make this possible. 
- 130 - 
Our sense perceptions, Whitehead argues, are often vague and confused.35 
They omit any discrimination of the fundamental activities within nature, even 
though, via symbolic reference, they do pick out the broad outlines of social 
order. Whatever predicates we are able to give to any particular body, they 
approximate, more or less, the type of order which dominates among the members 
which impose common characteristics on each other. 
Whitehead specifically defines a society as a nexús of social order 
in which: 
(i) there is a common element of form illustrated in 
the definiteness of each of its included actual 
entities, and (ii) this common element of form arises 
in each member of the nexus by reason of the conditions 
imposed upon it by its prehensions of some other members 
of the nexus, and (iii) these prehensions impose that 
condition of reproduction by reason of their inclusion 
of positive feelings of that common form.36 
These three conditions provide the main point of a society, namely, that it is 
self- sustaining. The society reproduces itself by the fact that the members 
of the society must positively prehend those eternal objects which not only 
define the society in question but ensure its continued survival. In this 
respect it is quite clear that a society is not simply an aggregate of 
mutually contemporary occasions, but rather multiple lines of inheritance. 
Even though there may be a certain amount of contemporaries at any one time, 
certain genetic conditions of prehension must be satisfied in order that the 
society endure through time.37 
Societies can be simple or vastly complex. The most simple ones are 
those with 'personal order', in which the members are ordered serially. The 
most specialized cases of these societies are the routes of electronic or 
protonic actualities in which the choices are indeed very limited. Here, 
there is only a single line of inheritance. But these simple societies form 
the base of 'higher' societies, namely electrons and protons, and thus begins 
the hierarchy of societies "...of increasing width of prevalence, the more 
special societies being included in the wider societies ".38 
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Whitehead therefore introduces the idea of a 'structured' society as one 
which includes subordinate societies and /or nexús. He says that: 
A structured society consists in the patterned 
intertwining of various nexus with markedly 
diverse defining characteristics. Some of these 
nexus are of lower types than others, and some 
will be of markedly higher types. There will be 
'subservient' nexus and the 'regnant' nexus within 
the same structured society. This structured 
society will provide the immediate environment 
which sustains each of its sub -societies, subservient 
and regnant alike.39 
A cell, for example, is structured in the sense that it is a society which 
harbors the existence of lower, more specialized societies- at one level 
molecules, at another atoms, and so on. So the higher society, (the cell) is 
regnant, and functions as an 'environment' for the lower level, (the 
molecules), while the lower societies are subservient and function as 
'organisms' for the higher level. This reciprocity of whole and parts 
applies throughout the various levels of order in the extensive continuum - 
working outwards in terms of environments or inwards in terms of organisms. 
In this way, all societies are enmeshed in a system of ever -widening 
characteristics and influence. The wider environment always provides the 
necessary conditions for the survival of the more special organism. 
"A 'structured society' may be more or less 'complex' in respect to the 
multiplicity of its associated sub - societies and sub -nexús and to the 
intricacy of their structural pattern "40 It may be 'inorganic' (crystals, 
rocks, planets, suns) or 'organic' (cells, tomatos, human beings). But there 
is no absolute gap between these two; they merely serve certain purposes where 
'life' may be important or unimportant.41 For instance, in the first category 
of material bodies 'life' is unimportant for the science of dynamics. But up 
and down the continuum we find that many apparently 'inorganic' societies 
sustain the organic ones, and 'organic' societies which include subordinate 
inorganic ones. For example, the solar system sustains the planet earth, and 
living animals and plants sustain their arrangements of molecules and atoms. 
If the society in question forms one body and the subordinate societies 
constitutive of it are all strands of enduring objects, it is said to be 
'corpuscular'. A volume of gas may be a rather loose society in that it 
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includes subordinate societies (molecules, atoms), but the volume itself is 
not corpuscular even though the individual molecules are. Corpuscular 
societies, such as stones and billard balls, consist of very low -level 
occasions which display little originality, thereby providing ideal instances 
of efficient causality for mechanics. As Whitehead says, they elicit "...a 
massive average objectification of a nexus, while eliminating the detailed 
diversities of the various members of the nexus in question ".42 Thus the 
Castle Rock at Edinburgh changes very little as the same eternal objects are 
inherited from year to year, century to century. In this sense, it remains 
'the same' Rock as seen by the Romans two thousand years ago, by Hume two 
hundred years ago, and by contemporary Edinburghers today. But sure enough, 
from the point of view of geological time, it is wearing away in proportion to 
the changes imposed upon it by the larger society, namely the planet earth. 
Most societies we come into contact with are 'democracies' in the sense 
that their subordinate societies function together without there being some 
central unified mentality. Certain cell colonies, plants, eco- systems and 
most lower forms of many -celled animals are democracies. These organisms 
react to stimuli, but there is no central direction or unified control. 
Higher animals, however, are those with a dominant living nexus of personal 
order. In the case of the vertebrate animals, the nexus of occasions with a 
dominance of the mental pole arises out of the complex nervous system- here 
defined as a system of neural occasions eventually forming the neurons. And 
the intensity of this experience, we must presume, varies from species to 
species. 
Whitehead's own account of psychological physiology (physiological 
psychology reversed) is indeed complex, and far exceeds our central theme 
of this section. Here we should only mention that the human being is 
an organic structured society in which the dominant nexus is a purely 
temporal single -line inheritance of actual occasions known as the 'stream of 
consciousness'- or what Whitehead calls the 'final percipient occasions' of 
human experience.43 As we saw in chapter III, this was the rather special 
stage of the concrescence resulting from a certain intensity of the subjective 
form.44 As Peirce once said, it is a kind of "public spirit among the nerve 
cells ". Throughout the course of this thesis, it has been our example of 
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the flow of reality, but one which, unlike the more fundamental types, 
captures the vivid immediacy of the present awareness of itself. 
Were there space to linger here and argue the cogency of Whitehead's 
views over the physicalist interpretations so popular today, it would be clear 
how the panpsychist conception of consciousness far surpasses the one -sided 
accounts of physio -chemical functions of the brain.45 Nonetheless it should 
be mentioned that, for the panpsychist, consciousness arises from a base which 
is more like itself (namely sentience), rather than from something which is 
utterly different. From Whitehead's point of view, the physicalist merely 
operates within a limited region of structured societies, i.e. internal organs 
of the body and sub - societies such as molecules and nerve cells. But it is 
never quite clear how consciousness could evolve from the inert and 
essentially lifeless base of matter. One set of external relations will be 
as good as any other set.46 
To proceed with the more general considerations of this section then, 
what makes Whitehead's philosophy an organic view of nature is this central 
idea of nested hierarchies of societies; of smaller units of organism nested 
in the larger ones. There is thus a certain interdependence of wholes and 
parts. But in accordance with the one -way dependence of the temporal process, 
certain exchanges take place between the organisms and their environments in 
order that higher, more complex organisms can evolve from lower, more simple 
ones. That is, the wholes and parts function together such that the parts 
are modified in accordance with the plan of the whole, and the whole is 
modified by its internal constituents. Whitehead, on this matter, locates two 
sides of the machinery involved in the development of nature. He says that: 
(i) a given environment dominates its subordinate societies such that the 
organisms adapt themselves to it, and (ii) the organisms create their own 
environment by a certain cooperation among themselves in producing the desired 
effect.47 On the first point (i), an individual organism (of whatever level) 
is liable to have aspects of the larger pattern dominating its own being and 
thus experiences modifications of the larger pattern reflected in itself. 
Obviously such reactions to changing circumstances in the wider environment 
are of utmost importance for the theory of Natural Selection where adaption 
becomes crucial. But also (ii), organisms can change and mold the environment 
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which defines them. To take a simple case, body cells, for example, alter 
their extracellular environment by exchanging chemicals, generating heat, and 
so on. The environment must therefore have a certain plasticity such that 
(over a longer period of time) a higher organism can evolve from changes which 
take place in the subordinate organisms. Changes at the lower level produce 
an increase of complexity, thus allowing the evolution of novel and more 
sophisticated organisms.48 
So, in the end, the survival and evolution of organisms is 
dependent upon favorable conditions in the larger environment which allow 
the proliferation of its members (i.e., the development of a larger number 
of similar organisms which are productive to the environment itself), while 
extinction implies the lack of such conditions. That is, an organism dies out 
when the environment ceases to favor its existence. The deterioration of the 
environment is the deterioration of the very order which allows for its 
proliferation. 
4. Cosmic Epochs and the Absolute 
If we pursue the general principle of whole -part relations, organisms 
and environments, to the highest conceivable level, we could very well arrive 
at one final society of the widest possible extension. Although Bradley 
does not arrive at his notion of the Absolute in quite this way, his 
general conclusion that there cannot be individuals or relations without some 
larger whole in which they are contained, approaches this line of thought. 
Indeed it is not too far off the mark to think of Bradley's supra -relational 
Absolute as one cosmic Organism which functions as the largest environment for 
everything in existence. 
But, for Bradley, this ultimate society is not in process or 
capable of evolution or decay. For him the final Reality is a timeless 
eternity where all subordinate aspects are but 'appearances' of the perfect 
order. From this perspective, the Absolute experiences the whole of existence 
in one frozen specious present. It contains process, but process is not 
reality. As Bradley puts the point in one of his more colorful passages: 
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.this one Reality enters into, but is itself 
incapable of evolution and progress... progress 
and decay are alike incompatible with perfection... 
There is of course progress in the world, and there 
is also retrogression, but we cannot think that the 
whole either moves on or backwards. The Absolute 
has no history of its own, though it contains 
histories without number... For nothing perfect, 
nothing genuinely real, can move. The Absolute has 
no seasons, but all at once bears its leaves, fruit 
and blossoms. Like our globe it always, and it never, 
has summer and winter.49 
All subordinate aspects of existence essentially contribute the richness of 
diversity to the life of the one Reality, but there is no sense in which the 
internal appearances move the Absolute to some state or condition of novelty. 
The final order simply is what it is; there is no better or worse, for in 
Bradley's view, these adjectives are but constructions based on some given 
piece of finitude. 
Within the Absolute, Bradley says, there is no logical objection to the 
possibility of an indefinite number of systems of space and time which have 
their own order but do not move on one another.50 That is, from the point 
of view of the type of spatio -temporal order we experience (however much 
imperfect and unreal), the order in these logically possible worlds is 
totally inconceivable to us. They are experienced by the Absolute as 
transmuted into one harmonious unity but each has an independent existence 
insofar as they do not affect one another causally. 
In many respects, though not wholly the same, this idea of alternative 
systems of spatio -temporal order comes into close accord with what Whitehead 
called 'cosmic epochs'. Our own epoch of space -time order he says is "... 
that widest'society of actual entities whose immediate relevance to ourselves 
is traceable ".51 But this is only one system of order which we can comprehend 
more or less by formulating the laws of nature, etc. Like Bradley, Whitehead 
holds that there is no logical objection, or, indeed, a metaphysical 
objection, to an indefinite number of such systems. But for Whitehead, they 
are not all contemporaries in some larger system. We must conjecture that 
there were an infinite number of cosmic epochs which preceded our present 
one, and with the decay of the present order reigning in this cosmic society, 
there will be an infinite number of successors. There was no first event, 
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nor will there be a final event. 
Although we shall discuss, in some detail, Bradley's conception of these 
alternative systems in our following section on "Temporal Unity and Direction" 
(Chapter VI), we shall here concentrate our attention on the much broader 
metaphysical picture. 
One of the crucial points of disagreement between Whitehead and Bradley 
concerns the issue of whether Reality contains process, or whether process 
Is reality. By our short exposition of the Absolute above, Bradley's answer 
is quite clear. All conflict, movement, evolution and process are finally 
resolved in one all- embracing, and self- contained Whole. Whitehead's 
position, however, is indeed complex and sometimes perplexing aside from the 
obvious answer. In what follows we shall attempt to indicate some of the 
problems associated with his position, and provide some clarification as to 
how they may be resolved. 
Whereas in Bradley's monism, whole -part relations finally cumulate in 
one all- embracing cosmic Whole, in Whitehead's view this layering of ultimate 
social order is potentially infinite. Beginning with our own cosmic epoch, he 
says, we discern a vast society of electronic and protonic actualities set in 
a wider social context of four -dimensionality. Beyond this level there is a 
geometrical society in which the axioms of geometry are discoverable by the 
method of extensive abstraction. But this 'geometrical' society presupposes 
even wider societies which fade from realization as they become more 
distanced from our inner -most cosmic society and our powers of intellectual 
discernment. At one level, Whitehead thinks, there is a society of mere 
dimensionality, and then finally we arrive at the widest society of order 
conceivable, namely, pure extension.52 
As Whitehead himself explains this system of whole -part relations in the 
extensive continuum, he writes: 
In these general properties of extensive connection 
[whole -part relations and various types of geometrical 
elements], we discern the defining characteristic of 
a vast nexus extending far beyond our immediate cosmic 
epoch. It contains in itself other epochs, with more 
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particular characteristics incompatible with each other. 
Then from the standpoint of our present epoch, the 
fundamental society in so far as it transcends our own 
epoch seems a vast confusion mitigated by the few, faint 
elements of order contained in its own defining char- 
acteristics of 'extensive connection'. We cannot 
discriminate its other epochs of vigorous order, and we 
merely conceive it as harboring the faint flush of the 
dawn of order in our own epoch. This ultimate, vast 
society constitutes the whole environment within which 
our epoch is set, so far as systematic characteristics 
are discernible by us in our present stage of develop - 
ment.53 
Although it would be tempting to identify this one ultimate society of pure 
extension with Bradley's Absolute, this is clearly not the case. For 
Whitehead explicitly says "...there is no society in isolation ".54 And to 
repeat his earlier claim regarding the boundless character of the extensive 
continuum, "There are always entities beyond entities because non - entity is no 
boundary ".55 Hence, the society of pure extension is not to be thought of as 
a 'final container', but rather as the largest conceivable society. Perhaps 
"...in the future the growth of theory may endow our successors with keener 
powers of discernment... ", but at this point in history, Whitehead thinks, the 
society of pure extension is the largest whole.56 
What then is 'beyond' the societies which constitute the physical 
and geometrical order of nature is unknown, or simply disorderly by our 
understanding of order, even though some sensé of whole and part is still 
vaguely discerned. As Whitehead makes this point: "Beyond these societies 
there is disorder, where 'disorder' is a relative term expressing the lack 
of importance possessed by the defining characteristics of the societies in 
question beyond their own bounds ".57 Chaotic disorder simply means the lack 
of dominant definition in societies beyond our comprehension. 
But here a problem arises with regard to the increasing width of social 
order beyond our own epoch. That is, once we have transcended the level of 
the cosmic epoch, is there any sense in which these ultimate societies can be 
understood to be in process? Does the geometrical society change, such that 
the axioms which are self- evident to one cosmic epoch become totally different 
ones to another cosmic epoch? Or even more generally, is there any evolution 
or process in the society of pure extension? Keeping in mind that the 
cosmological theory is only applicable to'our particular cosmic epoch, the 
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question then arises as to the metaphysical ultimacy of process in Whitehead's 
philosophy. 
Considering the vastness of the universe, Whitehead does not ascribe 
to the extensive continuum anything more than the very general properties of 
extensiveness, divisibility, and the relation of whole and part. As he 
attempts to locate the ultimate metaphysical necessities in this scheme he 
writes: 
Some general character of coordinate divisibility 
is probably an ultimate metaphysical character, 
persistent in every cosmic epoch of physical occasions. 
Thus some of the simpler characteristics of extensive 
connection, as here stated, are probably such ultimate 
metaphysical necessities... 
The more ultimate side of this scheme, perhaps 
that side which is metaphysically necessary, is at once 
evident by the consideration of the mutual implication 
of extensive whole and extensive part... 
In this general description of the states of 
extension, nothing has been said about physical time 
or physical space, or of the more general notion of 
creative advance. These are notions which presuppose 
the more general relationship of extension.58 
With considerations of this sort we might be led to find an affinity with 
Bradley here, for if only such general principles of extensive connection are 
metaphysically ultimate, then it seems that process and the creative advance 
apply to the very limited regions of the universe. But this would be 
contrary to the very spirit of Whitehead's philosophy in which process is 
reality. 
The difficulty can, I think, be cleared up with the essential point 
that the scheme of extensive connection is an abstraction from the process. 
That is, this whole scheme is derived from actual occasions. As we recall 
from an earlier chapter, the extensive continuum is an abstract system of 
logical relations.59 It is the first determination of order, of real 
potentiality or possibility for actuality. As we ascend the continuum to 
various levels of social order, extending outward spatially, we become more 
removed from the concrete actual occasions, which atomize the continuum, to 
increasingly abstract levels, where the defining characteristics become so 
general that we can barely comprehend them. So, when Whitehead is talking 
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about the metaphysical necessities of extensive connection, he is talking 
about form in general. No reference is made to the special asymmetry of time 
or the creative advance at this level of analysis because he is investigating 
levels of order which transcend, yet apply throughout all cosmic epochs. 
Indeed, the peculiarity of this scheme is that it can be thought of without 
reference to physical time, space and the creative advance. But this does not 
mean that it is disconnected. As Whitehead says: The 'extensive' scheme is 
nothing else than the generic morphology of the internal relations which bind 
the actual occasions into a nexus.... "60 It is the most general system of 
relatedness of all possibilities, but only as a system limited by its 
relevance to the general fact of actuality. 
So the idea of a continuum is a spatialization, or an abstraction, which 
omits the process by which an individual event comes into being. This is why 
Whitehead says: "The notion of nature as an organic extensive community omits 
the equally essential point of view that nature is never complete. "61 
What we must keep in mind is that, for Whitehead, the whole universe 
evolves from bottom up. That is, with the becoming and perishing of actual 
occasions, and the evolution and decay of societies which occur over longer 
periods of time, cosmic epochs also become and perish over stretches beyond 
our comprehension. And even beyond cosmic epochs there must be some sense of 
evolution though the changes may be very minute. The point is that with the 
passing moment the whole world conspires to produce a new creation and thus 
changes are felt throughout the universe. This is why Whitehead says that 
none of the laws of nature give the slightest evidence of necessity.62 With 
the running down of a cosmic epoch there is a general decay of the dominant 
patterns of prehensions constituting these 'laws'. Such laws fade into 
unimportance once the epoch passes into the background of the past. But as 
a cosmic epoch passes away and another becomes from an aboriginal disorder 
of actual occasions, we must conjecture that changes are felt at the higher 
levels of society, even though they may be of negligible importance. 
Logical, mathematical and geometrical laws are usually held in such high 
epistemological esteem because they are seen as eternally true, or true in all 
possible worlds. But, for Whitehead, even these laws are not metaphysical 
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truths.63 They seem to be eternally true since they are largely unaffected by 
the process of the lower levels. But it is possible that in some distant 
cosmic epoch, where there will have been sufficient change in the wider 
societies, that 1 + 1 will not make the sum of 2, modus ponens will be an 
invalid form, and a line will be something other than a breathless length. 
This is indeed a genuine possibility if process is the ultimate metaphysical 
necessity, and Whitehead does, I think, convincingly argue the point. It is 
only that the sense of 'endurance' in the ultimate societies is so general 
that the laws seem eternal, but they are only propositions about our present 
cosmic epoch. 
By the 'Ontological Principle' we have a metaphysical necessity that 
the whole universe is composed of actual occasions whose essence is process. 
When we abstract from this process of occasions certain formal properties of 
extensive connection can be formulated as whole and part, which is probably, 
Whitehead says, a metaphysical ultimate. Points, lines, surfaces, 
straightness and flatness are the geometrical elements applicable to this 
stage of cosmic history, then there are the more special characteristics of 
the specific cosmic epoch in question. In ours the laws of electromagnetic 
phenomena reign. In others perhaps laws of anti - electromagnetic phenomena 
are dominant, or the social order is radically different from the order we 
experience. But it is quite clear that nothing of this scheme gains any 
meaning without the activity of actual occasions. 
For Whitehead, we saw that the level of social order known as 'pure 
extension' was the largest conceivable level, but this vastly general society 
was not the end of relations in the Bradleian sense. There is no 'final' 
or 'perfect' level of order in the universe. There is always room for 
improvement, and equally, every chance of destruction. Whitehead therefore 
criticizes Bradley in several places for absorbing process into the perfection 
of the Absolute.64 And, generally speaking, he writes of Absolute Idealism: 
.the immensity of the world negatives the 
belief that any state of order can be so 
established that beyond it there can be no 
progress. This belief in a final order 
popular in religious and philosophic thought 
seems to be due to the prevalent fallacy that 
all types of seriality necessarily involve 
terminal instances.65 
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Clearly Whitehead is allowing for some further order to be achieved out 
of the nebulous disorder beyond. So, extensive relations must be potentially 
infinite in both the temporal sense of before and after, and the spatial sense 
of whole and part. Aside from these most general properties of the extensive 
continuum, there is no eternal static order as one final container. Just as 
various forms of seriality extend on infinitely on one or both sides, there is 
no reason why the universe cannot be conceived in similar fashion. This is 
the doctrine of the unbounded universe- the 'seamless coat'. 
Whitehead could very well accept Bradley's general conclusion that there 
cannot be individuals or relations without there being some larger whole, but 
there is no reason to accept one final Whole, if the wholes are themselves 
generated by the creative process. Instead of postulating one final Whole in 
order to understand how the levels of society nestle inside one another, the 
essential notion for event -pluralism is that the actual occasion is "... the 
whole universe in process of attainment of a particular satisfaction ".66 The 
actuality of the universe is derivative from the solidarity in each occasion. 
This is, I think, what Whitehead means when he says that his cosmology is a 
"...transformation of some of the main doctrines of Absolute Idealism onto a 
realistic basis ".67 The essential modification is that the 'realistic basis' 
is evolutionary.68 
Recalling that Whitehead's pluralism necessitates an inversion of 
Bradley's doctrine of actuality, W. E. Hocking, recording his recollection of 
a conversation with Whitehead, quotes him as follows: 
I am very near to absolute idealism when you 
take the finite as an abstraction; the slightest 
push would push me over. But where I differ is, 
your Absolute is a super -reality. My point is, 
when you try to get at a ground of reality more 
real than the given, you get an abstraction; your 
super -reality is an under -reality. Reality is 
always emergence into a finite modal entity.69 
This may seem odd indeed when we consider Bradley's claim that the Absolute 
is the most concrete Reality, but of course the Absolute is not the given 
concrete reality, but rather a hypothesis about how all the finite centres 
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form one larger concrete Whole. Even Bradley is quite clear that it is 
only in feeling that we have a low and imperfect example of an immediate 
whole, and this is never more than the unity of our own finite centre. 
So, in the end, as to our central problem of whether the Absolute 
swallows process in one timeless eternity, or process and the general flux 
of the creative advance dissolve any conception of a final order, we have 
slightly pfessed Whitehead's position over Bradley's. But, for the most part 
we have, in this section, simply wished to expose the very different 
conceptions of the universe which occur in their respective metaphysical 
speculations. 
It may indeed be said that one side reduces time to space by defining 
all temporal relations in terms of parts or appearances of the Whole, while 
the other side reduces space to time by defining all spatial relations in 
terms of process and evolution. In some sense this is true, but it is much 
too simple a formulation of the conflict between Bradley and Whitehead. 
Whether we are monists or pluralists on the question whether ultimate 
reality is one or many, I think, largely depends upon the soundness of the 
general arguments on relations. And, although Bradley's analysis of the 
relational was, for the most part, rejected in our last chapter, we now turn 
to a more detailed examination of his arguments and others' on the theory of 
time, where the problem of relations once again becomes acute. 
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CHAPTER VI 
TIME 
1. Temporal Unity and Direction 
In this chapter we concentrate on special problems of time which arise 
in connection with the conflict between Bradley's conception of the Absolute 
and Whitehead's conception of an infinite process. After considering how 
Whitehead might have attempted to solve various problems raised by Bradley, we 
shall consider how Santayana's theory of time might be used to clarify various 
points in Bradley. Given this new formulation of the argument, various 
objections will be raised in connection with Whitehead's theory of prehension 
and objectification, and finally an attempt will be made to defend Whitehead 
against these objections. 
Although Bradley never mitigates the severity of his treatment of 
time as a low appearance on the scale of reality, he does wish to establish 
"... how by its inconsistency time directs us beyond itself ".1 By this we 
understand that time must find its wider harmony and consumption within the 
experience of the Absolute. In effect, Bradley repeatedly argues that the 
essential togetherness or cohesion of the universe is a result of the total 
interdependence of experience happening in an eternal present. Such a 
teleology, it must be noted, does not involve a dependence of becoming in time 
and satisfaction of purpose in sequential order, but rather the telos of 
parts which form a de facto whole. From this it is clear that time cannot 
hold a primary place in such a system; that is, given its relational and 
atomistic character as conceived by ordinary thought. It is but an isolated 
aspect which loses its special character when absorbed into the timelessness 
of the Absolute. 
In two of our chapters above we gave considerable attention to Bradley's 
views regarding the inconsistency of time as a plurality of discrete moments.2 
But we now turn our attention to his arguments where his theory of the 
transcendence of time comes clearly into focus. Here the attack is focused on 
temporal unity and direction as a one -way succession in which everything in 
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the universe must conform. 
As regards the unity of time, Bradley says we have a tendency to 
regard all events "...as members in one temporal whole, and standing therefore 
throughout to one another in relations of 'before' and 'after' or'together'. "3 
However, evidence which runs against this notion is the possibility of a 
number of independent time - series which have their own serial unity but do not 
form a unity when considered all together. This, presumably, would look like 
layers of overlapping series though no one series would be dominant or play 
the foundational role upon which the others are interwoven. Each would have 
its own phenomenal order. To illustrate these possible realms, Bradley 
considers dreams, imaginative wanderings and fictions. Each dream, for 
example, has its own logical order and time lapse, yet when considered in 
relation to the order in a different dream or fiction, we find no sense in 
which they can be said to be part of one series of real events. This, Bradley 
concludes, leads us "...to realize that the successive need have no temporal 
connection ".4 
On a slightly different but related theme, Bradley now considers 
direction in time which follows much the same course as temporal unity. The 
direction of time poses a most interesting problem. Is it the case that time, 
past and present, moves forwards into a novel future, or that the succession 
of events becoming as fresh sensations each moment, immediately slip backwards 
into the past? Though Bradley thinks the latter is more natural, either 
direction is entirely dependent on present experience.5 Why one may be 
preferred to another is not a matter of how time is directed in reality, but 
rather a habit of the animal nature for best practical results. Mockingly, he 
relates such sense of direction in time to the principle by which fish feed 
heading upstream instead of downstream.6 Direction, he thinks, is infected 
with relativity. Being a construction of the present, direction in time is 
entirely a convenient way of dealing with our world. To make this point 
Bradley entertains the notion of a direction in time which would be the 
reversal of our order of events. In such a world we may conceive of a high 
technologically advanced society de- evolving into unicellular organisms. This 
world, in its reversed causation, doesn't in any way come into contact with 
our own experienced world for it is totally independent. By our understanding 
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"Death would come before birth, the blow would follow the wound, and all must 
seem irrational ".7 One is here reminded of the story of Benjamin Button in 
F. Scott Fitzgerald's Tales of the Jazz Age.8 His life, moving backwards 
from the grave to cradle, began in the last stages of senility and became 
younger until he perished as an embryo, splitting into an egg and sperm. One 
imperfection though, is that Fitzgerald conceived of Benjamin's stream of 
consciousness as running forwards instead of backwards with the diminishing 
physical regression. Bradley, to be consistent, I presume, would also have to 
accept the notion of a causally reversed consciousness in his reversed order. 
Still the aim of such a thought experiment is obvious. If there are multiple 
overlapping directions in time which are counter to our own experience, then 
in the timeless perfection of the Absolute, all times must be transmuted and 
balanced into an eternal present. 
Bradley again takes up the problem of direction in time in a most 
curious and puzzling essay "Why Do We Remember Forwards And Not Backwards ? ". 
Here as the title suggests, his main concern is the general tendency of memory 
to trace events forwards from the past to present.9 However, in so doing, he 
wishes to refute the idea that memory follows a real direction in time. The 
image of a flowing stream is used to indicate the direction of our 
consciousness in time. Bradley explains: 
It is not a stream in general which we have to do 
with, but the stream of our events. And here we 
have the essence. It is our psychical states which 
furnish both the flood and all the matter which flows 
or which stands against the stream. In the succession 
of these states it is the group of self, more or less 
unvarying, that has the place taken by .. in our 
scheme.10 And it is the attitude of this group towards 
the incoming new presentations on which everything turns. 
It is this relation which gives a meaning to direction, 
and shows the essence of our problem.11 
The forward direction of time, Bradley thinks, is tied to our tendency of 
thinking that consciousness flows as a stream forwards to "meet fresh 
experiences ". Or, if we think of time as moving backwards "it is because we 
do not go back ", but hold our own against change, like the fish feeding 
upstream. Lastly, if we think of ourselves as stationary, the direction is 
relative to our experience and makes no real difference. In the end-, 
Bradley thinks that our tendency to remember forwards is tied with the first 
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of these notions of direction in time. It is simply a habit, in that we 
anticipate the future, and this suits our needs best for approaching coming 
sensations and actions. Instances in which we would remember backwards are 
just as valid, but not so common, because we would be directed away in time 
from our present selves which concern us most.12 This Bradley concludes 
should convince us that direction is just as much an illusion as time 
itself. The appearance of a direction which time follows is of our own 
psychological making and not part of the nature of reality. 
Now Whitehead, I think, would challenge Bradley from the point 
of view that our intuitive grasp of time as moving forward exemplifies the 
very process of becoming in which the antecedent world forces a novel moment 
in the immediate present. This asymmetry of concrete relations implies a 
concept of time in which the past is determinate, the present in the making 
and the future indeterminate. There is no altering what is fixed in the past 
but as such data exist as an accumulation in the present, there is a genuine 
choice to be made regarding the future. As the present moment sheds its 
actuality it does not merely become nothing as it fades into the past. Having 
perished, its determinate and individual character achieved as present is 
preserved in the form of an organic memory, though its degree of existence in 
the future is to be determined by the positive prehensions of subsequent 
actual occasions, that is, the extent to which the future shall choose the 
past and provide its objective immortality. The process of time is not, 
therefore, a shifting of eternally present occasions of experience, but the 
actualization of a potentiality as creative choice determines a particular 
distinctness with a subsequent loss of its actuality. 
Implicit in Bradley's arguments which purport to establish that temporal 
unity and direction are ideal constructions from our present experience, is a 
universe of symmetrical interdependence. His realms of possible time series 
do not, however, refute or show the absurdity of time as one unifying process 
of events. Firstly, it is highly unlikely that the fictions and dreams which 
Bradley points out as having their own independent time series occur to any 
of us as having the same degree of reality as our normal conscious states.13 
We can surely discriminate by the fact that dreams and unconscious states 
do not form a continuous identity of the self, as is the case with normal 
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consciousness. Secondly, his attempt to refute the idea of one asymmetrical 
series of temporal unity is based on an erroneous assumption that these 
realms of floating fictions are on the same level as our experience of 
universals, yet to be seen as independent from the temporal process. But 
our experience of dreams, imaginative wanderings and various fictions in time 
is how we come to know them, and the mode of being which they have is entirely 
dependent upon our memory of them. This is a point which Bradley fails to 
consider. What he does ask us to consider is how various fictions and dreams 
stand in the order of 'before' and 'after' in time.14 Each fictional series, 
he thinks, has its own logical order, but is independent, insofar as we try to 
relate it to one temporal process. But it must be noted that each came into 
existence by our creating them in time. Upon subsequent reflection, each 
fiction easily has the appearance of not being a part of time, especially when 
considered in relation to one another. Thus, their status seem equal to that 
of timeless universals. But unlike the universal, the fiction is dependent 
upon memory in the temporal process. 
Let us pursue a similar analogy. Mozart, for example, writes the 
score for his Don Giovanni. Surely his act of creating the opera is in the 
temporal process and each time it is performed it has a phenomenal unity 
recognized as Don Giovanni. The individual notes which constitute the music 
of the opera exist as timeless universals, however the patterns themselves 
are not universals because they can be destroyed or lost to humanity. Hence 
the opera does not occupy an independent realm with its own time. In 
Whitehead's view it exists only insofar as actual occasions are prehending 
this pattern or sequence of eternal objects. The only sense in which Don 
Giovanni exists after its composition and aside from its being performed, is 
in some form of memory (e.g., musical notation, or human memory) which has 
potential to be performed in the present. Accordingly, patterns of 
universals or eternal objects would not establish the existence of a number 
of time series. 
Following this line of thought the argument opposing direction, 
though parasitic on the argument opposing temporal connection, can be seen as 
clarifying Bradley's position regarding symmetry. The direction of a series 
which we experience as a,b,c,d,...z is counterbalanced and therefore 
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neutralized in a totality which contains the possible world in which direction 
runs z,y,x,w,...a. Though these serial orders within the Absolute may be 
multiple and overlapping in their timelessness, for our present purposes 
with regard to symmetrical interdependence, it will be sufficient to consider 
the case running directly opposite to our own experienced world. Bradley asks 
if such a world is contradictory or anything but possible. But what is 
crucial about this conceptual problem is that the reversed direction is not 
part of our experience which is directional in terms of aim and memory. It 
merely occurs as one of many within the comprehensive experience of the 
Absolute. This being the case, it is conceivable that such a world might 
exist outside of our current cosmic epoch, provided that we are mere 
observers, and not agents who affect the order of events. Also, with this 
reversed direction, it must be noted that experience in this world too is an 
asymmetrical relation; one -way, except from effects to causes. An apple would 
then roll along the ground, bounce and leap upwards attaching itself to a 
branch of a tree. A man's life from death to birth (with a reversed flow of 
consciousness also) would de- evolve and in such a world people would use 
'before' and 'after' in a sense which would have the exact opposite logical 
ramifications. But what does this all come to? Here we would have a world in 
which the laws of physics and biology would be reversed to apply to the 
reversed order in which physical bodies move. Also, the laws of psychology 
would explain how events are contained in memory and become more vivid until 
they happen and become a desire or aim, finally vanishing as the bud of an 
idea. This being so, the creatures in this world would still experience 
events as an irreversible asymmetric process. Now it seems difficult to see 
how Bradley establishes the symmetrical case. This world could be reconciled 
just as easily with the direction of our world. It is just that people in the 
reversed world would talk about aim and memory to mean the opposite of what 
we mean. The sequences- a,b,c,d,...z and z,y,x,w,...a, then, would not be 
running counter to one another, but rather they would be synchronized in the 
momentary pulse of becoming. 
What is surely rejected by the primacy of process is the notion that 
the future can exist as determinate moments beyond the present. That is, a 
cannot exist as a determinate occcasion happening first in one sequence and 
last in the other. In the reversed order, all that exists at the instance of 
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a's becoming is the becoming of z. Bradley, in order to establish the 
symmetrical case must always presuppose the existence of the Absolute to 
provide a basis in which events would run counter to each other in seperate 
times. For example, he assumes that all moments in both independent series 
exist in a timeless Whole. However, without this unnecessary hypothesis, 
time and direction conform as a one -way dependence. 
As active participants in the creative process, that is, as agents 
which affect the content in experience through our volition and activity, we 
shape the present and essentially contribute to the direction in time. 
Anticipation of fresh sensations, then, does describe the nature of directed 
experience in that we are conscious of creating the present and how that 
experience will be continuous with the future. 
Though Bradley's theory is founded upon a universe of innumerable 
centres of experience, he argues that much of our understanding of this 
experience is illusory. But, if the occasions of experience which 
compose our psychical states provide a sense of direction as a stream of 
events moving forwards, then why not take this as the paradigm of reality? 
This I find to be something of an inconsistency in Bradley's thought. For, on 
the one hand, he certainly emphasizes our taking feeling and direct intuition 
just as it comes without the mutilation of analysis. Yet, on the other hand, 
his interpretation of experience is a concentration on timeless being, in 
which our experience is to be understood as eternally present. The obvious 
difficulty is a result of defining experience in terms of a permanent and 
essentially static conception of the Absolute. 
As I have argued above, Whitehead's criticism of Bradley focuses on 
distinguishing the occasion of experience into its becoming and perishing. 
In this analysis, Whitehead further distinguishes two aspects of our 
continuous experience as a passage from re- enaction to anticipation. This 
was Whitehead's earliest preoccupation in his scientific works regarding our 
inability to experience a durationless instant, i.e., a point in time which 
is a pure abstraction from process. The notion which is fundamental in 
experience, he says, is that each occasion is not without the past or future - 
"...the present is the fringe of memory tinged with anticipation " - a point 
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often alluded to by the poet's insight: 
Life is what happens, 
While you're busy, 
Making other plans. 
Re- enaction is the inheritance of experience as cumulative through a selective 
process in which each novel re- arrangement involves some degree of the past as 
objective data. Likewise, the status of the future, though indeterminate 
insofar as it exists in some definite point beyond the present, can be seen as 
immanent in each occasion. That is to say, the present occasion anticipates 
existence beyond itself in that its achievement will have value for 
occasions in the future. The future then is a necessary aspect of the 
present. Without it, "...the present collapses, emptied of its proper 
content ".15 However this is not to say that the future is actual. For 
Whitehead, the disparity between past and future is grounded in asymmetrical 
relations. Though both past and future are immanent in the present, the past 
is objective in the present, while the present will be objective in the 
future. 
2. The Eternalistic Theory of Time 
The notion that temporal passage must be resolved ultimately into a 
static eternity is by no means a novel idea to metaphysicians. Plato had 
said that time is nothing but a "moving image of eternity ", and Bradley does 
seem to follow him here with his notion that Reality does not exist in time 
but only appears there. But aside from the claims of various forms of 
Idealism, others who have meditated on the nature of time have discovered 
something very peculiar about the notion of becoming and perishing, and the 
unequal ontological status of past, present and future events. Santayana, for 
instance, in his argument for determinationism, claims that the for 
the truth or falsehood of our judgments about the past or future lies in the 
correspondence between such judgments in the present and the actual existence 
of past and future events. This leads him to the view that all events are 
intrinsically present and that past and future are simply relative to the 
now in question. Truth in Santayana's view is therefore eternal, but this 
does not mean that the actual passage of events is resolved into a static 
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eternity. Santayana, in fact, stresses that it is of the very essence of 
each event or 'natural moment' to be lapsing into the next. The dynamics of 
process are not, in his view, illusory; for this too is a part of the eternal 
truth of things. But the important point to keep in mind is that each 
moment, though propulsive in one respect, is also eternally fixed in its 
place in the temporal flux.16 
Although we shall return to consider the arguments for this theory in 
more detail later in this section, we must here return to Bradley's theory of 
time for further elaboration. Having briefly introduced the central problem 
which gives rise to what is sometimes called "the eternalistic theory of 
time ", we shall find some indication that Bradley himself leaned in this 
direction, but of course developed his view in a much more monistic fashion. 
Also I should mention here that in large measure I derive my understanding 
of the compatibility of the eternalistic theory of time and the doctrine of 
the Absolute from Professor Sprigge's metaphysics, where this synthesis 
has been shown to be most effective.17 
At times, Bradley seems to deny that there is a real past or future. 
He calls such mental phenomena 'ideal constructions'. The past, for 
instance, is constructed from the present because it is not directly 
experienced and must therefore be unreal; albeit an important aspect of 
dealing with the identity of our present selves. Since the past is not a part 
of immediate experience, it can only be considered in terms of synthetic 
judgments of sense which involve an inference from our present memory - 
experience. Similarly, the future would be a construction based on a present 
expectation. Reality then can never be known in its totality though, our best 
intuition comes in the undivided immediacy of feeling. As Bradley argues in 
his Principles of logic: "It is impossible, perhaps, to get directly at 
reality, except in the content of one presentation; we may never see it, so to 
speak, but through a hole. "18 Such remarks might lead one to believe that 
Bradley is advocating the view sometimes called "the philosophy of the 
present " - that past and future are unreal because all that truly exists is 
the particular now immediately present. 
But this is clearly not the case, for even though Bradley here, and in 
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other places, emphasizes that past and future are, from our point of view, 
"ideally constructed ", he also says that they must be real for there to be 
anything for our judgments to be true about. For example, in his essay, 
"What is the Real Julius Caesar ?" he writes: 
The past and future vary, and they have to vary, 
with the changes of the present, and, to any man 
whose eyes are open, such variation is no mere 
theory but is plain fact. But, though ideal, the 
past and future are also real, and, if they were 
otherwise, they could be nothing for judgment or 
knowledge. They are actual, but must remain 
incomplete essentially.19 
But here we seem to be faced with the problem as to how the past and 
future can be both real and ideal. Or, put another way, how can past and 
future be actual if time itself remains, in Bradley's view, essentially 
unreal? Bradley is far from clear about the exact formulation of his theory, 
but at least here he seems to have approached the idea that all events past, 
present and future are just "eternally there" in the Absolute. 
The reason why Bradley seems to be rather obscure here is due to a 
tension in his thought between Reality as one timeless moment, and reality as 
many 'related' moments contained in this eternal present. In fact the obvious 
difficulty with the latter is the amount of abstraction involved once analysis 
has cut into the continuous Whole present in immediate feeling. Indeed it is 
quite clear that the division of time into past, present and future leads 
invariably to an infinity of relations, and this is never ultimately 
satisfactory in Bradley's view. However we must also keep in mind that some 
of the restrictions of Bradley's radical monism are mitigated by his notion of 
'degrees' of truth and reality, and this I take to be the key to understanding 
the above dilemma. 
As we recall, there are in Bradley's philosophy, many levels of truth 
and reality which are valid for their limited purposes. Hence, various types 
of thought which deal with some form of plurality are 'necessary' and this is 
particularly true of our judgments about past and future events. Once the 
Absolute is broken down into various degrees of reality, we discover a 
hierarchy of levels in which these various forms of plurality begin to 
- 153 - 
appear. (For our present purposes we distinguish four levels, and, once 
again, we employ the distinction made earlier in this thesis between centres 
of experience as 'enduring' and 'momentary'.20) Our analysis of this 
hierarchy proceeds as follows: 
1. The Absolute as an undivided Individual 
2. The Absolute as the unity of enduring centres 
3. The enduring centres as the unity of momentary centres 
4. The momentary centres as the unity of 'that' and 'what' 
At the first level, the Absolute is the only fully complete and final 
Reality existing in one timeless eternal present. Then, one step down 
the Absolute is the unity of an indefinite number of enduring centres of 
experience. Since they are at one with the Absolute they are eternal, though, 
from our perspective, they 'endure' throughout all time. Then, another step 
down, each enduring centre is the unity of its many momentary qualifications, 
i.e., the momentary centres or 'this- nows'. As Bradley says on this point, 
the enduring centre "... contains a lapse and a before and after, but these 
are subordinate ".21 It is at this level that time 'appears' and judgment 
about the various moments of time becomes important. And, finally, another 
step down, we arrive at the level in which each momentary centre is a unity of 
existence and content, of 'that' and 'what' fused together to make up the 
individual psychical unities. 
Now quite clearly, each lower level will be an adjective of the 
immediately higher level, and each will have therefore a perfectly determinate 
place in the Absolute. All will be present but at the third and fourth levels 
past and future will be relative to the point of view of any particular 'now' 
of a momentary centre. That is, each 'this -now' will feel its place in the 
particular series of the enduring centre to which it belongs; and it will also 
have a certain perspective on the Whole from this particular place. 
What we must remember is that Reality, for Bradley, is continuous 
throughout, but since our given presentation is merely a restricted hole 
through which we gaze into the eternal, we see it only partially. This is 
why past and future are but constructions from our present point of view. 
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We 'ideally' fill in the portions of the continuous reality which are not 
present. But for the Absolute, past and future are just as real and actual as 
is our given present. All moments, then, are just "eternally there" in the 
Absolute, even though they remain essentially incomplete and imperfect in 
themselves. 
Bradley himself does not say this in so many words, but I think this is 
the upshot of his theory and it is the only sense which I can make of his 
notion that past and future are both ideal and real. That is, what makes our 
judgments more or less true or false is that there is that portion of reality 
actually present in the Absolute experience. 
One point emphasized by many Absolute Idealists is that any 
representation of the Absolute will fail miserably simply because our humble 
finite perspective on Reality never comes close to grasping the whole of 
eternity beyond. Also, any particular model will be illuminating only for 
certain points, while wholly deceptive for others. But, if we are to choose 
the best of the worst, perhaps a globe comes closest to satisfying this need 
of an image, and this will (I hope) aid us in our present discussion. As we 
recall from our last chapter, this was, in fact, one of the few images which 
Bradley himself offers. With such a model we can imagine a whole which 
contains at its core the enduring centres of experience all fused together in 
absolute harmony, but on the outer surface there are innumerable routes which 
belong to one centre or another. Such routes will be the various appearances 
of finite centres in time forming what might be called 'space -time worms', and 
at each point, there will be a momentary centre which fills that portion of 
reality. Leaving aside for the moment the complications of points of contact 
where two or more routes cross or run parallel to one another, we can easily 
conceive of how each momentary centre must always be eternally there from the 
point of view of the Absolute. 
What Bradley seems to say in this connection is that all finite 
centres of experience are ultimately present and influence one another in 
some degree or other, but within certain limits we separate them into 
distinct periods of time which are not contemporary, i.e., their various 
momentary appearances.22 As he puts this point in the conclusion to his 
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essay on Julius Caesar, he writes: 
The real individual then... we find does not fall 
merely within a moment, nor is he bounded by his 
birth and death, nor is he in principle confined 
to any limited period. He lives there wherever 
the past or future of our 'real' order is present 
to his mind, and where in any other way whatever 
he influences or acts on ít.23 
So at the core of Reality lies the real Julius Caesar who was and always will 
be present there. But what Bradley also says here is that the limits in which 
we fix the period of Caesar's life (100 -44 B.C.) are arbitrary. Thus, there 
is reason to believe that in the end, Bradley himself would not wholly ascribe 
to the theory we have constructed above (that all moments are determinately 
fixed in the Absolute experience) since he does not give too much reality to 
what we have called 'momentary centres'. That is, since he thinks the more 
pluralistic and atomistic views are largely our constructions in order to 
deal with time, we cannot be sure exactly how such momentary aspects are 
ordered in the Absolute. But let us here return to Santayana, who did expound 
a pluralistic theory compatible with eternalism, and whose arguments can be 
used to clarify the more obscure points in Bradley, at least where he seems to 
have leaned towards some theory of determinationism. 
What Santayana calls his 'realm of truth' is, in many ways, quite 
consistent with the Bradleian Absolute. For instance, Santayana says that: 
The truth... forms an ideal realm of being 
impersonal and super -existential. Though every- 
thing in the panorama of history be temporal, 
the panorama itself is dateless: for evidently the 
sum and system of events cannot be one of them. It 
cannot occur after anything else. Thus the truth of 
existence differs altogether in ontological quality 
from existence itself.24 
Such views accord quite well with the Bradleian view of the Absolute as 
the one Reality which has no history, but contains histories without end. 
The realm of truth, like the Absolute, is ontologically distinct and 
supertemporal; it does not however carry any implications of absolute spirit 
nor is it the non -relational One by which everything is finally absorbed. 
But such differences need not concern us now.25 
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What is quite relevant in this context is that past, present and future 
are, for Santayana, eternally fixed in the universe as determinate moments of 
temporal order. Contrary to Bradley then, Santayana would accept that the 
reality of Caesar is bounded by his birth and death, but this stretch of 
history is always present in its own time. The limits of his life are not 
arbitrary; each moment forms a determinate piece of reality. 
As mentioned above, Santayana's central argument for this view is 
that a proposition or judgment must have an existing object, and this applies 
regardless of the specific period of time which contains the referent. 
Intelligence, he says, comes to perceive a certain continuity of events and 
definite truths about them.26 For instance, in our own flow of consciousness 
we have a direct experience of the truth of each moment, and of the 
substantial derivation of one to the next. But the truth of each moment 
is a fact which does not itself change with the passage of time. 
Santayana insists that the present point of view, 
present immediacy, is particularly deceptive with regard to the eternal truth 
of all time. Since "nowness runs like a fire along the fuse of time "27 we 
might be led to see truth changing as fast as the spark of immediacy. But, 
for Santayana, this is to confuse the essence 'now' with particular 'nows'. 
Particular 'vows' change one for another in rapid succession, but the 
truth of each distinct 'now' in its determinate place in the flux, forms the 
unchangewble truth of history. The fallacy in thinking that past events have 
simply perished is therefore a result of sliding "from a truism to a private 
perspective ". That Caesar lived long ago is true only in relation to our. 
present. But Caesar's present is a truth which does not change: it will 
always be there in that particular portion of reality. In what must be the 
clearest statement of this argument, Santayana writes: 
If Julius Caesar was alive at a certain date, it was 
then true, it had been true before, and it will be 
true always that at that date he was or would be or 
had been alive. These three assertions, in their 
deliverance, are identical; and in order to be identical 
in their deliverance, they have to be different in form, 
because the report is made in each case from a different 
point in time, so that the temporal perspectives of the 
same fact, Caesar's death on the Ides of March, require 
different tenses of the verbs. This is a proof of the 
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instability of knowledge in contrast to the fixity of 
truth. For the whispered oracle, Beware the Ides of 
March, the tragic event was future; for the Senators 
crowding round Pompey's statue it was present; for the 
historian it is past: and the truth of these several 
perspectives, each from its own point of origin, is a 
part of the eternal truth about that event.28 
From this it is quite clear that past, present and future must all have an 
equal ontological status, regardless of which particular date we choose as our 
point of departure. The future beyond my writing this sentence is just as 
determinate in character as is yesterday or the day of Caesar's death. It is 
only that our knowledge of such future events is limited by the fact that they 
have not occurred in relation to our present, and this is, Santayana claims, 
only a pecularity of human life- that we have much knowledge of the past and 
little of the future. But the alleged disparity between past and future is 
not an issue of our knowledge which wants to identify truth with our knowledge 
of it. Eternal truth is rather supertemporal and involves no limitation of 
scope in which human opinions operate. It is complete, accurate and perfectly 
determinate in either direction. 
3. Replies to Some Objections to Whitehead 
Our discussion has now reached the threshold of our final comparison, 
yet at the same time we seem to be confronted with a grave difficulty. In 
one respect, the central issue raised by the eternalistic theory of time is 
crucial to the final question: "What does it all come to ? ". For without some 
fadeless preservation of the perfect moment there can be no determinate 
truth.29 The passing of each moment cannot simply become nothing. If it did 
(and this is quite clear) the position would not be altogether different from 
the Heraclitean paradox of 'that which is always becoming and never is'. The 
basic problem for a philosophy of process, then, is how novelty does not 
entail loss, for the flux of existence is essentially meaningless without 
reference to permanance. As Whitehead on this point often quoted: 
Abide with me; 
Fast falls the eventide.30 
But on the other hand, the position we have sketched above is clearly at odds 
with Whitehead regarding the equal status of past, present and future. If 
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indeed Santayana's argument is a sound one, Creativity cannot be the ultimate 
principle governing the becoming of experience, for the truth of every actual 
occasion is definite prior to its instant of becoming. 
Professor Sprigge, having adopted Santayana's theory of time in his 
own metaphysics, has in The Vindication of Absolute Idealism and elsewhere, 
raised several pointed objections to Whitehead's theory of prehension and 
objectification.31 Since these two notions were seen to be the very heart 
of the mechanism of process, the criticisms advanced by Sprigge will be 
especially important here in order to illuminate further the central contrast 
with the theory of eternalism. And although I cannot, in this limited space, 
do justice to his intricate arguments for 'holistic relations' essential to 
his view, I will simply point to various ways in which the process view 
may be defended against these objections. 
Sprigge concedes that in large measure the panpsychist ontology espoused 
by Whitehead accords quite well with his own conclusions. However, he utterly 
rejects the notion of a later occasion containing an earlier one as opposed to 
some manner of echoing it. If an actual occasion has been prehended by a 
later one, it has lost subjective immediacy, or, as Sprigge puts it, "suffered 
a kind of sea -change" and attained objective immortality.32 But Sprigge asks, 
how can this earlier occasion be the same particular as an element in the 
later one ?33 
The point crucial to Whitehead is that an actual occasion creates itself 
out of its causes; it prehends the multitude of occasions in its immediate 
past as the essential data in which it forms its novel synthesis, again to be 
broken down into data for future prehensions. But it is clear that in this 
process a past occasion does not survive as a whole in any future occasions. 
It has only a partial existence (with a continuance of subjective form) in 
many subsequent occasions, since the very concept of prehension demands that 
a successor eliminate certain elements incompatible with its own unique 
subjective aim, (i.e., the positive and negative prehensions). But if a 
past occasion has been altered such that it exists only as separate elements 
objectified in many present ones, what then guarantees the truth of it when it 
was subjectively immediate? Why should not the death of Julius Caesar become 
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a little less bloody as subsequent prehensions thousands of years later 
continue to redistribute the data that was this determinate event in the 
history of the Roman empire? The upshot of Whitehead's theory, at this point, 
seems to force him to the unfortunate conclusion that there is nothing 
actually existent which would settle the issue of what would make a judgment 
about the inherent character of this event true. 
In effect, Sprigge argues that the whole notion of perishing or loss of 
subjective immediacy is incoherent, and that we must, in the end, accept the 
idea that Caesar's death is an untransformed event, eternally present in that 
particular portion of Reality. 
Sprigge's objection to Whitehead really falls into two separate 
problems which we shall address as follows: (i) the problem of prehension, and 
(ii) the problem of perishing. Both are of course intimately connected in 
order to understand the mechanism of process. But for our present purpose we 
shall approach them separately. 
(i) As to the first problem, in which Sprigge asks how an earlier 
occasion (which has lost subjective immediacy) can be the same particular 
as an element in the later one (or ones), I reply that it is not. The 
conjunctive unity achieved at the end -point of its process is not the same 
particular as the disjunctive diversity scattered among its successors. 
That is, the elements or 'objects' prehended as data are not to be understood 
as the real 'particulars' of the process. Only the actual occasions achieve 
this ontological status once they have become fully determinate and complete 
moments of experience. Also, what is quite clear is that we can make no sense 
of prehension of the past without the crucial point that when an occasion is 
subjectively immediate, the extensive characteristics or objects have not yet 
appeared. Objects only arise once the occasion has reached its satisfaction 
and has become a determinate entity. The whole notion of subjective 
immediacy, then, means that the occasion is "still in the making" and 
therefore indeterminate. But once it does reach its satisfaction the truth 
of this entity is not altered by the fact that the successors must have 
something to work with. That is, since the successors cannot create 
ex nihilo, there must be some material or data there to manipulate, in order 
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to produce the novel unity. 
Some explanation is still needed. What we require is more elucidation 
of the various stages of the concrescence where the fluency of the past world 
makes its transition into the actual world of the immediate present. As we 
recall, this was the main concern of our section "Genetic Analysis and the 
Component Elements ".34 
Generally speaking, the occasion must be seen as a process which moves 
from becoming in which the occasion is subjectively immediate, to being 
which is the completed satisfaction or superject, to perishing. Now it 
is this second stage in which the determinate entity appears and becomes 
a potential object for a novel becoming. When an occasion reaches its 
satisfaction and becomes part of the actual world composed of other occasions 
which have reached their end - points simultaneously, it becomes a datum for a 
successor now in the stage of becoming (subjective immediacy). But this 
new occasion, having picked up where the others left off, begins to break 
down the actual world to form its own conjunctive unity and will choose only 
those elements compatible with its own present ideal. And here is the 
crucial point. Even though the chief ontological status of the predecessor 
is that of an 'initium' of its successors, the organic unity thus formed is 
greater than the sum of its parts which will become the elements in subsequent 
prehensions. Hence, any element which survives beyond this organic unity is 
but an abstraction from this concrete whole. 
Sprigge goes further to say that those who hold this view of the 
objectification of the earlier in the later, have the notion of influence as 
injection of something of its quality by one experience into a successor, but 
this is inconceivable unless understood as "...the passage of quality from one 
locus to another within something like a single specious present.... "35 But 
are actual occasions, natural moments, or momentary centres of experience so 
impenetrable that no feelings of the others can enter into them and affect 
their own internal constitution? A simple echo or manner of influence does 
not seem to do the trick. And even here I should like to point out that I 
can make no sense of Santayana's metaphor of the moments "lapsing into one 
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another" without some penetration of content. One's ability to sympathize 
with the type of experience another being has seems a good point of departure 
here, since this is, in fact, so important for Sprigge's own view.36 But it 
becomes rather difficult to imagine how one could truly sympathize with the 
reality of another being if one did not literally share in his (or its) 
experience, and feel at least some of those feelings. If so much is granted, 
it seems that the door is open for prehension. And this is because any 
experience of sympathy which one may feel for another is of that experience 
in what is one's own immediate past. This is, in fact, what Whitehead claims 
is happening in the first stage of becoming in the new occasion, i.e., a 
receptive sympathy. He says: "There is always the vague feeling of things 
beyond us, which are also within us, a.d. within which we live. "37 
(ii) Now however much we may (or may not) be inclined to accept 
the notion of prehension as one experience containing elements of other 
experiences, we are still left with the problem of perishing. Where is the 
real past if it is only the elements which survive in the present? This I 
take to be the stronger part of Sprigge's objection to Whitehead, and it is 
one which deserves considerable attention. 
According to Whitehead the past is real but gone. Just when the 
occasion reached,its satisfaction (from becoming to being) it 'handed off' 
its data to the immediate present and perished. But where is it, if real and 
not still actual in the past? As we have said, it is partially here in the 
present, but as past, it is dead and gone. But if only the constituents 
survive, what determines the truth of the occasion as it was when present? 
In reply to this objection it will be necessary to anticipate many 
of the conclusions of our final chapter where Whitehead's notion of the 
consequent nature of God finds a definite parallel with Bradley's notion of 
the Absolute. And here it is quite clear that Whitehead himself recognized 
that the prehension and objectification of finite actualities was not 
sufficient to complete his final vision of reality. 
In the "Final Interpretation" of Process and Reality, Whitehead 
remarks with a certain poetic insight: "Objectification involves elimination ", 
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for the present never fully embodies the past in its totality. The world 
craves for novelty, yet, at the same time, it "...is haunted by terror at the 
loss of the past ".38 Such is our experience of the joy of birth and the 
sorrow of death in the world. But the whole issue of the loss of the past is 
one which sets the stage for the most general formulation of the religious 
problem. Whitehead here writes: 
In the temporal world, it is the empirical fact 
that process entails loss: the past is present 
under as abstraction. But there is no reason, 
of any ultimate metaphysical generality, why 
this should be the whole story.39 
Indeed the truth of the temporal world must be somewhere in actuality, and 
Whitehead's solution here involves one actual entity which moves with the 
whole of creation, absorbing each occasion in perfect harmony. As he says, 
"...there can be no determinate truth, correlating impartially the partial 
experiences of many actual entities, apart from one actual entity to which it 
can be referred ".40 "The truth itself is nothing else than how the composite 
natures of the organic actualities of the world obtain adequate representation 
in the divine nature ".41 And here, Whitehead, by one actual entity, means 
God, who in His consequent nature, prehends every actuality as a determinate 
whole. 
But here we have another problem. Sprigge in an article appropriately 
entitled "Ideal Immortality" raises the point that the attempt to resolve the 
problem of perishing by envisaging the realm of past events as contained in 
God's memory of all things that have happened, creates another problem of 
distinguishing the real past event from the memory of it in God's mind.42 
Whitehead's use of the term 'representation' above does indeed suggest that 
there is such a difference. But he also says that the passing moment can find 
its adequate intensity only by submission to permanence, which indicates that 
he thought of the absorption as something more than just a cosmic memory.43 
Let us then see how such an interpretation is possible by applying the concept 
of prehension to God. 
Whitehead says that God is devoid of negative prehensions. He prehends 
the whole world positively such that He saves it as it passes into His 
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immediacy. God differs from actual occasions of the temporal world in 
that He is an eternal actual entity which never perishes. He is dynamic, 
creating and flowing with the world, and therefore changes not into a more 
excellent being, but into a more excellect state of the same being. Through 
His prehensions, nothing is lost that was a "mere wreckage" in the temporal 
world.44 All becomes objectively immortal. 
Now if God positively prehends the whole world, this is not a mere 
memory in the cosmic mind. When He prehends the world it becomes the internal 
constitution of His eternal being. Hence, every occasion, once it is absorbed 
into God's essence, is preserved as perfectly determinate in every aspect. 
And if this sort of retention justifies the reality of the past and satisfies 
the problem of the interdependence between the permanent eternal side of the 
universe and the momentary finite side, the problem as to how we distinguish 
between the real past and the cosmic mind which retains it vanishes. The non - 
actuality of the past only refers to the finite character of the temporal 
world. Objective immortality, when considered as an aspect of God's nature, 
provides the notion of the eternal presence of all that has happened. This 
explains why Whitehead says that, apart from God, every actuality is merely a 
"passing whiff of insignificance ". 
Perhaps Whitehead's notion of perishing is rather misleading in the 
sense that it carries with it such implications of "dead and gone" or becoming 
nothing. It may therefore help if we distinguish two senses of perishing- (i) 
perishing from the temporal world, and (ii) perishing from reality. Clearly 
Whitehead does not mean that (ii) occasions completely vanish from reality, 
if, in fact, they "live for evermore" as elements in God's nature. According 
to the 'Ontological Principle', everything must be somewhere in actuality, 
and Whitehead explicitly says here that the principle is maintained by the 
absorption of finite actualities into the divine nature.45 On the other hand, 
Whitehead does mean that, (i) an occasion perishes from the temporal flux in 
order to make room for the new. 
What I take to be the Whiteheadian modification of the theory 
of determinationism is that occasions cannot be eternally "subjectively 
immediate" because this stage of becoming is indeterminate, in the making,- 
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and so forth. There cannot be events there in the past world still feeling 
that particular portion of reality because none of them would be determinate 
entities. They would all be eternally "frustrated" in the stage of becoming. 
Thus, it is only as completed entities that something is available for the 
prehensions of the future occasions; and for God, where adequate intensity is 
finally obtained. 
One negative consequence of this position is that, one way or another, 
it seems that subjective immediacy is lost. Here I suppose Whitehead would 
have to accept that the truth of each occasion as it was when subjectively 
immediate is preserved as objectified by God, but only as the determinate 
choices it made in forming a satisfaction. God knows, in objectifying them, 
what they were as subjectively immediate by the very character of the final 
entity which was prehended as a whole. 
So, we see that past events must be somewhere in reality for there 
to be any truth about them. But what about future events? We have not yet 
addressed the issue of the equal determination of the past and future. For, 
as Santayana argued, if we accept the determinateness of the past, it is 
relatively easy to see how the equal determinateness of the future logically 
follows. If one side is fixed, so is the other. But, on the other hand, if 
Creativity is the ultimate metaphysical principle, as Whitehead and Hartshorne 
argue, no actual occasion, not even God, has yet reached the future and 
created anything beyond the immediate past. Hence there is nothing that would 
make a judgment about a future event true because there is literally nothing 
there. The point which Whitehead makes in this connection is that: "The 
proposition 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' could not be felt by Hannibal in 
any occasion of his existence on earth ".46 No actual occasion can feel a 
proposition, if its actual world does not include the logical subjects of 
that proposition.47 
As we recall, the essential point of the argument for equal 
determination was that there is no real difference between past and future 
(aside from the present "now" which establishes point of view) because all 
events are "intrinsically present ". But here the determinateness of 
the present is the crucial issue at stake in order to show the equal 
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determinateness of events on either side, first, from present to past, and 
then from present and past to future. This is precisely what is rejected by 
Whitehead. 
From the process point of view "intrinsically present" essentially means 
a stage of indeterminateness. Within the duration (or specious present) which 
constitutes the "subjective immediacy" of an occasion, there is something 
determinate, but this is only what is felt as already settled by the actual 
world of the immediate past. The present itself is essentially a transition 
where the potential objects supplied by this actual world are in the process 
of actualization, and this is what provides us with a sense of genuine choice 
regarding our present actions. The present is always a transition of 
becoming determinate. And indeed this being the case, it follows that the 
future must be open. 
Of course this very rich and complex activity of the immediate 
present and the whole notion of 'stages' of the concrescence is not likely 
by determination theorists. Sprigge, for example, denies 
that there is this much going on in any occasion of human experience.48 
But, if I understand correctly, the theory of determinationism holds that all 
genuine possibilities could be exhaustively actualized. (Here I say 'could 
be' because it is not metaphysically necessary, but it seems more than 
likely.) And if this is so, it looks as if actual occasions would be 
valueless since all of the possiblities must be already fixed in the actual. 
But doesn't our experience seem to suggest otherwise? Beauty and value seem 
to be the unconscious aim of each moment of existence. 
I think there is a slgight of hand in Santayana's argument in that he 
moves from the truth of the past to the truth of the future, but always in 
retrospect. The future of the Ides of March is determinate only for those 
who now have that future in their past. This is a rather obvious point, but 
Santayana seems to treat all events, past, present and future as if they were 
all past. Perhaps it is no accident that the examples of determinationism 
work from the present backwards. 
Also, what I find rather odd about Santayana's theory of time is this 
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combination of equal determinateness of all events and the genuine asymmetry 
of the flux in which predecessors lapse into successors, i.e., the one -way 
influence. But are these two notions satisfactorily combined in his theory? 
If an event is forever present in its own place in the flux, isn't this to 
deprive it of its very eventfulness in affecting the course of events beyond 
its present position? In other words, how can an event truly influence any 
other event if both predecessors and successors are equally determinate? 
Another question which naturally arises in this context is, why do not future 
events equally influence past ones if the limits are absolutely fixed in 
both directions? It seems that Santayana is saying that all events are 
interdependent and that dependence works only one -way. 
What is usually meant when philosophers have claimed that 'time is 
unreal' is that the intuitive grasp of it as the becoming and perishing of 
experience is largely illusory. This is, I suggest, because time is 
interpreted not just as it is experienced, but usually through some sort of 
transcendental and essentially static realm of being or Absolute. But if all 
of time is eternally present (as opposed to the eternal presence of the past), 
this sense of the importance of the present moment, becoming afresh in the 
flux of experience, seems to lose its special meaning. 
According to the process view, the asymmetry from past to present is 
unique in the sense that it is cumulative. Our present memory- experience of 
the past provides a good indication of definite traces of it. But what is 
there in the present which provides any traces of the future ?49 Expectation 
is a poor example of a future analogue of memory. At most it provides us with 
probability. For Whitehead the truth is always unfolding. The truth about 
the past is retrospective while the truth about the future is simply a matter 
of possibility. Santayana is right to claim that truth does not change. But 
it is a paradox that there is an unchanging truth about an event which has not 
yet become. 
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CHAPTER VII 
God and the Absolute 
1. Universal Absorption 
Throughout the course of this thesis we have seen considerable 
resistance on the part of Whitehead to a supra -relational Absolute reality as 
espoused by Bradley. In the early chapters, I attempted to elucidate definite 
points of affinity regarding the doctrine of experience, but in the later 
chapters the interpretation of feeling in terms of a distinctive pluralistic 
ontology led to definite points of conflict under three major topics of 
investigation: (i) relations, (ii) extension, and (iii) time. However, as 
I indicated in the last section of our preceding chapter, there is one 
attribute of Bradley's Absolute which Whitehead wholeheartedly accepts as 
essential to complete his system of reality. 
As we recall, in the preface to Process and Reality, Whitehead wrote: 
"...though throughout the main body of the work I am in sharp disagreement 
with Bradley, the final outcome is after all not so greatly different ".1 And 
in a later essay entitled "Process and Reality ", Whitehead articulates what he 
means by the 'final outcome': 
If you get a general notion of what is meant 
by perishing, you will have accomplished an 
apprehension of what you mean by memory and 
causality, what you mean when you feel that 
what we are is of infinite importance, because 
as we perish we are immortal. That is the one 
key thought around which the whole development 
of Process and Reality is woven, and in many 
ways I find that I am in complete agreement 
with Bradley.2 
Indeed, it is the concept of 'universal absorption' of all finite actualities 
in one eternal actual entity which will occupy our attention in this final 
chapter of our comparative analysis of Whitehead and Bradley. Let us then 
first look to Bradley for the source of this idea with which Whitehead finds 
himself in 'complete agreement'. 
One of Bradley's central arguments for the Absolute focuses on the mere 
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fragmentariness of feeling and our sense of incompleteness and imperfection 
in the passing of each moment. In Appearance and Reality, he says that the 
universe, in its diversity, has always shown itself to be inexplicable.3 But 
in feeling, he also says, we are supplied with a clue as to how the universe 
finally comes together in absolute perfection. Bradley emphasizes time and 
time again that such perfection is never comprehended by man in any detail, 
but to grasp something of its nature in broad outline is sufficient for our 
purpose in knowing ultimate Reality. 
In feeling, Bradley argues, we have an immediate experience of a non - 
relational many- into -one which, if developed to a final completion, provides 
us with our basis for belief in a Whole qualified non -relationally by every 
fragment of experience.4 In other words, since feeling supplies us with only 
a "low and imperfect example of an immediate whole ", we are compelled to 
further the many- into -one principle to the idea of a perfect Experience which 
embraces all finite appearances in absolute harmony.5 This is, in fact, what 
constitutes a satisfaction of the intellect for Bradley. Reality as Absolute 
is the crowning conception attained by the intellect in its struggle to 
comprehend the less intelligible forms of appearance and imperfection. Thus 
he writes: 
The universe as a whole may be called intelligible. 
It may be known to come together in such a way as 
to realize, throughout and thoroughly, the complete 
demands of perfect intellect. And every single 
element, again, in the world is intelligible because 
it is taken up into and absorbed in a whole of this 
character.6 
So we see that finitude, diversity and appearance can only become intelligible 
by our realization of how things come together in one final Experience, which, 
for Bradley, is achieved by nothing short of the Absolute. Everything begins 
and ends in feeling. The many become one. 
Not only does the Absolute absorb every detail of finite appearance 
into a final unity; perfection requires that it transform all diversity 
and conflict into cosmic harmony. This is an essential principle of monism. 
All discord, strife and opposition must come to rest in one final unity. 
Goodness, evil, beauty, ugliness, pleasure, suffering and error all come 
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together in a unity which includes all, yet cannot be identified with any 
one per se. 
What we find operating here is an implicit acknowledgement by Bradley 
of something.like Whitehead's doctrine or category of 'transmutation'. 
Whenever diversity and conflict are felt as an harmonious unity, there must be 
a transmutation of the many once absorbed into the final feeling. As Bradley 
says: "We have a rearrangement not merely of things but of their internal 
elements. We have an all- pervasive transfusion with a re- blending of all 
material. "7 This is quite essential when we consider how it is possible 
that opposition and discord finally achieve a harmonious unity. In fact, 
the doctrine of transmutation is exactly what is needed in Bradley's 
philosophy in order that the Absolute override the relational form of ordinary 
thought. There must be a process of filtering in the higher order such that 
diversity is blended and transmuted into a richer and more concrete form of 
Reality. 
But here a problem seems to arise. Bradley, in several places 
is quite insistent on the point that, in the process of absorption by which 
transmutation takes effect, the individual natures are lost.8 And this 
applies whether we are concerned with selves, finite centres or mere 
properties of individual facts. Yet, in other places he is equally, if not 
more strongly, insistent that nothing is lost, and that it is only by 
realizing how things come together in a larger Whole that we understand how 
every single appearance survives in the result. He says: "We can find no 
province of the world so low but the Absolute inhabits it. Nowhere is there 
even a single fact so fragmentary and so poor that to the universe it does 
not matter. "9 
So, on the one hand, transmutation and perfection in the final unity 
seem to demand that the constituent individual natures and appearances 
surrender their unique characters to the Whole, yet on the other hand, the 
only sense in which all things finite reach their ultimate immortality in the 
universe is by consumption in this higher Feeling which at once both retains 
and transmutes them. This Ì shall call the 'problem of transmutation' which 
(we shall see) applies to both Bradley and Whitehead, and serves as a final 
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point of affinity in our comparative analysis. 
Now, Bradley is well aware of such an objection to his Absolute. 
If in the process of absorption all individual detail and variety is 
completely lost, the end result would be indeed really poorer. The 
Absolute in its absolute harmony and perfection would be simply a "flat 
monotony of emptiness" standing outside of all life as a bare Thing -in- 
itself.10 But Bradley says this would be a serious misunderstanding of 
the final solution. Because we cannot tell how inconsistencies are united 
or how the final unity harmonizes all detail, this does not imply that all 
detail is abolished. He says that: "We do not know how all these partial 
unities come together in the Absolute, but we may be sure that the content 
of not one is obliterated. "11 And elsewhere he offers the solution to this 
problem as such: even though the private characters remain, they must be 
"neutralized by complement and addition ".12 There must be an attenuated 
importance of the individual nature in the Whole such that the balance can be 
achieved, but quite clearly it does not vanish. In fact, Bradley says that 
the Absolute is there to see that nothing is in the end lost.13 But the 
Whole will always be an infinitely richer Individual than the mere sum of 
its parts. 
What I think we must keep in mind when reading those passages 
where Bradley is concerned with loss of individual natures is that he means 
the sense of absolute independence must be lost once we accept the idea that 
inconsistency and imperfection can only be resolved by a more complete and 
comprehensive form of Reality. Individuals and private characters do exist 
though none exist in and by themselves. In fact, for Bradley, it is only by 
absorption in the higher Reality that the individual has gained its survival 
beyond its merely finite and transitory character. As he sums up his 
position with a mastery of eloquence, he writes: 
'For love and beauty and delight', it is no 
matter where they have shown themselves, 'there 
is no death nor change'; and this conclusion is 
true. These things do not die, since the Paradise 
in which they bloom is immortal. That Paradise is 
no special region nor any given particular spot in 
time and space. It is here, it is everywhere where 
any finite being is lifted into that higher life 
which alone is waking reality.14 
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There is, however, one qualification which remains in the end. 
Even though the Absolute becomes richer through absorbing every detail of 
individual appearance, it is quite clear that some appearances are more real 
than others. So, for example, since Bradley thinks that beauty and goodness 
contain more reality than ugliness and evil, the end result must be understood 
as balanced only in the sense in which the appearances find their proper place 
in the eternal harmony. 
2. The Consequent Nature of God 
When Whitehead claims that he is in complete agreement with Bradley, 
or that the final outcome of his cosmology is not so greatly different, it 
is quite clear that he has in mind the ultimate immortality of the temporal 
world as it passes into God's nature. In fact, for Whitehead, the concept 
of universal absorption of the finite into one eternal harmony supplied 
the key to the problem as to how the two cravings of the world could be 
jointly satisfied- that permanence and transience could be combined in such a 
way that novelty does not mean loss. But on the other hand, there is reason 
to believe that Whitehead, in his acknowledgement to Bradley, has once again 
slightly overstated the extent to which his doctrine actually agrees. 
Nonetheless, given that our discussion above has grasped Bradley's essential 
position, we shall find that Whitehead's conception of the consequent nature 
of God does have strong points of contact with the Bradleian Absolute, even 
though, in the end, Whitehead's God must be conceived as an 'Absolute open at 
one end'. Also in what follows, we shall find that there are problems which 
Whitehead seems not to have realized in his description of God as one actual 
entity. But before we become engaged in these purely Whiteheadian concerns, 
let us first concentrate on the points of affinity with Bradley. 
Running throughout Whitehead's philosophy is a principle of harmony 
of opposites. In his view, the universe has a side which is mental and 
permanent, and a side which is physical and transient. He says: "The key 
to metaphysics is this doctrine of mutual immanence, each side lending to 
the other a factor necessary for its reality. "15 Much of this comes clearly 
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into focus in his speculations on natural theology, where God is understood to 
embody this harmony of opposites in Himself. He is the reason for order and 
provides the transition from the eternal to the actual, and the actual to the 
eternal. Like the Bradleian Absolute, He is the beginning and the end of 
feeling, the alpha and omega of existence. 
Whitehead says that God is not to be thought of as an exception to the 
metaphysical principles, but as their chief exemplification.16 Like every 
actual occasion, God has a twofold nature: one side which is conceptual and 
atemporal, and another side which is physical and temporal. But God, as one 
final actual entity, differs from ordinary actual occasions of the temporal 
world in several important ways. 
According to Whitehead, God has a side which is primordial and a 
side which is consequent. As primordial, He is the aboriginal instance of 
creativity and the keeper of the wealth of atemporal potentials. He is the 
primordial conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects, 
and, in this respect, He is the beginning of feeling in the world by providing 
the lure for their realization. The point Whitehead here wishes to stress 
is that God is immanent in each occasion by supplying it with its initial 
subjective aim; instilling in it the desire for perfection as is possible 
in its immediate situation. On the other hand, as consequent, God is the 
conscious and unbiased reception of the physical world as it passes into 
the immediacy of His feeling. Regardless of the outcome in the temporal 
world (however much each occasion approximated its ideal for perfection), 
it is taken into a harmonious unity which preserves every detail of finite 
achievement. As Whitehead here says: 
.there is the phase of perfected actuality, in 
which the many are one everlastingly, without 
qualification of any loss either of individual 
identity or of completeness of unity. In ever- 
lastingness, immediacy is reconciled with objective 
immortality.17 
As consequent, God is therefore the end of feeling in the sense that every 
occasion of the physical world finds its ultimate completion in a unity which 
contains it with a fadeless preservation. 
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So, in summary, the mental permanent side of the universe passes 
into the physical transient side by the primordial nature of God, which is 
primarily His drive for realization. The one becomes many by the unity 
of His vision passing into the physical world. And the transient physical 
side of the universe passes into the mental permanent side by the consequent 
nature of God, which is His coordination of achievement. The many become 
one by reaching a final completion and harmonization in God's eternal being. 
Now as we recall from our preceeding chapter, it is this latter 
conception, God as consequent, which finds a definite parallel with the 
Bradleian Absolute. Compare, for example, the manner in which Bradley 
expresses his view that: 
the Absolute is there to see that nothing in 
the world is lost. That effort which for our 
vision is wasted, passes over beyond our vision 
into reality and is crowned with success.18 
with Whitehead's conception that: 
He (God) saves the world as it passes into the 
immediacy of his own life. It is the judgment 
of a tenderness which loses nothing that can be 
saved. It is also the judgment of a wisdom which 
uses what in the temporal world is mere wreckage.19 
On this point, both Bradley and Whitehead agree on the final result- our 
actions "perish yet live for evermore" as they are perfected by the reality 
of divine wisdom. 
As I said in section 1 of this chapter, the essential concept which 
brings Bradley and Whitehead together on the notion of universal absorption 
is to be found in the doctrine of transmutation.20 In the end, the final 
unity must be achieved by one transmuted feeling where the many become one 
everlastingly. But here it is obvious that Whitehead runs into the same 
difficulty as Bradley, i.e., the problem of transmutation. 
In accordance with Bradley, Whitehead holds that all opposition and 
discord come together in God's nature such that the immediacies of sufferings, 
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sorrows, failures, triumphs and joys are "...woven by the rightness of 
feeling into the harmony of the universal feeling... "21 But how is it that 
an individual remains once it has been transmuted into the final unity? In 
Modes of Thought, Whitehead says: "...the summation of the many into the 
one, and the derivation of importance from the one into the many, involves 
the notion of disorder, of conflict, of frustration. "22 In fact, the very 
nature of individuality in the physical world involves conflict of finite 
realizations. But again, how can nothing be lost from this world when 
everything must be transmuted into one final harmonious feeling? 
Although Whitehead makes no explicit reference to the difficulties which 
arise in connection with the doctrine of transmutation (as applied to God), 
it seems clear enough that his solution would run fairly close to Bradley's. 
Individual facts are not themselves altered once absorbed into the higher 
unity. (Obviously if they were there would be no determinate truth about 
them.) Like Bradley, Whitehead contends that there is no loss of individual 
identity. The private characters remain. But the synthesis which emerges 
from this final unification is more than the world as a mere collection of 
individual achievements. God's consequent nature, Whitehead says: ". 
originates with physical experience derived from the temporal world, and 
then acquires integration with the primordial side ".23 Or more eloquently 
put: "...the consequent nature is. the weaving of God's physical feelings 
upon his primordial concepts ".24 So even though every detail of finite fact 
remains once prehended by God's consequent nature, there is some sense 
of transformation as the many acquire integration with the all- embracing 
primordial nature. 
The exact meaning this transformation in God's primordial nature is, 
at best, unclear. Whitehead emphasizes that this integration 'of God's twofold 
nature results in a conscious, infinitely wide harmony of feeling which grows 
without any loss or fading of its members. Yet in some sense, God, like other 
actual occasions, necessarily involves a valuation and coordination of His 
prehensions. And this means that there must be a certain frustration of 
conflicting achievements in the final unity. 
Some hint of Whitehead's position, I think, can be found in his 
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conception of God as necessarily good. In one place he writes: 
The revolts of destructive evil, purely self - 
regarding, are dismissed into their triviality 
of mere individual facts; and yet the good they 
did achieve in individual joy, in individual 
sorrow, in the introduction of needed contrast, 
is yet saved by its relation to the completed 
whole.25 
Once the world is prehended by God's consequent nature, there is no 
obstruction. But in His integration with His primordial side, there must 
be an attenuated importance of the "revolts of destructive evil "; and here, 
parenthetically, we may find another note concordant with Bradley. God 
salvages from the wreckage. The truth of the individual facts remain, but 
the good achieved reaches a higher harmonization in God's nature. He is the 
fellow sufferer with the world; prehending every actuality just as it is. But 
He uses the goodness achieved for His own vision of what the world may become 
in some unrealized future. 
I do not wish to claim that Whitehead's position here is wholly 
compatible with Bradley. There are elements of the Galilean vision of God - 
-as -Love mixed into Whitehead's conception, and this would not be accepted 
by Bradley as an essential attribute of his Absolute. But in another 
respect, (at least as I see it) the notion that goodness and beauty reach 
a higher harmonization with God's wisdom does come fairly close to Bradley's 
notion that such appearances involve less transformation in the final unity, 
and therefore conduce to a higher Reality. This is not to say that, for 
Whitehead, goodness is more 'real'; but that it is valued more by God in His 
function as Prime Mover. Evil and ugliness are never eliminated from the 
world. They are, in fact, required for various forms of contrast, which save 
the world from bland monotony. God's vision, then, does include His desire 
for contrast, but the fact that each occasion only approximates the ideal set 
by God means that failures and various forms of destructive evil are 
inevitable. 
Obviously one crucial point of divergence in Whitehead's position 
concerns the openness of the future for God. Since, for Whitehead, both God 
and the World are both in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground of 
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process, neither reaches a final completion or perfection. In order to 
understand exactly where Whitehead parts company with Bradley here, let us 
return to the essential doctrine of mutual immanence or harmony of opposites. 
Although for Bradley all finite appearances belong together in one 
all- embracing Experience, it is just as true for him that the one Absolute 
is present in each of its many parts. So not only is it true for him that 
appearance is reality; it is equally true that reality is appearance. The 
many are one, and the one is many. 
It is indeed tempting to see this same dialectical relationship 
repeated in Whitehead's philosophy when, in his analysis of ideal opposites, 
he concludes that none of the concepts- 'God', 'permanence', 'eternity', 
'unity', or the One can be understood without reference to their opposites - 
'the World', 'flux', 'actuality', 'diversity', or 'the Many'.26 But a more 
careful study would reveal that, where for Bradley, these opposites are 
interpreted in terms of one final timeless order; for Whitehead, the universe 
continually weaves itself between the opposites such that new orders evolve 
with the creative advance into novelty. The key concept, for Whitehead, is 
that universal relativity (mutual immanence) does not stop with the consequent 
nature of God. If it did, his God would not be altogether different from 
Bradley's Absolute. But instead, his God is an Absolute open at one end. By 
this I mean that God is not the only real Individual, as is commonly held in 
monistic philosophies (e.g. Spinoza's God, Bradley's Absolute), but one divine 
and eternal actual entity which moves with the whole of creation. That is, He 
is only 'Absolute' as regards the absorption of the past. In the immediately 
present, however, there remains the multiplicity of contemporary actual 
occasions moving through their concrescence, and these many will only become 
one (with God) once they have reached their satisfaction. Whitehead's 
position, then, remains pluralistic. 
As we saw above, God embodies both permanence and flux in His twofold 
nature. But since He can only prehend what has already become determinate in 
the immediate past, the present and the future are genuinely open for Him as 
well. In fact, the whole concept of freedom requires that God should not have 
omnipotence over the world. God is therefore 'open' in the sense that He is 
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never complete. But whatever is decided by the temporal world, He is always 
there in a unison of immediacy to receive the outcome. 
This very concept constitutes Whitehead's most radical divergence from 
both Western philosophic thought and 'orthodox' theology: God too is in 
process. In his criticism of previous systems Whitehead writes: "The vicious 
separation of the flux from the permanent leads to the concept of an entirely 
static God, with eminent reality, in relation to an entirely fluent world, 
with deficient reality ".27 But if the flux essentially qualifies God, He 
too acquires a new life and refreshment with each successive stage of the 
universe, and in turn, He provides the ideal for the novel order in the 
present. "What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, 
and the reality in heaven passes back into the world. "28 
The idea that God is dynamic; creating and flowing with the world, 
yet saving it by absorbing every detail of finite achievement is an 
attractive alternative to the traditional Judeo- Christian conception. It 
has been the motivating force which has inspired a whole 'school' of process 
theology. But there are difficulties in Whitehead's conception of God as 
one actual entity, at least insofar as we take seriously his claim that He 
is the chief exemplification of the metaphysical principles. Indeed, in most 
cases, the problems which arise with Whitehead's God are a result of 
inconsistencies with the rest of the metaphysics. 
Despite the analogies with actual occasions, it is far from clear how 
this conception of God as chief exemplification can be maintained.29 Even 
though God, like ordinary actual occasions, is dipolar, essentially a mass of 
feeling, and a diversity in unity, He cannot accomplish what the occasions of 
the temporal world can- namely, satisfaction, or completion of the process of 
becoming. 
It seems clear enough that Whitehead thought of God as an exception 
here. After all, if God reached a final satisfaction, He would not be God. 
He must therefore be conceived of as a creative advance devoid of perishing. 
He is always becoming, even though as primordial keeper of the eternal 
objects, He must, in some sense, have being. God therefore differs from 
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ordinary actual occasions in the sense that He is an 'everlasting 
concrescence' which reaches satisfaction only in the sense that, at each 
moment, He "delights" and "suffers" with the world as it passes into His 
consequent nature. 
But the problem of not reaching satisfaction creates yet another 
difficulty. If God does not reach a completed stage of His concrescence 
(being), He cannot be objectified so as to provide initial aims for the 
occasions beginning the new concrescence. In other words, since God is 
always 'open', there is no determinate entity to function as 'object' for the 
actual occasions of the temporal world. This I shall call the 'problem of 
causal independence'. According to the metaphysical principles, two 
contemporary occasions of experience cannot prehend each other. But God as 
an everlasting concrescence is always subjectively immediate, and cannot, 
therefore, influence a present occasion in its novel becoming. 
Modification of some sort is certainly required here, and Whiteheadians 
have, for years, sought various alternatives to Whitehead's view.30 As I see 
it, the main problem confronting Whitehead is how God is to be conceived as a 
temporal entity. This is indeed a very difficult problem. 
One way out of the difficulty is to conceive of God's experience as 
happening in one grand epochal moment or specious present. Proceeding along 
these lines we would be approaching Bradley's or Royce's conception of the 
Absolute as that Individual whose time span overlaps all others; whose 
temporal epoch is such that within which all other temporal epochs are 
encompassed. This would solve the problem of casual independence because all 
the actual occasions; past, present, and future, would be subjectively 
immediate in God's experience, and there would be no need of initial aims. In 
effect, the order in the world would be aboriginal, rather than continually 
evolving, and God's physical experience of the world would be analogous to His 
conceptual experience of the realm of eternal objects. But quite clearly, 
this would be to abandon the whole notion of God's creative advance with the 
world because God would be bound on both ends of time, and all would be 
determinate within. We would be left with one final order- permanent and 
static. Hartshorne, criticizing this view, remarks: "A God who eternally 
knew all that the fulfillment of his purpose would bring could have no need of 
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that fulfillment or of purpose. "31 
But how else are we to conceive of God's experience as temporal? 
Hartshorne has attempted to solve the problem of causal independence by 
conceiving of God as a personally ordered society of divine occasions.32 
On this modification of Whitehead's doctrine, God is a 'stream of experience' 
analogous to that of human consciousness, and, at first sight, this idea does 
seem promising. Instead of being purely subjectively immediate, God's 
experience is subjective- becoming -objective, (i.e., predecessors objectified 
in successors). And, if this idea is adopted, God's antecedent states (as 
objectified) are capable of interaction with the world. However, aside from 
the obvious anthropomorphism, this modification generates new problems which 
do not necessarily apply to Whitehead. In particular, this view of God runs 
into the difficulty of reconciling a general 'creative advance' with the 
denial by relativity physics of a cosmic simultaneity. Since God's experience 
happens as a succession of occasions, His prehension of the world would 
require a cosmic "now ". Each divine occasion would have to be almost 
instantaneous, yet fill all of space.33 Moreover, on this view, Hartshorne 
seems to approach the idea of God's experience of the world as contained in 
a cosmic memory since His antecedent states accumulate in the present 
occasion. But here, as Sprigge points out, we would have to distinguish 
between the real event as it was in the temporal world and the memory of it 
in God's mind.34 
Perhaps Whitehead recognized some of the difficulties in this conception 
when he chose to view God as one actual entity (as opposed to an 'actual 
occasion'). He wished to emphasize the permanent, eternal character of God, 
who absorbs every detail of the world in everlasting harmony; while at the 
same time, he wished to emphasize the idea that God sets the ideal for what 
the world can achieve. On the former, his affinity to Bradley is quite 
clear. Whitehead saw in Bradley's Absolute a model for the one which 
preserves the many without loss or fading. But on the latter, Whitehead's 
qualification that this one continually evolves with the world and 
therefore never reaches a static completion results in his inability to 
account for God's initial action on the world. This is important because 
without God's ideal there could be no order. 
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Much of this, I think, depends upon how we interpret God's 
incompleteness. As we have seen, the essential problem is that if God is 
genuinely open and never reaches satisfaction, then there cannot be an 
'object' to act on the present. But at one point, Whitehead does mention the 
'superjective' nature of God as the "...pragmatic value of his specific 
satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal 
instances ".35 And this idea appears again when he discusses the four phases 
in which the universe accomplishes its actuality.36 Here he seems to imply 
that the movement of the universe from many to one, and one to many does 
provide an internal satisfaction or objectification in God's experience. 
What I think Whitehead means when he says that God does not reach a 
static completion is that there is always room for novelty. There is always 
room for some unrealized achievement to become part of His nature. But as each 
moment completes itself and passes into His consequent nature, there is an 
internal or momentary satisfaction in God. As one divine entity, God 
continually recycles the data of the temporal world to formulate His own ideal 
vision, which in turn, acts back into the world. 
But how does this solve the problem of causal independence? On this 
view we have a process within a process: the latter is God as an everlasting 
concrescence, never complete and always moving with the world; while the 
former is the process of internal satisfaction- God as 'enriched' by the 
world as each occasion passes into His aesthetic harmony. Even though the 
many continually add to the one (i.e., the weaving of the physical onto the 
conceptual), the one is always there for each new occasion to receive its 
ideal. For each occasion, God is complete at the instant of its becoming. 
There is, at that time, the vision that God has for the world. But for God, 
the world is incomplete since the occasions recur and recur. 
Whitehead's admirable precision and accuracy of detail seem to fail him 
when he attempts to reconcile his conception of God with the mechanics of his 
cosmology. It is as if his romantic mode of expression and his classic, 
rational mode of expression clash once he attempts to integrate the two in his 
natural theology.37 But if the details of Whitehead's description of God are 
- 181 - 
here lacking, is this altogether different from Bradley's repeated claim that 
the details of the Absolute completely escape finite judgment? With both 
philosophers we seem to be left with a broad outline. But in the end, 
whether we side with Bradley, that all moments are just eternally there in 
the Absolute experience, or with Whitehead, that all moments become elements 
in God's consequent nature, the result is indeed "not so greatly different ". 
As we speculate on the endless succession of drops, we are inspired with a 
sense of the importance of our actions as we realize how each forms part of 
an eternity beyond. 
3. Concluding Remarks 
Our examination of the affinities and contrasts in the philosophies of 
Whitehead and Bradley has now come to a close. In the above chapters I 
attempted to bring to light points of contact between Whitehead and Bradley, 
and to show how the central doctrine of feeling provides a common bond uniting 
their respective philosophies. It was here that we found how a metaphysics of 
sentient experience far surpasses the materialist or physicalist conception 
of the universe and man's place in the scheme of things. But I have also 
attempted to expose the differences between Whitehead and Bradley regarding 
the problem of relations. In this respect, I have argued Whitehead's position 
over Bradley's in an attempt to defend: 
(i) the more pluralistic interpretation of the world in which science and 
metaphysics can be seen as developing concurrently as opposed to the radically 
monistic interpretation in which science and metaphysics are to be seen as 
different points of view, 
(ii) the general notion of creative advance and evolving order in 
opposition to the idea of a final and perfect order, 
(iii) the reality of process and time as opposed to the relative 
unreality of time, and 
(iv) the idea of a genuine freedom of choice and the openness of the 
future as opposed to the idea that the whole of time is determinately fixed 
within the experience of the Absolute. 
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But even though Whitehead's views on these points have been seen to 
be more satisfactory than Bradley's, I am nonetheless aware of certain 
difficulties in the process view which do not arise in a more eternalistic 
view of the universe. Some of this came to surface in our final chapter 
where inconsistencies were discovered in Whitehead's conception of God. But 
whether or not the explanations offered above proved satisfactory, these 
problems do not seem to be insurmountable. Even though Bradley's system, in 
the end, might be seen as more internally consistent, the idea that the whole 
of history; past, present, and future is eternally there in the Absolute 
seems just as perplexing as Whitehead's idea that the history of the universe 
accumulates in God's consequent nature. 
To admit a certain ambivalence here is not to overthrow the conclusions 
of this thesis; for this is just one of the enduring questions which forms the 
crux of speculative philosophy, and stimulates the mind to the sense of 
mystery and enchantment in the universe. 
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